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AMERICAN-STYLE JUSTICE IN
NO MAN'S LAND
PeterNicolas*
I. INTRODUCTION
For much ofthe nineteenth century, the geographic region known

today as the Oklahoma Panhandle and bounded on the east by the
hundredth meridian of longitude, on the south by Texas, on the west
by New Mexico, and on the north by Colorado and Kansas, was
commonly referred to as the Public Land Strip, the Neutral Strip,
or more ominously, "No Man's Land."1 The region was so-named
* Assistant Professor, University of Washington School of Law. The author would like
to thank Wendy Condiotty, Magdalena Cuprys, Ann Hemmens, Paul Holcomb, Nancy
McMurrer, Cheryl Nyberg, Barbara Swatt, Lisa Wagenheim and the editors of the Georgia
Law Review for their valuable research, feedback and assistance.
1 See Act of May 2, 1890, ch. 182, § 1, 26 Stat. 81, 81-82 (describing territory "commonly
called No Man's Land"); Cook v. United States, 138 U.S. 157, 165 (1891) ("ITIhe Public Land
Strip, ... commonly called No Man's Land .... is 167 miles in length, 34% miles in width, lies
between the 100th meridian oflongitude and the Territory of New Mexico, and is bounded on
the south by that part of Texas known as the Panhandle, and by Kansas and Colorado on the
north."); JEFFREY BURTON, INDIAN TERRITORY AND THEUNITED STATES, 1866-1906: COURTS,
GOVERNMENT, AND THE MOVEMENT FOR OKLAHOMA STATEHOOD 4 (1995) CWest of the

hundredth meridian is a neck of land containing 5,672 square miles now known as the

895

896

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:895

because, for much of the nineteenth century, it fell outside of the
jurisdiction of any state or territorial, and, seemingly, any federal
court.2 This unusual circumstance was the result of a geographic
gap created by the federal statutes defining the boundaries of Texas,
Colorado; New Mexico, Kansas, and Indian Territory.
Given the evident lack of any court with jurisdiction over No
Man's Land, it was perhaps inevitable4 that the region became the
setting for a notorious murder, known as the Massacre of Wild
Horse Lake.' On July 25, 1888, a group of Kansans associated with
one faction of local Kansas politics, led by one Cyrus E. Cook,
ambushed and murdered four other Kansans associated with a rival
political faction inside the boundaries of No Man's Land.6 After the

Oklahoma Panhandle and formerly called the Public Land Strip, Neutral Land Strip, or No
Man's Land.").
2 See BURTON, supra note 1, at 4 (It was not part of Indian Territory and was not
attached to any State or Territory until it was included in Oklahoma Territory under the
provisions of the Organic act of May 2, 1890."); THE FEDERAL COURTS OFTHE TENTH CIRCUIT:

AHISTORY 180 (James K. Logan, ed., 1992) ("The Oklahoma panhandle, Indian country west
ofthe 100th meridian, remained beyond any federal or state jurisdiction, literally a No Man's
Land, until 1889.") [hereinafter FEDERAL COURTS OF THE TENTH CIRCUIT].

See generally

BURTON, supra note 1, at 160-61.
3 See Act of Jan. 6, 1883, ch. 13, § 2, 22 Stat. 400, 400 (providing "all that part of the
Indian Territory lying north of the Canadian river and east of Texas and the one hundredth
meridian not set apart and occupied by the Cherokee, Creek, and Seminole... shall... be
annexed to and constitute a part of the United States judicial district of Kansas."); Act of Feb.
28, 1861, ch. 59, § 1, 12 Stat. 172, 172 (defining boundaries of Colorado territory); Act ofMay
30, 1854, ch. 59, § 19, 10 Stat. 277, 283 (defining southern boundary of Kansas); Act of Sept.
9, 1850, ch. 49, § 1, 9 Stat. 446, 446 (defining boundaries for State of Texas); id. § 2, 9 Stat.
446, 447 (defining eastern boundary of New Mexico territory as running from intersection of
"the thirty-second degree of north latitude ... with the one hundred and third degree of
longitude west of Greenwich; thence north with said degree of longitude to the parallel of
thirty-eighth degree of north latitude .... "); Cook v. United States, 138 U.S. 157, 166 (1891)
("[A]t the date of the alleged homicide the Public Land Strip was not within the jurisdiction
of any particular state or federal district, .... ").
" The inevitability was not necessarily due to the inherent lawlessness of the people
actually resident in No Man's Land, as most of the violent episodes resulted from the actions
of outsiders. See Elmer E. Brown, No Man's Land-Note on Early Settlement, in 4
CHRONICLES OF OKLAHOMA, No. 2, 89, 98 (1926) ('In the years without legal restraint only

three or four homicides occurred which were the result of differences between residents. The
outstanding cases of homicide were due to differences between residents of the states
temporarily in No-Man's-Land."); BURTON, supranote 1,at 160 ("But even this period, before
No-Man's-Land was brought by statute into the Paris division of the Eastern District of
Texas, knew only a few isolated cases of murder among those actually living in the Neutral
Strip.").
5 FEDERAL COURTS OF THE TENTH CIRCUIT, supranote 2, at 181.
6 Id.; BURTON, supra note 1, at 160; GEORGE RAINEY, No MAN'S LAND: THE HISTORIC
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incident occurred, the perpetrators made no secret of their act and
indeed boasted of it, believing themselves to be immune from
prosecution since the killing occurred in No Man's Land.7 The
incident thus raised an interesting jurisdictional question: Can you
literally get away with murder if you kill someone in No Man's
Land?
Throughout this country's history, as American trade and
expansionism have taken Americans westward and around the
globe, Congress has used its authority to create and define the
jurisdiction of the federal courts to fill jurisdictional gaps in
geographic enclaves where the alternative is no forum at all. In
some instances, Congress has simply extended the territorial reach
of an existing Article III federal district court. In the case of No
Man's Land, for example, shortly after the Massacre of Wild Horse
Lake, Congress vested the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Texas with judicial jurisdiction over the region,8 even
though it fell outside the boundaries of the State of Texas.9 In other
instances, Congress has created new, specialized federal courts
having jurisdiction over disputes arising within a particular
geographic region, as it has done for most of the U.S. territories."
In addition to using the federal courts to serve this geographic
gap-filling function, Congress has also used its authority over the
courts to provide a federal forum where the existing fora, while
theoretically available, were perceived by Congress as inadequate
to protect the rights of particular parties either due to parochial bias
or other actual or perceived deficiencies. In some such instances,
Congress has vested existing Article III federal courts with jurisdiction over disputes involving particular parties, as in the case of

STORY OFALANDED ORPHAN 198-204 (Enid, Oklahoma, privately published 1937).
7 RAINEY, supra note 6, at 204.
a Act of Mar. 1,1889, ch. 333, § 17,25 Stat. 783,786. The following year, Congress made
No Man's Land a part of the newly created Oklahoma Territory, thus placing it under the
jurisdiction of the Oklahoma territorial courts. Act of May 2, 1890, ch. 182, § 1, 26 Stat. 81,
81-82.
9 See Act of Mar. 1, 1889, ch. 333, § 1, 25 Stat. 783, 783 (defining Indian Territory
boundaries, thus describing it as including region known as No Man's Land).
10 See, e.g., 48 U.S.C. § 1821(a) (1994) CThere is established for and within the Northern
Mariana Islands a court of record to be known as the District Court for the Northern Mariana

Islands.").
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diversity and alienage jurisdiction, where the risk of state court
bias" prompted Congress to provide for federal court jurisdiction
over most disputes between citizens of different states 12 and
between a citizen of a state and a citizen of a foreign state." In
other instances, Congress has created new, specialized federal
courts to adjudicate disputes arising in foreign countries involving
American citizens, such as the United States Court for China,' 4
which was established to protect U.S. nationals from what was
perceived to be "barbarous and cruel punishments inflicted" by the
courts of non-Christian countries. 5
" See THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 495 (Alexander Hamilton) (Henry Cabot Lodge ed.,
1888) C'[The peace of the WHOLE ought not to be left at the disposal of a PART."); id. at 497.
[I]n order to the inviolable maintenance of that equality of privileges and
immunities to which the citizens of the Union will be entitled, the national
judiciary ought to preside in all cases in which one State or its citizens are
opposed to another State or its citizens. To secure the full effect of so
fundamental a provision against all evasion and subterfuge, it is
necessary that its construction should be committed to that tribunal
which, having no local attachments, will be likely to be impartial between
the different States and their citizens....
Id.; see also Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 87 (1809)
However true the fact may be, that the tribunals of the states will
administer justice as impartially as those of the nation, to parties of every
description, it is not less true that the constitution itself either entertains
apprehensions on this subject, or views with such indulgence the possible
fears and apprehensions of suitors, that it has established national
tribunals for the decision of controversies between aliens and a citizen, or
between citizens of different states.
Id.
12 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
13 Id. § 1332(a)(2)-(3).
"4See Act of June 30, 1906, ch. 3934, § 1, 34 Stat. 814, 814 (establishing United States
Court for China and providing for its "exclusive jurisdiction in all cases and judicial
proceedings whereof jurisdiction may now be exercised by United States consuls and
ministers by law and by virtue of treaties between the United States and China .....
'5 In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 463 (1891).
The intense hostility of the people of Moslem faith to all other sects, and
particularly Christians, affected all their intercourse, and all proceedings
had in their tribunals ....For this cause, and by reason of the barbarous
and cruel punishments inflicted in those countries, and the frequent use
of torture to enforce confession from parties accused, it was a matter of
deep interest to Christian governments to withdraw the trial of their
subjects, when charged with the commission of a public offense, from the
arbitrary and despotic action of the local officials.
Id.; CHARLES SUMNER LOBINGIER, AMERICAN COURTS IN CHINA 2 (1919) (stating treaty of
Wang-Hiya provided for absolute exemption ofAmericans from Chinese jurisdiction and was
negotiated to prevent China, as non-Christian state, from exercising control over life and
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Despite these historical efforts by Congress, "no forum" and
"biased forum" problems continue to arise today in the United
States in civil disputes arising in Indian Country16 and in civil
disputes arising elsewhere to which Indian tribes, tribal members,
or tribal entities are party. People are typically drawn to the field
of Indian Law 7 because of their interest in and commitment to the
substantive rights of Native Americans with respect to land, water,
hunting and fishing, religious expression, and the like." However,
Supreme Court decisions in the field, especially recent ones, have
focused much attention on questions of adjudicative jurisdiction. 9
libertyofUnited States citizens); Gustavus Oblinger, Extra-TerritorialJurisdictionin China,
4 MICH. L. REV.339, 339-342 (1906).
1
Mhe term "Indian country".., means (a) all land within the limits of any
Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, including rightsof-way running through the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian
communities within the borders of the United States whether within the
original or subsequently acquired territory thereo and whether within
or without the limits of a state, and (c)all Indian allotments, the Indian
titles to which have not been extinguished, including rights-of-way
running through the same.
18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2000). Although this is the definition of Indian Country for purposes of
federal criminal statutes, it is also applicable for civil matters. See, e.g., Okla. Tax Comm'n
v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 453 & n.2 (1995) (regarding state taxation jurisdiction);
DeCoteau v. Dist. County Ct., 420 U.S. 425, 427 n.2 (1975) (regarding civil adjudicative
jurisdiction).
" The term "Indian Law" as used in this Article refers to the field of Federal Indian Law,
which involves the body of law governing the legal relationships between Indian tribes and
the United States, as contrasted with tribal law, which involves the internal laws governing
Indian Nations. DAVID H. GETCHES ET. AL., FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 1 (4th ed. 1998).
"' See Frank A. Demolli, A Pueblo's Response to Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 14 T.M.
COOLEYL REV. 541, 541-42 (1997) (statingpurpose of Indian law isto help "the native people
of the United States regain their freedom."); Robin West, The Word on Trial, 35 WM. &MARY
L. REV. 1101, 1102 (1994) (reviewing MILNER S. BALL, THE WORD AND THE LAW) (taking note
of Native American Rights activists committed to restoring Native Americans to their land).
" See, e.g., C &LEnters., Inc. v. Citizen BandPotawatomi Indian Tribe, 121 S. Ct. 1589,
1592 (2001) (tribal sovereign immunity); Nevada v. Hicks, 121S. Ct. 2304,2308 (2001) (tribal
court subject matter jurisdiction); El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, 526 U.S. 473, 476
(1999) (federal and tribal court subject matter jurisdiction); Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Techs., Inc.,
523 U.S. 751, 753 (1998) (tribal sovereign immunity); Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438,
442 (1997) (tribal court subject matter jurisdiction); Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band
Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505, 507 (1991) (tribal sovereign immunity); Duro v.
Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 679 (1990) (tribal court subject matter jurisdiction); Miss. Band of
Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 32, 54 (1989) (federal subject matter jurisdiction);
Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Graham, 489 U.S. 838, 839-40 (1989) (federal subject matter
jurisdiction); Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 11 (1987) (federal subject matter
jurisdiction and abstention); Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Eng'g, 476 U.S. 877, 893 (1986)
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And while courts, practitioners, scholars, and students have long
struggled with complicated questions of subject matter jurisdiction,
abstention, sovereign immunity, and the like,2" in no area of law are
these issues so complex 2 and unsettled, 2 the outcomes so harsh2"
and counterintuitive,2 4 as in civil actions arising in Indian Country
or those actions arising elsewhere involving Indian tribes, tribal
members, or tribal entities. Thejurisdictional inquiry necessitates

C'Wold Br') (state court subject matter jurisdiction); Nael Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow
Tribe, 471 U.S. 845, 857 (1985) (federal subject matter jurisdiction); Three Affiliated Tribes
v.Wold Eng'g, 467 U.S. 138, 140 (1984) CWold 1") (state court subject matter jurisdiction);
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 51, 58 (1978) (tribal sovereign immunity and
federal subject matter jurisdiction); Oliphantv. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 193-95
(1978) (tribal court subject matter jurisdiction); Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida,
414 U.S. 661, 682 (1974) (federal subject matter jurisdiction); Kennerly v. Dist. Ct., 400 U.S.
423, 425 (1971) (state court subject matter jurisdiction); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 218
(1959) (state court subject matter jurisdiction); Exparte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 557 (1883)
(territorial court subject matter jurisdiction); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1,
80 (1831) (federal subject matter jurisdiction). "Adjudicative jurisdiction" as used in this
Article refers to cases addressing subject matter jurisdiction, sovereign immunity, or
prudential abstention.
' See Amy B. Cohen, 'Arising Under"Jurisdictionand the CopyrightLaws, 44 HASTINGS
L.J. 337, 342 (1993) (noting federal courts' struggle "to define when an action arises under
federal law according to section 1331."); Samuel Hoar, Note, Unravellingthe "PendentParty"
Controversy: A Revisionist Approachto Pendentand Ancillary Jurisdiction,64 B.U. L. REV.
895, 895-97 (1985) (noting struggle of federal courts with defining Congressional limits on
their jurisdiction).
21 Frank Pommersheim, Coyote Paradox. Some IndianLaw Reflections from the Edge
of the Prairie,31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 439, 477 (1999); Dean B. Suagee, The CulturalHeritage of
American IndianTribesand the PreservationofBiologicalDiversity, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 483,491
(1999).
' Amanda K. Wilson, Hazardous & Solid Waste Dumping Grounds Under RCRA's
Indian Law Loophole, 30 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1043, 1047 (1990).

' See, e.g., Owens Valley Indian Hous. Auth. v. Turner, 185 F.3d 1029 (9th Cir. 1999)
(affirming dismissal of eviction action brought by Indian housing authority against tribal
member for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, even though state and tribal courts lacked
subject matter jurisdiction and thus there was no forum in which to prosecute action),
withdrawn and rehg granted, 192 F.3d 1330 (9th Cir. 1999), appeal dismissed, 201 F.3d 444
(9th Cir. 1999); Schantz v. White Lightning, 502 F.2d 67, 68-70 (8th Cir. 1974) (affirming
dismissal of tort action arising on Indian reservation brought by non-Indian plaintiffs against
Indian defendant for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, even though state and tribal courts
lacked subject matter jurisdiction and thus there was no forum in which to prosecute action).
2 CompareRichardson v. Malone, 762 F. Supp. 1463, 1466-67 (N.D. Okla. 1991) (finding
no federal diversity jurisdiction over dispute between non-Indian plaintifffrom Oklahoma and
defendants who are members of Osage Indian Tribe where latter's reservation is physically
located within geographic boundaries of Oklahoma), with Poitra v. Demarrias, 502 F.2d 23,
24, 29 (8th Cir. 1974) (holding diversity jurisdiction exists in dispute between two members
of Standing Rock Reservation where reservation crosses state boundaries and plaintiff lives
on North Dakota side while defendant lives on South Dakota side).
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an examination of the judicial power of three different sovereigns-the federal, state, and tribal governments 2 5-- against the
backdrop of a modern-day congressional policy that eschews state
and federal incursions into tribal sovereignty26 (yet leaves many
tribes without the resources and expertise necessary to create or
develop their own judicial systems),27 the federal judiciary's
historically narrow view of its statutory grants of diversity28 and
federal question jurisdiction,26 congressional inaction,30 and a
confusing and often contradictory body of federal Indian Law that
has developed in layer-cake fashion over two centuries."1
The explosive growth in tribal gaming over the past
decade 32-- attributable in large part to the Supreme Court's holding
Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 760 (1998) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
Sandra Day O'Connor, Lessons from the Third Sovereign: Indian Tribal Courts,33 TULSA
L.J. 1, 1 (1997).
25 See Act of Apr. 11, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 406, 82 Stat. 73, 80 (codified at 25 U.S.C.
§ 1326 (1994)) (conditioning state jurisdiction over Indian Country on tribal member consent);
Government-to-Government Relations With Native American Tribal Governments, 59 Fed.
Reg. 22,951, 22,951 (Apr. 29, 1994) (publishing memorandum issued by President Clinton to
heads of executive departments and agencies designed to "ensure that the Federal
Government operates within a government-to-government relationship with federally
recognized Native American tribes").
27 U.S. COMM'N ON CiVIL RIGHTS, THE INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 29-43, 72-74 (1991);
Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, Public Law 280 and the Problem of Lawlessness in California
IndianCountry, 44UCLAL.REV. 1405,1439 (1997); Laurie Reynolds, AdjudicationinIndian
Country: the Confusing Parametersof State, Federal,and Tribal Jurisdiction,38 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 539, 577 (1997).
' See, e.g., Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 704 (1992) (recognizing domestic
relations exception to statutory grant of diversity jurisdiction); Markham v. Allen, 326 U.S.
490, 494 (1946) (recognizing probate exception to statutory grant of diversity jurisdiction);
Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267-68 (1806) (reading "complete diversity"
requirement into statute granting federal courts diversity jurisdiction), overruled on other
grounds by Louisville, Cincinnati & Charleston R.R. Co. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497
(1844).
' See, e.g., Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 671 (1950) (limiting
jurisdiction over declaratory judgment actions to those suits that could have been filed in
federal court absent the existence of the Declaratory Judgment Act); Louisville & Nashville
R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908) (reading "well-pleaded complaint' rule into
statute granting federal courts federal question jurisdiction); Gold-Washing & Water Co. v.
Keyes, 96 U.S. 199, 201-02 (1877) (same).
' Pommersheim, supranote 21, at 440; Judith V. Royster, The Legacy ofAllotment, 27
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 75-76 (1995).
31 See generally Blake A. Watson, The Thrust and Parry of FederalIndianLaw, 23 U.
DAYTON L. REv. 437 (1998).
' Stephanie Dean, GettingaPiece of theAction: Should the FederalGovernment beAble
to Tax Native American GamblingRevenue?, 32 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 157, 158 (1999);
2
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in Californiav. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians3 that even tribes
subject to state criminal jurisdiction are exempt from state laws
regulating gaming activity 34-has increased the importance of civil
adjudicative jurisdiction over actions involving Indian tribes, tribal
entities, and tribal members. The primary effect of Indian gaming
has been a dramatic increase in the commercial interaction between
Indians and their non-Indian neighbors, 5 increasing the number of
legal disputes between them36 and raising issues of tribal sovereign

Michael Donovan Cox, Gaming Enforcement Under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act,
N97GENB ABA-LGLED D-1, D-1 (1997).
'3

480 U.S. 202 (1987).

"' Id. at 220-22. Subsequent to the Supreme Court's decision in Cabazon, Congress
enacted the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-21 (1994), which provides in
pertinent part that "Indian tribes have the exclusive right to regulate gaming activity on
Indian lands if the gaming activity is not specifically prohibited by Federal law and is
conducted within a State which does not, as a matter of criminal law and public policy,
prohibit such gaming activity." Id. § 2701(5).
' See Nicholas S. Goldin, Castinga New Light on TribalCasino Gaming: Why Congress
Should Curtailthe Scope ofHigh Stakes Indian Gaming,84 CORNELLL. REV. 798, 850 (1999)
('[Tribal casinos . . . cater overwhelmingly to non-Indians"); John F. Petoskey, Doing
Business with MichiganIndianTribes, 76 MICH. B.J. 440,446 (1997) (noting daily commercial
interaction between Indians and non-Indians in Michigan).
' See Nell Jessup Newton, Tribal Court Praxis: One Year in the Life of Twenty Indian
Tribal Courts, 22 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 285, 294 (1998) (noting frequency of cases brought by
non-Indians in relation to gaming).
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immunity, 7 subject matter jurisdiction," abstention, 9 and forum
bias.40 Moreover, an important secondary effect of Indian gaming
and the concomitant growth in tribal economic resources has been
an increase in the economic interaction between tribal governments
and their members, both in a proprietary role (e.g., hiring casino
employees) as well as a sovereign role (e.g., providing subsidized
housing).4 ' This increased interaction between tribes and their
tribal members has added to the civil caseload of the judicial
system, and has likewise raised complicated jurisdictional questions.4 2
' See, e.g., GNS, Inc. v. Winnebago Tribe, 866 F. Supp. 1185, 1186, 1191 (N.D. Iowa
1994) (holding tribal sovereign immunity bars contract action brought in federalcourtby nonIndian casino managers against tribe); Trudgeon v. Fantasy Springs Casino, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d
65, 66 (Ct. App. 1999) (holding corporation organized by tribe to operate casino is entitled to
sovereign immunity); Gross v. Omaha Tribe, 601 N.W.2d 82, 82 (Iowa 1999) (affirming
sovereign immunity bars suit against tribe by patron who was knocked down by another
patron at tribe's gambling casino); Gavle v. Little Six, Inc., 555 N.W.2d 284,287 (Minn. 1996)
(holding sovereign immunity bars suit against tribe by employee alleging employment
discrimination); Doe v. Oneida Indian Nation, 717 N.Y.S.2d 417,418 (App. Div. 2000) (holding
sovereign immunity bars suit against tribe when patron at tribe's gaming resort hotel was
pierced by hypodermic needle); see also Tribal CasinoImmune from Wrongful Termination
Lawsuit, 4th Cir. Says, 3 No. 9 ANDREWS GAMING INDUS. LITIG. REP. 11 (1999) (discussing
unpublished opinion in which Fourth Circuit dismissed Title VII action against tribe brought
by non-Indian former employee on sovereign immunity grounds).
' See, e.g., Tamiami Partners, Ltd. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 999 F.2d 503, 506-08
(11th Cir. 1993) (finding no federal question jurisdiction over contract dispute between nonIndian operator of gaming facility and tribe); Calumet Gaming Group-Kan., Inc. v. Kickapoo
Tribe, 987 F. Supp. 1321, 1324-25 (D. Kan. 1997) (finding no diversity jurisdiction in contract
action brought by non-Indian gaming consultant against tribe); Abdo v. Fort Randall Casino,
957 F. Supp. 1111, 1112 (D.S.D. 1997) (finding no diversityjurisdiction in wrongful discharge
and contract action brought by non-Indian former casino manager against tribe).
' See, e.g., Calumet Gaming, 987 F. Supp. at 1326-30 (discussing reasons for court's
decision that tribal court should decide issue first); Abdo, 957 F. Supp. at 1112-14 (staying
cours proceedings pending tribal court's determination).
' See generally Newton, supra note 36, at 285-295 (discussing perception that Indian
Courts are biased against non-Indians).
" See Eugene Martin Christiansen, Gamblingand the American Economy, 556 ANNALS
AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 36, 44-45 (1998) (noting economic benefits to tribal members of
Indian gambling); Kathryn R.L. Rand & Steven A. Light, Virtue or Vice? How IGRA Shapes
the Politics of Native American Gaming, Sovereignty, and Identity, 4 VA. J. SOC. PoLY' & L.
381, 402-04 (1997) (describing how Indian gaming increases standard of living in tribes and
contributes social good to impoverished Native Americans).
42 See, e.g., Owens Valley Indian Hous. Auth. v. Turner, 185 F.3d 1029, 1034 (9th Cir.
1999) (finding no federal subject matter jurisdiction over eviction action brought by tribal
housing authority against tribal members); Minn. Chippewa Tribal Hous. Corp. v. Reese, 978
F. Supp. 1258, 1267 (D. Minn. 1997) (same); Round Valley Indian Hous. Auth. v. Hunter, 907
F. Supp. 1343, 1349 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (same).
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Unfortunately, when such disputes arise, some parties find
themselves without a forum in which to prosecute their claims.4 3
Federal statutory44 and common law,45 as well as state law,46 deprive
most state courts ofjurisdiction over such disputes; federal constitutional,47 statutory, 4 and decisional law 49 limit federal court jurisdiction; and tribal courts either do not exist 0 or lack jurisdiction as a
matter of tribal law.5 1 Moreover, when suit is brought against an

' See, e.g., Owens Valley Indian Hens. Auth., 185 F.3d at 1029; Schantz v. White
Lightning, 502 F.2d 67, 69-70 (8th Cir. 1974) (dismissing tort action involving non-Indian
plaintiffs and Indian defendants in automobile collision on Indian reservation for lack of
federal jurisdiction); Minn. Chippewa TribalHes. Corp., 978 F. Supp. at 1267; Neadeau v.
Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., No. C7-93-691, 1993 WL 302127, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 10,
1993) (affirming dismissal of suit involving Indian plaintiff and non-Indian uninsured
motorist carrier for lack of federal jurisdiction); see also Lynn, Jackson, Schultz & Lebrun,
P.C., Casino ManagerLoses Big Award to TribalImmunity, 3 No. 10 S.D. EMP. L. LETER 3
(1998) (describing tribal employee's failed efforts to enforce arbitration award).
4 See 25 U.S.C. § 1326 (1994) (providing state court jurisdiction in Indian Country only
if approved by majority of Indian voters in special election); 28 U.S.C. § 1360(b) (1994)
(restricting "alienation, encumbrance or taxation of any real or personal property" belonging
to Indians or Indian tribes).
'* See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959) (denying state jurisdiction over nonIndian store owner plaintiff and Indian customer defendants because such jurisdiction would
undermine tribal court authority).
' See Washington v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S.
463, 478-93 (1979) (holding that disclaimers of jurisdiction over Indian Territory in state
constitutions, although have no force as matter of federal law, retain force as matter of state

law); COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 369 & nn.181-84, 374 & n.229 (Rennard

Strickland et al. eds., 1982) (describing failure of some states to assume jurisdiction over
matters in Indian Country).

See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. M, § 2, cl. 1 (setting forth scope of federal judicial power).
See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (setting forth scope of federal
diversity jurisdiction).
'4 See, e.g., Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Graham, 489 U.S. 838, 839-42 (1989) (finding wellpleaded complaint rule bars federal court from exercising federal question jurisdiction where
question of tribe's federal right of sovereign immunity comes in as defense); Iowa Mut. Ins.
Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 14-20 (1987) (requiring federal courts that would otherwise have
diversity jurisdiction to abstain in favor of tribal court jurisdiction over such dispute);
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1,20 (1831) (holding Indian tribes are not foreign
states for purposes of diversity jurisdiction); Romanella v. Hayward, 114 F.3d 15, 16 (2d Cir.
1997) (holding Indian tribes are not state citizens for purposes of diversity jurisdiction).
' See, e.g., Owens Valley Indian Hous. Auth. v. Turner, 185 F.3d 1029, 1034 (9th Cir.
1999) (noting plaintiffs complaint of no forum since Indian tribe lacks competent tribal courts
and state courts are statutorily precluded from hearing case); Richardson v. Malone, 762 F.
Supp. 1463, 1469 (N.D. Okla. 1991) (noting lack of tribal court in Indian territory created
choice between creating"zone ofcivil lawlessness" or"federal common law" to adjudicate); see
also Reynolds, supra note 27, at 576 (noting tribal courts may not exist).
" See, e.g., Schantz v. White Lightning, 502 F.2d 67, 69-70 (8th Cir. 1974) (explaining
tribe's statutory code precludes jurisdiction); Minn. Chippewa Tribal Hous. Corp. v. Reese,
'
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Indian tribe itself, the tribe enjoys sovereign immunity from suit in
any court-state, federal, or tribal.52 Faced with this "no forum"
dilemma, most courts reluctantly dismiss the case,5" leaving the
dispute to nonjudicial resolution and running seemingly counter to
the legal maxim that "where there is a legal right, there is also a
legal remedy."5 4 In some such instances, the failure of any court to
exercise jurisdiction has caused the parties to resort to violence or
at least the threat of violence.5 5 A few courts, finding the "self-help"
alternative untenable, strain to interpret statutory and decisional
law so as to allow them to exercise jurisdiction." The result is that

978 F. Supp. 1258, 1260-61 (D. Minn. 1997) (finding tribal court in question had no provisions
to hear civil actions other than prosecution of game and fish violations on Reservation);
Neadeau v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., No. C7-93-691, 1993 WL 302127, at *3-*4 (Minn. Ct.
App. Aug. 10, 1993) (Schumacher, J., dissenting) (opining because tribal court has no
jurisdiction over Indians bringing suit against non-Indian corporations majority should find
that state court jurisdiction would not interfere with tribal sovereignty); see also Reynolds,
supranote 27, at 576 (noting that if tribal court exists, it may still lack jurisdiction).
' See Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 753 (1998) (putting doctrine oftribal
immunity in historical context and deferring to will of Congress to perpetuate doctrine).
0 See Owens Valley Indian Hous. Auth., 185 F.3d at 1034 (dismissing case for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction); Schantz, 502 F.2d at 70; Minn. Chippewa,978 F. Supp. at 1264
(finding that absence of available forum is insufficient to invoke federal question jurisdiction);
Neadeau, 1993 WL 302127, at *1 (affirming dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction);
Jean Pendleton,,Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v. LaPlante and DiversityJurisdictionin Indian
Country: What if No Forum Exists?, 33 S.D. L. REV. 528, 543 (1988) ('The North Dakota
Supreme Court, explicitly recognizing that the non-Indian litigants were left without aforum,
nevertheless held that only a legislative remedy was proper."); Reynolds, supranote 27, at
576 ("Some courts steadfastly refuse to alter their analysis of adjudicatory jurisdiction even
when confronted with the possibility that no alternative forum exists. For those courts, nonIndian adjudication of the dispute would constitute an impermissible infringement on tribal
sovereignty.").
" Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803); see also id. ("The government
of the United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men.
It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the
violation of a vested legal right."). But see Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2266 (1999)
(recognizing, in context of state sovereign immunity, that rights can exist absent judicial
remedies).
' See Goldberg-Ambrose, supranote 27, at 1428-31 (noting that in one instance, tribal
members, unable to carry out eviction of suspected drug dealer in judicial proceeding, armed
themselves and nearly resorted to violence to ensure eviction of someone they believed to be
threat to community).
' See, e.g., Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. v. Arapaho & Shoshone Tribes, 623 F.2d 682,684-85
(10th Cir. 1980) (deeming tribal sovereign immunity abrogated where alternative is no forum
has jurisdiction over dispute); Richardson v. Malone, 762 F. Supp. 1463, 1467-70 (N.D. Okla.
1991) (holding federal subject matter jurisdiction arises as matter of federal common law
where alternative is that no forum has jurisdiction over dispute); All Mission Indian Hous.
Auth. v. Silvas, 680 F. Supp. 330, 331-32 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (holding eviction action by tribal
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these courts effectively take on the role of creating their own
jurisdiction57 and, in some instances, abrogating a tribe's sovereign
immunity.5" In attempting to do justice in an individual case, these
courts eradicate what could otherwise be viewed, as a lawless
situation only by acting themselves in an arguably lawless manner.
In still other situations, a dispute arises between an Indian tribe,
tribal entity, or tribal member and a non-tribal member or state,
and a state or tribal forum is available to the parties, but a federal
forum-due to jurisdictional lmitations' 9 or principles of
abstention 6 0-is not. The Supreme Court presumes these nonfederal courts to be fair,6 but the same rationale which underlies
diversity jurisdiction appears to be equally present in these

housing authority against Indian tenant arises under federal law for purposes of § 1331);
Pendleton, supra note 53, at 542 ('[Slome courts have found the lack of forum unacceptable
and have gone through analytical gymnastics to justify judicial imposition of a federal
forum."); Frank R. Pommersheim, The Crucibleof Sovereignty: Analyzing Issues of Tribal
Jurisdiction,31 ARIZ. L. REV. 329, 348 (1989) ("Other courts have strained to fill such
jurisdictional gaps."); Reynolds, supranote 27, at 577 ('[O]ther courts that face this dilemma
choose to assume adjudicatoryjurisdiction. For these courts, the choice between'acknowledging a "zone of civil lawlessness" or allowing [non-Indian courts] to "interstitially" fill in the
gaps' is guided by the overriding importance of the availability of judicial review .... ).
57 See, e.g., Richardson, 762 F. Supp. at 1467-70 (holding federal subject matter
jurisdiction arises as matter of federal common law where alternative is that no forum has
jurisdiction over dispute).
6' See, e.g., Dry Creek Lodge, 623 F.2d at 684-85 (deeming tribal sovereign immunity
abrogated where alternative is no forum has jurisdiction over dispute).
" See, e.g., Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Graham, 489 U.S. 838,839-42 (1989) (finding no federal
question jurisdiction in suit between state tax commission and Indian tribe where question
of tribe's sovereign immunity arises only by way of defense to suit brought by state tax
commission); Weeks Const., Inc. v. Oglala Sioux Hous. Auth., 797 F.2d 668,672-74 (8th Cir.
1986) (finding no diversity jurisdiction between non-Indian plaintiff and tribal defendant
where defendants reservation is located within plaintiffs state).
' See, e.g., Abdo v. Fort Randall Casino, 957 F. Supp. 1111, 1114 (D.S.D. 1997) (requiring
non-Indian plaintiff to bring wrongful discharge action against tribally owned casino in tribal
court). See generally Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 14-20 (1987) (requiring
petitioner to exhaust available tribal remedies before subjecting tribe's determination of
jurisdiction to federal review).
61 See Iowa Mut. Ins., 480 U.S. at 18-19 (rejecting argument that tribal court bias
necessitates exercise of federal court jurisdiction); Sumner v. Mats, 449 U.S. 539, 549 (1981)
(presuming state judges discharge their oath of office to same extent as do federal judges).
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situations,12 making the availability of a federal forum desirable in
the face of this potentially "biased forum" scenario.
A number of scholars have written about the "no forum" problem,
and have warned that if tribal governments do not take steps to
solve the problem, Congress will."' But assuming this prediction to
be correct, what exactly is it that Congress can do? On this point,
the existing literature offers little in the way of discussion, only
suggesting in passing that Congress could give tribes the support
necessary to develop their judicial systems,64 repeal federal laws
depriving state courts of civil jurisdiction over Indian country,65 or
create a suitable federal forum. 66 Of these, the first is rather

obvious (and doctrinally uninteresting), and the second would not
only be a major setback for tribal sovereignty, but would eliminate
the "no forum" only by exacerbating the "biased forum" problem. It
is the last of these potential congressional responses that raises the
most interesting doctrinal questions, yet the existing literature is
silent as to the constitutional bases for either granting existing
federal courts subject matter jurisdiction over such disputes or
creating new federal courts empowered to hear such disputes. This
Article seeks to fill the gap in the existing literature by exploring
the constitutional limits on federal court subject matter jurisdiction
in the context of civil disputes arising in Indian Country and civil
disputes arising elsewhere involving Indian tribes, tribal entities,
and tribal members.
Part II of this Article catalogues the universe of "no forum" and
"biased forum" jurisdictional quagmires with respect to civil
But see Iowa Mut. Ins., 480 U.S. at 18-19 ("Petitioner also contends that the policies
underlying the grant of diversity jurisdiction-protection against local bias and incompetence-justify the exercise of federal jurisdiction in this case. We have rejected similar
attacks on tribal court jurisdiction in the past.").
' See Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 27, at 1441-42 (discussing alternative federal
responses to "no forum" problem); Pendleton, supra note 53, at 544-45 (theorizing federal
diversity forum will be provided if tribes do not cure the "no forum" problem); Pommersheim,
supranote 56, at 351 (stating failure of tribes to provide forum risks federal legislative action
or misapplication of jurisdictional doctrine to fill voids).
" See Goldberg-Ambrose, supranote 27, at 1441-42 (suggesting as solution to "no forum"
problem that federal government make up for retarded development of tribal institutions).
' See id.(discussing possibility ofbroadening scope ofstate jurisdiction to eliminate gaps
in jurisdiction resulting in lawlessness).
' See Pendleton, supra note 53, at 544 (theorizing solution to "no forum" problem
appears to be legislative).
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disputes arising in Indian Country or those arising elsewhere
involving Indian tribes, tribal entities, and tribal members,
examining the existing legal obstacles that prevent federal, state,
and tribal courts from exercising jurisdiction over the "no forum"
cases, and those obstacles to federal jurisdiction over "biased forum"
cases.67 Part III of this Article examines the constitutional authority for and the ways in which Congress has historically expanded
the jurisdiction of Article III courts and created specialized, nonArticle III courts both to address geographic gaps in adjudicative
jurisdiction and to provide a check against local court bias.6" Part
IV of this Article applies these principles to the "no forum" and
"biased forum" problems in Indian Law, and demonstrates that
Congress has the authority to eradicate these problems by either
creating specialized, non-Article III courts or expanding the
jurisdiction of the existing federal courts.6" This Article concludes
that if Indian tribes wish to avoid further ad hoc erosion of their
sovereignty by federal and state courts, they must work with
Congress to create federal solutions to the "no forum" and "biased
forum" problems.
The goal of this Article is by no means to advocate a particular
method of solving these jurisdictional problems. Rather, this Article
seeks to accomplish two goals, one policy-oriented and the other
jurisprudential. The policy goal is to provide an exhaustive analysis
of the constitutional scope and limitations of federal judicial power
so as to enable tribal and congressional leaders to solve the "no
forum" and "biased forum" problems with full knowledge of the
available options. The jurisprudential goal is to provide a muchneeded catalyst for increasing cross-pollination between the parallel
fields of Federal Courts and Indian Law,7" in the hopes that the

67 See infra notes 71-603 and accompanying text.

See infra notes 604-1019 and accompanying text.
69 See infra notes 1020-1102 and accompanying text.
70 See Pommersheim, supra note 21, at 467-68.
Even a cursory survey of texts and casebooks on the federal courts reveals
the complete lack of any discussion of tribal courts within the federal
system. The marginalization of tribal courts within the canon of federal
courts textbooks and scholarship only makes it more likely that they will
continue to be marginalized in federal courts'jurisprudence itself If there
is no discussion of tribal courts within the standard federal courts
68
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latter will not only continue to develop in its own right but will be
integrated into and will enrich the former.
II. THE INDIAN LAw "NO FoRuM" AND "BIASED FORUM" PROBLEMS
A. THE "NO FORUM" PROBLEM IN INDIAN LAW

As indicated above, the "no forum" problem in Indian Law is a
result of federal, state, and tribal constitutional, statutory, and
common law restrictions on the jurisdiction of federal, state and
tribal courts.71 This section provides some examples of the "no
forum" problem in Indian Law, examines the underlying causes of
the problem, and explores how Congress and the courts have dealt
with the "no forum" problem thus far.
1. Illustrationsof the "o Forum"Problem in IndianLaw. The
"no forum" cases reported to date have involved three different basic
fact patterns: an auto accident occurring in Indian Country, a
wrongful detainer action brought by a tribal housing authority, or
a suit against an Indian tribe. Schantz v. White Lightning7 2 and
Neadeau v. American FamilyMutual InsuranceCo." involved auto
accidents which occurred, respectively, within the North Dakota
portion of the Standing Rock Sioux Indian Reservation,74 and the
Red Lake Indian Reservation Minnesota. 5 In Schantz,the plaintiffs
were non-Indian citizens of North Dakota suing Indian defendants
residing on the North Dakota portion of the Standing Rock Sioux

casebooks, it will be all the more difficult for them to achieve legitimacy
in practice when they are missing from the textual canon, not discussed
in the primary course for aspiring federal judge law clerks, and otherwise
academically well hidden. So while it is true that the role of tribal courts
in the federal system is being litigated daily on the frontier of federal
courts jurisprudence, it is also true that they remain invisible in the boot
camp of legal academia where (future) federal judges and their law clerks
receive their basic training. If their basic training is so deficient, is it
really so surprising that they are so ill prepared for combat?
Id.

71 See supra notes 43-52 and accompanying text.
72 502 F.2d 67 (8th Cir. 1974).
73 No. C7-93-691, 1993 WL 302127 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 10, 1993).
71 Schantz, 502 F.2d at 68-69.
7" Neadeau, 1993 WL 302127, at *1.
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Indian Reservation.7 6 In Neadeau,the plaintiff was an Indian suing
her non-Indian auto insurance company for uninsured motorist
benefits."
In both cases, the tribal courts on the respective
reservations lacked jurisdiction over the disputes as a matter of
tribal law.7 8 Also in both cases, suits filed in the state courts were
dismissed on the ground that they lacked subject matter jurisdiction
over the disputes as a matter of federal law.79 Finding no statutory
basis for exercising jurisdiction, the federal courts in both cases
dismissed the suits with full knowledge that the litigants lacked an
alternative forum in which to pursue their claims.8"
Owens Valley Indian Housing Authority v. Thrner8 ' and
Minnesota Chippewa Tribal Housing Corp. v. Reese 2 involved
unlawful detainer actions brought by tribal housing authorities
engaged in the development and provision of low-income housing for
Indian families on reservations.8 3 In Owens Valley, the Housing
Authority, acting as landlord, sought to evict an Indian tenant from
a housing unit located on reservation lands.8 4 In Minnesota
76 Schantz, 502 F.2d at 68. One of the defendants was an enrolled member of the
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, while the other an enrolled member of the Three Affiliated Tribes.
Id.
7 Neadeau, 1993 WL 302127, at *1-*2. The uninsured motorist was also a resident of
the Red Lake Indian Reservation. Id. at "1.
78 See Schantz, 502 F.2d at 69 & n.2 (noting jurisdictional statute of Standing Rock
Sioux's tribal court vested it with jurisdiction over suits brought by non-Indians only if they
had resided on or done business on reservation for at least one year prior to bringing suit, and
even then, only if amount in controversy was less than $300); Neadeau, 1993 WL 302127, at
*2-*4 (Schumacher, J., dissenting) (noting Red Lake Court of Indian Offenses lacked
jurisdiction over dispute).
79 Schantz, 502 F.2d at 68-70 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1322(a) and Gourneau v. Smith, 207
N.W.2d 256 (N.D. 1973)); Neadeau, 1993 WL 302127, at *1 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1162 and 28
U.S.C. § 1360 as current versions of Public Law 280 which explicitly exclude Red Lake Indian
Reservation from Minnesota's jurisdiction).
80 See Schantz, 502 F.2d at 70 C"The legal anomaly is therefore obvious-the non-Indian
litigants are left without a forum in which to pursue their claim."); Neadeau, 1993 WL
302127, at *2-*4 (Schumacher, J., dissenting) (noting absence of alternative forum where
claimant could pursue claim).
81 185 F.3d 1029 (9th Cir. 1999). Because the appellee died while the appeal was
pending, the court withdrew its opinion, Owens Valley IndianHous.Auth. v. Turner,192 F.3d
1330 (9th Cir. 1999), and dismissed the case as moot. Owens Valley Indian Hous. Auth. v.
Turner, 201 F.3d 444 (9th Cir. 1999). The decision is nonetheless important, however, as it
reflects what the court likely would do in a similar future case.
12 978 F. Supp. 1258 (D. Minn. 1997).
' Owens Valley, 185 F.3d at 1031; Minn. Chippewa,978 F. Supp. at 1260.
s4 Owens Valley, 185 F.3d at 1031-32.
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Chippewa, the Housing Authority, acting as mortgagor, sought to
evict Indian defendants who failed to perform under a loan agreement with the Housing Authority that required the defendants to
develop low-income housing on reservation lands.8 5 In both cases,
the state courts refused to exercise jurisdiction over the actions on
the ground that they lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the
disputes as a matter of federal statutory law.86 In Owens Valley, the
reservation on which the subject property was located had not7
8
established any tribal courts that could adjudicate eviction cases.
In Minnesota Chippewa, the Housing Authority attempted to bring
suit in the appropriate tribal court, but the court dismissed the
action on the ground that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain unlawful
detainer actions under the tribal code. 8 In both cases, the federal
courts refused to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that there was
no statutory basis for federal court jurisdiction. 9 As with the auto
accident cases, the courts dismissed the cases with full knowledge
that the disputes would otherwise go unresolved in a judicial
forum.9 0
Finally, in Calvello v. Yankton Sioux Tribe,9 ' James Calvello, the
former manager of a casino owned and operated by the Yankton
Sioux Tribe, sought arbitration in accordance with his employment
contract after the Tribe terminated his employment.9 2 The Tribe
participated in the arbitration proceeding, and the arbitrator
awarded damages to Calvello, but the Tribe refused to honor the
award.9 3 Calvello attempted to bring suit against the Tribe in
federal, state, and tribal courts, but all three courts refused to
exercise jurisdiction over his claims.9 4

' Minn. Chippewa, 978 F. Supp. at 1259-60.
6 Owens Valley, 185 F.3d at 1031-32, 1034 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1360(b)); Minn. Chippewa,
978 F. Supp. at 1260 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1360(b)).
. Owens Valley, 185 F.3d at 1031-32.
' Minn. Chippewa, 978 F. Supp. at 1260-61.
89 Id. at 1032-33; Minn. Chippewa, 978 F. Supp. at 1266.
Owens Valley, 185 F.3d at 1034; Minn. Chippewa, 978 F. Supp. at 1263-64.
9' 899 F. Supp. 431 (D.S.D. 1995).
92 Id. at 433-34.
3 Id.at 434.
4 See id. at 434-.36 (noting there was no diversity jurisdiction, reasoning tribe is not
citizen of any state for purposes of diversity statute, and that breach of employment contract
claim did not fall within court's federal question jurisdiction); Calvello v. Yankton Sioux
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2. Causes of the 'W'o Forum"Problemin Indian Law. For a state
to be admitted into the United States, two enactments by Congress
are typically required: an organic act, often used to establish a
territorial government and conditions for admittance and to provide
for a constitutional convention; and an enabling act, admitting the
state to the Union after the state's constitutional convention and
popular vote ratifying the state constitution.95 For several of the
states admitted between 1889 and 1959, Congress conditioned
admission96 on the states disclaiming all "right and title" to Indian

Tribe, 584 N.W.2d 108, 111 (S.D. 1998) (noting sovereign immunity barred suit against tribe
in state court); Lynn, Jackson, Schultz & Lebrun, P.C., supranote 43, at 3 (noting tribal court
dismissed suit on grounds of tribal sovereign immunity).
' See generally Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and TerritorialStates: The
ConstitutionalFoundationsof Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 317-18 (1992).
Under the "equal footing" doctrine,
When a new State is admitted into the Union, it is so admitted with all of
the powers of sovereignty and jurisdiction which pertain to the original
States, and that such powers may not be constitutionally diminished,
impaired or shorn away by any conditions, compacts or stipulations
embraced in the act under which the new State came into the Union,
which would not be valid and effectual if the subject of congressional
legislation after admission.
Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 573 (1911). Since Congress has discretion to admit or refuse
to admit states into the union, it can condition its admission of states on their taking certain
action. See id. at 568 ("The constitutional provision concerning the admission of new States
is not a mandate, but a power to be exercised with discretion. From this alone it would
follow... Congress may require.... that the organic laws of a new State at the time of
admission shall be such as to meet its approval."). However, once admitted into the Union,
only those conditions that fall within one of Congress's constitutionally delegated powers are
enforceable. Id. at 573. Thus, provisions in many state enabling acts limiting state
jurisdiction over Indian reservations would appear to be enforceable, as Congress could so
legislate under the Indian Commerce Clause. See id. at 570.
[S]tipulations ... in respect to the control by the United States of large
Indian reservations and Indian population of the new State, are found in
the Oklahoma enabling act. Whatever force such provisions have after
the admission of the State may be attributed to the power of Congress
over the subjects, derived from other provisions of the Constitution, rather
than from any consent by or compact with the state.
Id.; see also id. at 574.
[I]t may well happen that Congress should embrace in an enactment
introducing a new State into the Union legislation intended as a regulation of commerce among the States, or with Indian tribes situated within
the limits of such new State... which might be upheld as legislation
within the sphere of the plain power of Congress. But in every such case
such legislation would derive its force not from any agreement or compact
with the proposed new State, nor by reason of its acceptance of such
enactment as a term of admission, but solely because the power of
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lands within the exterior borders of the state and providing that
Indian lands remain under the "absolute jurisdiction and control" of
the federal government in their proposed constitutions. 7 These
1 1 New
states included Alaska,9" Arizona,99 Idaho, 1000 Montana,
4 Washington, 10 5
l
03
0
2
1
Dakota,
South
Dakota,
North
Mexico,
Oklahoma, 06 Utah, 107 and Wyoming.'0 8
One might view these conditions as potentially significant
restrictions on the ability of the state courts in these states to
Congress extended to the subject, and, therefore, would not operate to
restrict the State's legislative power in respect of any matter which was
not plainly within the regulating power of Congress.
Id. Interestingly, the history of the Admissions Clause would seem to undercut the so-called
"equal footing" doctrine. The original draft of the Clause provided that"fi]f the admission be
consented to, the new States shall be admitted on the same terms with the original States.
But the Legislature may make conditions with the new States, concerning the public debt
which shall be then subsisting." 2THERECORDS OFTHE FEDERAL CONVENTION 188 (Madison,
6 Aug.) (Max Farrand ed., 1937) (emphasis added). Governor Morris successfully moved to
strike this language from the clause, arguing that "[hie did not wish to bind down the
Legislature to admit Western States on the terms here stated," with Madison opposing the
motion, "insisting that the Western States neither would nor ought to submit to a Union
which degraded them from an equal rank with the other States." Id. at 454 (Madison, 29
Aug.).
9

COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 46, at 368 & n.175.

' See ALASKA CONST. art. XII, § 12 (disclaiming right to Indian lands, which remain
under federal jurisdiction); Act ofJuly 7,1958, Pub. L. No. 85-508, § 4,72 Stat. 339 (providing
for admission of Alaska into Union).
" See ARIZ. CONST. art. XX, 4; Act of June 20, 1910, ch. 310, § 20, 36 Stat. 557, 569.
'00 See Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 117, § 1, 12 Stat. 808, 809. Idaho did not have an enabling
act, COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 46, at 368 n.175, but it
submitted a Constitution containing a disclaimer clause, IDAHO CONST. art. XXI, § 19, and its
constitution was accepted by Congress. Act of July 3, 1890, ch. 656, 26 Stat. 215.
o' See MONT. CONST. art. I, § 1; Act of Feb. 22, 1889, ch. 180, § 4, 25 Stat. 676, 677; Act
of May 26, 1864, ch. 95, § 1, 13 Stat. 85, 86.
112 See N.M. CONST. art. XX, § 2; Act of June 20, 1910, ch. 310, § 2, 36 Stat. 557, 558-59;
Act of June 16, 1906, ch. 3335, § 25, 34 Stat. 267, 279-80.
03 See N.D. CONST. of 1889, art. XVI; Act of Feb. 22, 1889, ch. 180, § 4,25 Stat. 676,677;
Act of Mar. 2, 1861, ch. 86, § 1, 12 Stat. 239.
'04 See S.D. CONST. art. XXVI, § 18; Act of Feb. 22, 1889, ch. 180, § 4, 25 Stat. 676, 677;
Act of Mar. 2, 1861, ch. 86, § 1, 12 Stat. 239, 239.
0 WASH. CONST. art. XXVI; Act of Feb. 22, 1889, ch. 180, § 4, 25 Stat. 676, 677.
' See OKLA.CONST. art. I, § 3; Act of June 16, 1906, ch. 3335, § 1, 34 Stat. 267, 267-268;

id. § 3, 34 Stat. at 269-270.

See UTAH CONST. art. III;
Act of July 16, 1894, ch. 138, § 3, 28 Stat. 107, 108.
'05 See Act of July 25, 1868, ch. 235, § 1, 15 Stat. 178. Wyoming did not have an enabling
10"

act, see COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 46, at 368 n.175, but it
submitted a Constitution containing a disclaimer clause, WYO. CONST. Art. XXI, § 26, and its
constitution was accepted by Congress in a statehood act. Act of July 10, 1890, ch. 664, 26
Stat. 222.
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exercise jurisdiction over actions arising in Indian Country within
the state. However, the Supreme Court has held otherwise,
reasoning that the disclaimer of "right and title" was a disclaimer
of the state's proprietary, not its governmental, interest in the
Indian lands and that "absolute" federal jurisdiction refers to
undiminished federal jurisdiction, as distinguished from "exclusive"
federal jurisdiction.0 9
In any event, when Congress sought to expand state court
jurisdiction over Indian Country in 1953, it consented, by statute, to
the states taking any action necessary under state law to remove
legal impediments to this exercise of jurisdiction over offenses
committed on reservations involving Indians, notwithstanding
anything to the contrary in the states' enabling acts."0 The 1953
Act effectively eliminated the force of these restrictions as a matter
of federal law. Nonetheless, the provisos are a part of these states'
constitutions, and in that capacity, they retain such force as is given
to them by state law"' to the extent they are not pre-empted by
federal law."'
In the 1953 Act, Congress charted a new policy of terminating the
special relationship between the tribes and the federal government
and subjecting Indian tribes to state legislative and judicial
jurisdiction."' In part, Congress carried out this policy by "terminat114
ing" 109 tribes from 1954 through 1962 in Wisconsin,

'° See Organized Vill. of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 68-70 (1962) (defining disclaimer of
right and title and absolute federal jurisdiction); accordThree Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Engg,
467 U.S. 138, 149 (1984) C'Wold F) (stating "absolute [federal] jurisdiction and contro' does

not strip states of all authority concerning Indian lands).
130 Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 280, § 6, 67 Stat. 588, 590 (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. § 1324 (1994)); Washington v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of the Yakima Indian
Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 478-493 (1979).
.. Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. at 478-93; CoHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN
LAW, supra note 46, at 369 & nn.181-84, 374 & n.229.
112 See Three Afliated Tribes v. Wold Eng'g, 476 U.S. 877, 883-85 (1986) CfWold IT')
(holding North Dakota's disclaimer ofjurisdiction was preempted by federal statute governing
state assumption of jurisdiction over Indian lands).
13 See H.R. Con. Res. 108, 83d Cong., 67 Stat. B132 (1953) C'[It is the policy of Congress,

as rapidly as possible, to make the Indians within the territorial limits of the United States
subject to the same laws and entitled to the same privileges and responsibilities as are
applicable to other citizens of the United States.").
14 See Act of June 17, 1954, ch. 303, 68 Stat. 250 (Menominee
tribe).
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Oregon," 5 Texas, 1 6 Utah,"' 7 California,1 1 Oklahoma,"' South
Carolina, 2 ' and Nebraska.' 2 ' The effect of this action was to
terminate the trust relationship between the tribes and the federal
government, to extinguish tribal sovereignty, and to subject the
members of the tribes and tribal lands to the legislative and
adjudicative jurisdiction of 22
the states within whose boundaries the
reservations were located. 1
That same year, in part due to its perception that law and order
did not exist on certain reservations,'23 Congress passed Public Law
280124 to address what it perceived to be a "no forum" problem.
While not terminating the sovereignty of individual tribes, Public
Law 280 expressly granted a handful of states civil and criminal
jurisdiction over all or nearly all of the Indian reservations located
within their states.'2 5 In addition, Public Law 280 gave other states
the option of assuming criminal and civil jurisdiction over Indian
reservations within their states by taking affirmative legislative
action without the need to obtain tribal consent.'2 6 Ten states opted
115 See Act of Aug. 13, 1954, ch. 732, 68 Stat. 718 (Klamath tribe); Act of Aug. 13, 1954,

ch. 733, 68 Stat. 724 (several tribes located within exterior boundaries of Oregon).

16 See Act of Aug. 23, 1954, ch. 831, 68 Stat. 768 (Alabama and Coushatta tribes).
.. See Act of Sept. 1, 1954, ch. 1207, 68 Stat. 1099 (several tribes located within exterior
boundaries of Utah); Act of Aug. 27, 1954, ch. 1009, 68 Stat. 868 (Ute tribe).
"s See Act of Aug. 18, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-671, 72 Stat. 619 (providing for distribution
of Indian lands); Act of July 10, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-91,71 Stat. 283 (transferring Indian land
to U.S. Army); Act of Mar. 29, 1956, ch. 100, 70 Stat. 58 (authorizing sale of land with
proceeds to Indians).
19 See Act of Aug. 3, 1956, ch. 909, 70 Stat. 963 (Ottawa tribe).
120 See Act of Sept. 21, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86.322, 73 Stat. 592 (providing for distribution
of Catawba lands).
1.1 See Act of Sept. 5, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-629, 76 Stat. 429 (providing for distribution of
Ponca lands).
22 See Charles F. Wilkinson & Eric R. Biggs, The Evolution of the TerminationPolicy, 5
AM. INDIAN L. REV. 139, 152-54 (1977) (describing effects of termination program).
123 See S. REP. NO. 699 at 5 (1953), reprinted in 1953 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2409, 2411-12
(incorporating H.R. REP. No. 848 (1953), explaining need for legislation).
124 Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L No. 280, §§ 2,4,67 Stat. 588,588-89 (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1162 (1994) (criminal jurisdiction) and 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1994) (civil jurisdiction)).
1
The original act gave jurisdiction to California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and
Wisconsin, but was later amended to include Alaska. Act ofAug. 8, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-615,
§§ 1-2, 72 Stat. 545, 545. Certain tribes within Minnesota, Oregon, and Wisconsin objected
to the extension of state jurisdiction over them, and because those tribes had functioning
tribal justice systems, Congress chose to exempt them from coverage. S. REP. No. 699 at 5
(incorporating H.R. REP. No. 848, describing exemptions).
128 See Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 280, § 7, 67 Stat. 588, 590 (codified as amended
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to accept some degree ofjurisdiction over Indian reservations under
that provision.'2 7 Further, Public Law 280 provided that, notwithstanding anything to the contrary in a state's enabling act, Congress
granted the states permission to take whatever action was necessary under state law to remove any legal impediment to the state's
exercise ofjurisdiction over offenses involving Indians committed on

reservations. 128
Shortly after Congress enacted Public Law 280, the Supreme
Court, in Williams v. Lee, 129 set forth an important background
limitation on a state court's ability to exercise jurisdiction over
disputes arising in Indian Country in the absence of a congressional
delegation of authority, such as Public Law 280. In Williams, a nonIndian operator of a general store on the Arizona portion of the
Navajo Indian Reservation brought suit in an Arizona state court
against a Navajo Indian and his wife, both of whom resided on the
reservation, to collect for goods sold to them on credit."' The state
supreme court upheld jurisdiction, reasoning that since no federal
statute expressly prohibited their doing so, the Arizona courts were
free to exercise jurisdiction over civil suits arising on Indian
reservations and brought by non-Indians against Indians.'
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that "absent governing Acts of Congress, the question has always been whether the
state action infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make

at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1322 (1994)).
1

These states were Arizona, Florida, Idaho, Iowa, Montana, Nevada, North Dakota,

South Dakota, Utah, and Washington. COHEN'SHANDBOOKOFFEDERALINDIANLAW, supra
note 46, at 362-63 n.125. Although it was not clear under the original act whether a state
could assume only partial jurisdiction, Congress amended the act in 1968 to make clear that
states could opt to assume only partial jurisdiction (by limiting geographic area or subject
area, or both). 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321(a), 1322(a).
'2 See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text (discussing statutory grant of
permission to states to exercise jurisdiction contained in Public Law 280). The Supreme
Court has held that whether a state is required to actually amend its constitution or may
instead merely enact a statute accepting jurisdiction over Indian Country is a question of
state law. Washington v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 439
U.S. 463, 493 (1979). As a matter of state law, the state courts have split on the question
whether a constitutional amendment is required. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN
LAW, supra note 46, at 368-69 & n.181.
129 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
"0 Id. at 217.
131 Id. at 218 (citing Williams v. Lee, 319 P.2d 998 (Ariz. 1958)).
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their own laws and be ruled by them."1 2 The Court concluded that
"to allow the exercise of state jurisdiction [there] would undermine
the authority of the tribal courts over Reservation affairs and hence
would infringe on the right of the Indians to govern themselves." 3
In addition, the Court indicated that Congress legislates with the
assumption that states lack jurisdiction over Indian affairs and that
when Congress intends to vest the states with civil or criminal
jurisdiction over tribal lands, it does so by statute." The Court
recognized that Public Law 280 did give states such as Arizona the
opportunity to exercise civil and criminal jurisdiction over Indian
reservations but noted that Arizona had not opted to accept
jurisdiction in accordance with the terms of Public Law 280. l1"
While Williams involved a suit brought by a non-Indian against
an Indian, the Supreme Court has extended its reasoning to include
suits brought by one Indian against another.3 6 The Court has also
held that, under Williams, there is no infringement when a state
court exercises jurisdiction over a suit brought by an Indian against
a non-Indian.1 37 Moreover, the exercise by a state court of jurisdiction over a suit between two non-Indians arising in Indian Country
would probably not be deemed to result in infringement.

132

Id. at 220.

"3 Id. at 223.
13s Id. at 220-21 & n.6.
3

Id. at 222-23.

13 See Fisher v. Dist. Ct., 424 U.S. 382, 386 (1976) (stating at least same standard must

be met before the state courts may exercise jurisdiction). Although Williams andFisherfailed
to draw a distinction between those Indians who are members of the tribe and those who are
not, the Court drew such a distinction in the criminal context, holding that tribal courts
lacked criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
Although Congress has overturned this ruling with respect to tribal court criminal
jurisdiction, 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (1994), it has not taken any action with respect to tribal court
civil jurisdiction. Modern Supreme Court cases considering tribal court civil jurisdiction
make a tribal member/nonmember distinction instead of an Indian/non-Indian one. See, e.g.,
Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 442 (1997) (suggesting potential limitation on
Williams and its progeny).
137 See Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Eng'g, 467 U.S. 138, 148-49 (1984) (Wold 1")
(finding such exercise neither conflicts with federal law nor undermines Indian selfgovernment). Although Wold Iused language that could be construed as limiting its holding
to the special situation in which the plaintiff was the Indian tribe itself and the tribal court
lacked jurisdiction over the dispute, id., it has not been so limited in subsequent lower court
decisions. See, e.g., State v. Zaman, 946 P.2d 459, 461-62 (Ariz. 1997) (upholding state court
jurisdiction over non-Indian father in child support suit).
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The Williams non-infringement test appears to be a rather
modest limitation on state court jurisdiction, given that Public Law
280 gave states the option of taking total civil and criminal jurisdiction over Indian Country. However, it takes on greater importance
in light of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 ("ICRA"), in which
Congress made a series of amendments to Public Law 280, one of
which is of particular relevance to the "no forum" problem in Indian
Law.
ICRA amended Public Law 280 to require that subsequent
assumptions of jurisdiction by states could take place only with the
consent of the Indians effected in a special election."' Under this
provision, it is not sufficient that the tribe's legislative body
consents to the exercise of state jurisdiction; consent must be
manifested by a majority vote of the enrolled Indians within the
affected area. 139 Since the enactment of this amendment, no tribe
has voted to consent to state court jurisdiction. 4 ' In addition, Public
Law 280 was amended to provide that states that had previously
opted to exercise jurisdiction over Indian Country could retrocede,
i.e., disclaim, such jurisdiction, subject to acceptance by the federal
government.'
In its two opinions in ThreeAffiliated Tribes v. Wold Engineering
("Wold 1' and "Wold IT%,),142 the Supreme Court addressed the effect
of these amendments and the scope of the Williams non-infringement test. Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation
was a federally recognized Indian tribe located within North
Dakota. The tribe contracted with Wold Engineering, a North
Dakota corporation, for the design and construction of a water-

38 Act of Apr. 11, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 406, 82 Stat. 73, 80 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §
1326 (1994)); see also 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1322 (1994) (amended to reflect requirement of tribal
consent).
133Kennerly v. Dist. Ct., 400 U.S. 423, 429 (1971).

,40 COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 46, at 363 & n.127.

14' Act of Apr. 11, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 40, 82 Stat. 73, 79 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §
1323(a) (1994)); see also Exec. Order No. 11,435, 33 Fed. Reg. 17,339 (Nov. 21, 1968)
(delegating to Secretary of Interior authority to accept or reject state retrocession of
jurisdiction). Under this provision, the federal government is free to accept all, a portion, or
none of the jurisdiction ceded to it by a state. Omaha Tribe v. Vill. of Walthill, 460 F.2d 1327,
1328 (8th Cir. 1972) (per curiam). Further, a state need not follow any particular procedure
to affect retrocession. U.S. v. Brown, 334 F. Supp. 536, 540-41 (D. Neb. 1971).
142 467 U.S. 138 (1984) ('Wold T'); 476 U.S. 877 (1986) C'Wold If").
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supply system on the reservation. 4 3 A dispute arose regarding
Wold's performance, and the tribe brought suit against Woldin state
court for negligence and breach of contract.1 44 At the time the suit
was filed, the tribal court of the Fort Berthold Reservation lacked
jurisdiction over the dispute, as the tribal code extended jurisdiction
over suits by an Indian against a non-Indian only by consent of all
the parties.'4 5 Wold moved to dismiss the suit, arguing that the
arising in
state court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over claims
147
Indian country,1 4 and the state supreme court agreed.
The U.S. Supreme Court, believing that the state court's
.determination
of its jurisdiction under state law may have been
influenced by its erroneous interpretation of Public Law 280,
reversed and remanded the case.' 4 8 The Court noted that although
North Dakota's enabling act required it to disclaim jurisdiction over
Indian Country located within the state, and its original constitution
so provided, the federal restrictions on the state's jurisdiction over
Indian Country were eliminated in 1953 by Public Law 280.14' The
Court then noted that in 1957, the North Dakota Supreme Court, in
Vermillion v. Spotted Elk,"'5 had held that the existing jurisdictional
disclaimers in both its enabling act and the state constitution
foreclosed civil jurisdiction over Indian Country only in cases
involving interests in Indian lands themselves. In 1958, the state's
constitution was amended to authorize the legislature to accept any
jurisdiction over Indian Country delegated to it by the federal
government.'' In 1963, the state enacted a statute that in subsequent cases-all involving suits brought in state court against
Indians-was construed by the state supreme court as a disclaimer
of the jurisdiction over civil actions arising in Indian Country

3

Wold I, 467 U.S. at 141.

144 Id.
14 Id. at 141-42.

'46 Id. at 142.

Id. at 140-41; Wold H, 476 U.S. at 878.
Wold I, 467 U.S. at 151-59.
Id. at 142-43; see also supranotes 110-11 and accompanying text (discussing statutory
grant of permission to states to exercise jurisdiction contained in Public Law 280).
110 85 N.W.2d 432 (N.D. 1957).
151 WoldI, 467U.S. at 143-44.
147
148
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recognized in Vermillion absent tribal consent. 5 2 A suggestion was
made in those cases that the state might be required to obtain tribal
consent under Public Law 280 as amended in 1968.153
In Wold I, the state supreme court expressly held that the
holding applied with equal force in suits brought by an Indian
against a non-Indian for claims arising in Indian Country. 15 4 The
Supreme Court noted that, although encompassing suits between
Indians (and thus invalid to that extent under Williams), Vermillion
did not infringe upon tribal sovereignty to the extent it allowed state
courts to exercise jurisdiction over claims by Indians against nonIndians, particularly where the suit was brought by a tribe itself
and the tribal court lacked jurisdiction over the dispute.'5 5 The
Court further held that the exercise of such jurisdiction was not
foreclosed by the state's enabling act.'5"
According to the Court, Public Law 280 neither required the state
to disclaim the jurisdiction over Indian Country recognized by the
North Dakota Supreme Court in Vermillion nor authorized the state
to do so.' Although Vermillion was decided after the enactment of
Public Law 280, the Court characterized Vermillion as a confirmation of the North Dakota state courts' pre-existing jurisdiction, and
it held that Public Law 280 did not divest states of their pre-existing
and otherwise lawfully assumed jurisdiction. 15 The Court further
held that the 1968 amendment to Public Law 280 requiring tribal
consent was not made retroactive, and thus did not displace
jurisdiction previously assumed under Public Law 280 or jurisdiction assumed prior to and apart from Public Law 280.'59 In
addition, Public Law 280, including the 1968 retrocession amendment thereto, did not authorize states to retrocede jurisdiction that
pre-existed Public Law 280.160

'5

Id. at 144-45.
Id. at 145-46 (citing Nelson v. Dubois, 232 N.W.2d 54 (N.D. 1975)).
Id.
Id. at 148-49.

'

Id. at 149.

152

'3
154

157
5
159

Id. at 150.
Id. at 150-51 & n.9.

Id. at 150-51.

160 Id.
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On remand, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that the 1963
state statute of its own force disclaimed any pre-existing jurisdiction
that the state courts had over claims arising in Indian country
brought by Indians against non-Indians and that, under state law,
the tribe could not bring suit in state court absent tribal consent and
a waiver of its sovereign immunity.16 '
The case returned to the U.S. Supreme Court, where the Court
-held in Wold II that the 1963 state statute as construed by the
North Dakota Supreme Court was pre-empted by Public Law 280.162
The Court noted that under Public Law 280 as it was originally
enacted, no provision was made for the retrocession of jurisdiction,
and that the 1968 amendment, while authorizing the United States
to accept retrocession of jurisdiction, limited that authorization to
the retrocession of jurisdiction assumed under the 1953 version of
Public Law 280.16' The Court concluded that since Public Law 280
occupied the field of state retrocession of jurisdiction-whether
acquired pursuant to Public Law 280 or pursuant to the state's preexisting jurisdiction-the fact that the disclaimer contained in the
1963 state statute was not authorized by Public Law 280 meant that
it was barred by it.' 6 4 In the Court's view, this was consistent with
tribal sovereignty and self-government, since any jurisdiction
assumed prior to the enactment of Public Law 280 was lawful only
to the extent that it was consistent with the Williams non-infringement test, and any jurisdiction assumed after the 1968 amendment
could be secured only upon receipt of tribal consent.'6 5
While some courts have construed Woldlas effectively requiring
state courts to exercise jurisdiction over suits brought by an Indian
against a non-Indian where there is no alternative forum, 166 or even
more broadly as allowing state courts to exercise such jurisdiction
regardless of whether or not an alternative forum exists,'6 7 it would
"'1 Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Eng'g, 476 U.S. 877, 882 (1986) ("Wold/i').
'6 Id. at 883-85.
Id. at 886.
1I4 !d.

Id. at 886-87.
18 See Reynolds, supra note 27, at 577 ('Moreover, these courts conclude that tribal
'

sovereighty cannot be infinged by non-Indian adjudication of a dispute that would otherwise
go unresolved.").
"- State v. Zaman, 946 P.2d 459, 461-62 (Ariz. 1997); see also Neadeau v. Am. Family
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be a mistake to give the case such a broad reading. Under Williams,
which, as indicated above, states the applicable background
principle in the absence of an act of Congress to the contrary,' 68
North Dakota's pre-Public Law 280 exercise of state court jurisdiction over suits brought by Indians against non-Indians was
permissible.'69 Having lawfully exercised such jurisdiction prior to
the enactment of Public Law 280, North Dakota could only retrocede
such jurisdiction in accordance with Public Law 280, which occupied
the field on retrocession and which did not permit the retrocession
of jurisdiction acquired prior to the enactment of Public Law 280.170
If a state had not exercised jurisdiction that would be permissible
under Williams prior to the 1968 Amendment to Public Law 280, it
would appear to be barred from unilaterally doing so thereafter,
since the amendment requires tribal consent for any subsequent
effort by a state to exercise civil or criminal jurisdiction over Indian
Country, making no distinction between infringing and noninfringing exercises of jurisdiction. 17' Indeed, the Supreme Court in
Wold II seemed to hold that the Williams non-infringement test is
relevant only for the purpose of determining the validity ofjurisdiction assumed by a state prior to the enactment of Public Law 280
and that all jurisdiction assumed after the 1968 amendment could
be secured only upon receipt of tribal consent.'
The 1968 Amendment to Public Law 280, requiring tribal consent
to subsequent exercises of state court jurisdiction over Indian
Country, would thus appear to have the effect of freezing state court
jurisdiction at the extent to which it was exercised by the state
courts prior to 1968. Accordingly, it is this provision that is
substantially responsible for state courts lacking jurisdiction in the

Mut. Ins. Co., No. C7-93-691, 1993 WL 302127, at *2-*4 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 10, 1993)

(Schumacher, J., dissenting) (arguing for finding jurisdiction because without it appellant is
precluded from pursuing valid and legally recognizable cause of action).
'8 See supra notes 129-37 and accompanying text (discussing limitations on state
jurisdiction over disputes in Indian country in absence of congressional delegation of
authority).
" Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Eng'g, 467 U.S. 138, 148-51 (1984) C'Wold 1").
170 Wold II, 476 U.S. at 886.
,7' 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321, 1322 (1994).
'72
Wold II, 476 U.S. at 887; see alsoRichardson v. Malone, 762 F. Supp. 1463, 1465 (N.D.
Okla. 1991).
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In Schantz,'7

4

the state

court lacked jurisdiction over the dispute because the Standing Rock
Sioux Tribe had not consented to the state's exercise of judicial
jurisdiction over actions arising within the boundaries of the
reservation in accordance with the 1968 Amendment. 175 And in
Neudeau, the original Public Law 280-vesting Minnesota with civil
and criminal jurisdiction over reservations in the state-had
specifically excluded the exercise of jurisdiction over the Red Lake
Indian Reservation.17 Thus, the "no forum" problem arises in these
cases because tribal consent to the exercise of state court jurisdiction is required regardless of whether or not the tribe has its own
tribal court or has vested its tribal court with jurisdiction over such
disputes.
A final jurisdictional roadblock created by Public Law 280 is its
encumbrance proviso, which provides that nothing contained in
Public Law 280 should be construed as authorizing the alienation,
encumbrance, or taxation of any Indian trust property or property
subject to a restriction against alienation imposed by the federal
government, including the ability to adjudicate the ownership or
right to possession of such property or any interest therein. 177 This
proviso caused the state courts in Owens Valley17' and Minnesota
Chippewa' to refuse to exercise jurisdiction over the unlawful
detainer actions brought therein. In both cases, the courts reasoned
that the proviso deprived them of the authority to adjudicate the
right of ownership or possession of trust property and that the effect
of adjudicating an unlawful detainer action would be to do just
that. 8 ' Other courts that have interpreted the proviso have
similarly construed it as barring state court jurisdiction over

See supranotes 72-94 and accompanying text.
u Schantz v. White Lightning, 502 F.2d 67 (8th Cir. 1974).
7 Id. at 68-70 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1322(a) (1970); Gourneau v. Smith, 207 N.W.2d 256
(N.D. 1973)).
17. See Neadeau v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., C7-93-691, 1993 WI, 302127, at *1 (Minn.
Ct. App. Aug. 10, 1993) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1988) and 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1988)).
7

177

(1994).
1
1
'o

18 U.S.C. § 1162(b) (1994); 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321(b), 1322(b) (1994); 28 U.S.C. § 1360(b)

Owens Valley Indian Hous. Auth. v. Turner, 185 F.3d 1029 (9th Cir. 1999).
Minn. Chippewa Tribal Hous. Corp. v. Reese, 978 F. Supp. 1258 (D. Minn. 1997).
Owens Valley, 185 F.3d at 1034; Minn. Chippewa, 978 F. Supp. at 1260.
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unlawful detainer actions or any other disputes regarding an
individual tribal member's right to possess tribal trust land, even
under a lease.' 8 ' Thus, this proviso stands as an independent
barrier to the exercise of state court jurisdiction over unlawful
detainer actions: A court that did not obtain jurisdiction over Indian
Country in accordance with Public Law 280 certainly has no
jurisdiction over such actions, and even one that did is nonetheless
barred from exercising such jurisdiction under the proviso.
In addition to these many limitations on state court jurisdiction,
another significant cause of the "no forum" problem in Indian Law
is that a tribal court simply does not exist, or, if one does, it lacks
jurisdiction over a particular type of dispute as a matter of tribal
law.'8 2 In Schantz, Neadeau, Minnesota Chippewa, and Owens
Valley, it was the lack of a tribal court or the absence of jurisdiction
as a matter of tribal law that resulted in the "no forum" problem,
rather than any external limitation imposed by federal law. The
most straightforward solution to this problem-and the one that
would be most consistent with encouraging tribal sovereignty and
self-determination-would be for the tribes themselves to create18a3
forum or extend jurisdiction to cover such circumstances.
However, the absence of a tribal forum usually results when a tribe
lacks the resources and expertise necessary to establish a tribal
court. The lack of a tribal forum is generally not the result of a
deliberate tribal legislative decision to preclude judicial remedies.' 8 4
In some instances, however, the lack of a tribal forum is due to
provisions in tribal constitutions or codes, often recommended to the
tribes by the federal government,'8 5 that condition civil jurisdiction
in suits between Indians and non-Indians on the consent of all the

...All Mission Indian Hous. Auth. v. Silvas, 680 F. Supp. 330, 331-32 (C.D. Cal. 1987);
Hous. Auth. of Seminole Nation v. Harjo, 790 P.2d 1098, 1104 (Okla. 1990); Ahboah v. Hous.
Auth. of Kiowa Tribe, 660 P.2d 625, 627 (Okla. 1983).
'
Reynolds, supra note 27, at 576.
"s See Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 27, at 1428-31 (discussing danger of lack of
jurisdiction); Pendleton, supra note 53, at 543-44 (arguing most satisfactory solution is for
tribe to provide forum); Pommersheim, supra note 56, at 351 (suggesting lack of tribal
jurisdiction decreases permissible range of matters for tribes to control).
'" All Mission Indian Hous. Auth., 680 F. Supp. at 33; Reynolds, supra note 27, at 577.
'8 E.g., 25 C.F.R. § 11.103(a) (2001).
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to when
parties-something that no defendant is likely to consent
86
his alternative is to be free from suit in any forum.1
Yet a third significant cause of the "no forum" problem in Indian
Law are the limitations on federal court jurisdiction. Federal courts
are courts of limited jurisdiction, subject to the constraints imposed
by Article III of the U.S. Constitution." 7 The federal courts are
further limited to exercising the statutory grants of power given to
them by Congress.1 88 Unlike personal jurisdiction and sovereign
immunity, the parties cannot waive subject matter jurisdiction.'8 9
Potential sources of statutory subject matter jurisdiction over
civil actions involving Indian tribes, tribal members, tribal entities,
and cases arising in Indian Country include federal question
192
9
jurisdiction,' 0 diversity jurisdiction, ' alienage jurisdiction,
foreign state defendant jurisdiction,' 9 foreign state plaintiff
However, in
jurisdiction,'9 4 and Indian tribe jurisdiction.'9 5
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,'9 6 the Supreme Court held that an
Indian tribe is not a "foreign State" within the meaning of Article
IJI,197 which provides that the federal judicial power extends to
actions "between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States,
Citizens or Subjects."' 98 This provision of Article III provides the
20 0
99
basis for the statutory grants of alienage, foreign state plaintiff,
and foreign state defendant20 ' jurisdiction. Cherokee Nation thus
Pommersheim, supra note 56, at 338-39 & nn.67-68, 348.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (discussing scope of federal judicial power).
' See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486,512-13 (1969) ([A] federal district court lacks
jurisdiction over the subject matter... if the cause is not one described by any jurisdictional
statute.").
'" Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 398 (1975); Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U.S. 237,244 (1934).
,0 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994).
191 Id. § 1332(a)(1).
Id. § 1332(a)(2)-(3).
I"
"3 Id. § 1330(a).
194 Id. § 1332(a)(4).
' Id. § 1362.
"
30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
'
CherokeeNation, 30 U.S. at 16-19.
"8 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cL 1.
" Singh v. Daimler-Benz AG, 9 F.3d 303, 305 (3d Cir. 1993); Iran Handicraft & Carpet
Exp. Ctr. v. Marian Intel Corp., 655 F. Supp. 1275, 1277 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
' Nael Petrochemical Co. v. MiT Stolt Sheaf, 860 F.2d 551, 553 (2d Cir. 1988).
2" COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 94TH CONG., JURISDICTION OF UNITED STATES COURTS IN
SUITS AGAINST FOREIGN STATES, H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 12, 33 (1976), reprintedin 1976
I

'
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forecloses the exercise of federal court jurisdiction over actions
involving Indian tribes, tribal entities or tribal members on the
basis of these statutory provisions." 2 Accordingly, the rest of this
section focuses on the remaining, potentially applicable statutory
sources of subject matter jurisdiction-federal question, Indian
tribe, and diversity jurisdiction. As these jurisdictional limitations
on the federal courts are equally applicable in the "no forum" and
"biased forum" scenarios, the limitations discussed in this section
will likewise be applicable to this Article's subsequent discussion of
the "biased forum" problem in Indian Law.
Section 1331 provides statutory federal question jurisdiction only
over those civil actions "arising under" federal law. 0 3 However, the
meaning of "arising under" for purposes of section 1331 is different
from and substantially narrower than the meaning of the identical
phrase as used in Article IM."04 As a general rule, a suit "arises

U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6611, 6632. Strictly speaking, however, foreign state defendant
jurisdiction-which is provided for in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act-is based only
in part on this language in Article III. It is also based on that portion of Article III, § 2, cl. 1
extending the judicial power to cases "arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United
States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority." Verlinden B.V.
v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 491-92 (1983). Yet reliance on the "arising under" clause
has nothing to do with the nature of the defendant as a foreign state, but has rather to do
with the plaintiff being a citizen of a foreign state, which would not be covered by the grant
of judicial power over actions "between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States,
Citizens or Subjects." Id. Accordingly, the foreign state defendant provision's reliance on the
"arising under" clause does not alter the definition of "foreign State" derived from Cherokee
Nation.
22 See, e.g., Stock West, Inc. v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, 873
F.2d
1221, 1226 (9th Cir. 1989) C'Regarding the citizenship of the tribal parties for the purposes
of diversity jurisdiction, first, it is perhaps clear that an Indian tribe is not a foreign state.');
Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 464 F.2d 916, 923 (2d. Cir. 1972) 'Neither can
plaintiffs establish diversity jurisdiction under § 1332(a)(3).... [t]he Oneida Nation of New
York is not 'a foreign state.' This was established as long ago as Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia ..
") (citation omitted), rev'd on other grounds by 414 U.S. 661, 682 (1974);
Romanella v. Hayward, 933 F. Supp. 163,166 (D. Conn. 1996) ('[The Supreme Courtlong-ago
held that an Indian tribe is not a foreign state.... Consequently, this court may exercise
diversity jurisdiction over this action only if the Tribe is a citizen of [a state different from
that of the opposing parties].") (citation omitted), affd, 114 F.3d 15, 16 (2d Cir. 1997). But see
Krempel v. Prairie Island Indian Cmty., 888 F. Supp. 106, 107-08 (D. Minn. 1995) (finding
jurisdiction under § 1332(a)(2) where plaintiff is citizen of Wisconsin and defendants are
citizen of Minnesota and Indian tribe, thus deeming tribe to be citizen of foreign state), reu'd
on other grounds by 125 F.3d 621, 622 (1997).
2
28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994).
2" Verlinden B.V., 461 U.S. at 494-95.

20021

NO MAN'S LAND

927

under" federal law for purposes of section 1331 only when the cause
of action itself is created by federal law,20 5 including federal common
law.2" 6 Thus, the mere fact that one of the parties to the suit is a
tribal member,2 7 an Indian tribe,20 8 or a tribal entity2°9 is insufficient to invoke a federal court's statutory federal question jurisdiction. Likewise, federal question jurisdiction will not extend to a
cause of action simply because tribal trust lands are involved in the
controversy,2 10 or because the case involves Indian property or a
contract to which a tribe is a party." In the view of some lower
federal courts, a contrary holding would mean that "the federal
12
courts might become a small claims court for all such disputes."
Thus, under existing case law, section 1331 would not provide

' Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257,260 (1916). In addition, the
Court has recognized that a suit may be deemed to arise under federal law for purposes of§
1331 even if the cause of action itself is created by state law, so long as a substantial question
of federal law is an essentialcomponent ofthe state law cause ofaction. Merrell Dow Pharm.,
Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 807 (1986); Franchise Tax Bd. v. Const. Laborers Vacation
Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 27:28 (1983); Smith v. Kan. City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 199
(1921). In addition, the Supreme Court has recognized that in certain cases in which federal
law creates the cause of action, but merely incorporates state law in toto, the suit may be
deemed not to arise under federal law for purposes of§ 1331. Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter,
177 U.S. 505, 508 (1900).
26 Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 98-99 (1972); Romero v. Intl Terminal
Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 392-93 (1959) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
SMartinez v. S. Ute Tribe, 273 F.2d 731, 734 (10th Cir. 1960); Deere v. St. Lawrence
River Power Co., 32 F.2d 550, 551 (2d Cir. 1929).
TamiamiPartners, Ltd. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 999 F.2d 503,507-08 (11th Cir.
1993); Stock West, Inc. v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, 873 F.2d 1221,
1225-26 (9th Cir. 1989); GNS, Inc. v. Winnebago Tribe, 866 F. Supp. 1185, 1191 (N.D. Iowa
1994) (citing Tamiami,999 F.2d at 507-08; Stock West, 873 F.2d at 1225; Martinez, 249 F.2d
at 917).
' See Weeks Const., Inc. v. Oglala Sioux Hous. Auth., 797 F.2d 668,672 (8th Cir. 1986)
(noting that mere fact that housing authority is created by and operates on behalf of Indian
tribe does not mean that disputes involving housing authority raise federal question) (citing
Martinez,249 F.2d at 917).
210 Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 676 (1974); Minn. Chippewa
Tribal Hous. Corp. v. Reese, 978 F. Supp. 1258, 1264-66 & n.9 (). Minn. 1997); Round Valley
Indian Hous. Auth. v. Hunter, 907 F. Supp. 1343, 1348-49 (N.D. Cal. 1995); COHEN'S
HANDBOOKOFFEDERALINDIANLAW, supra note 46, at 312. But see All Mission Indian Hous.
Auth. v. Silvas, 680 F. Supp. 330, 331-32 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (finding dispute involving tribal
trust lands arises under federal common law).
21 Stock West, 873 F.2dat 1225-26; GNS, Inc., 866 F. Supp. at 1191 (citing Tamiami,999
F.2d at 507-08; Stock West, 873 F.2d at 1225; Martinez,249 F.2d at 917).
212 Stock West, 873 F.2d at 1225-26 (quoting Gila River Indian Comty. v. Henningson,
Durham & Richardson, 626 F.2d 708, 715 (9th Cir. 1980)).
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jurisdiction over actions involving simple tort, contract, or landlordtenant disputes-such as those involved in Schantz, Neadeau,
Minnesota Chippewa, and Owens Valley-merely because the
dispute arose in Indian Country or one of the parties is a tribe,
tribal entity or tribal member.
A related limitation on section 1331 is the well-pleaded complaint
rule, which provides that a suit "arises under" the Constitution and
laws of the United States only when "the plaintiff's statement of his
own cause of action shows that it is based upon those laws or that
Constitution."" 3 Thus, the mere fact that a federal question is
raised in the dispute by way of a defense is insufficient to invoke
federal question jurisdiction.2 14 As with the construction of "arising
under" for purposes of section 1331, the well-pleaded complaint rule
is a gloss on section 1331 itself and not an Article III requirement.1 5
The Supreme Court has thus made clear that the fact that an
Indian tribe raises the defense of sovereign immunity does not allow
for removal of the case from state to federal court. In Oklahoma
Tax Commission v. Graham,"' Oklahoma filed suit in state court
against the Chickasaw Tribe, seeking to collect unpaid state excise
taxes on the sale of cigarettes and taxes on the receipts from bingo
games at an inn owned and operated by the tribe.21 The tribe
removed the suit to federal court, and the district court denied the
motion to remand and dismissed the suit on the merits, finding it
barred by the federal right of tribal sovereign immunity.2 18 The
court of appeals affirmed and reaffirmed after a remand from the
U.S. Supreme Court.1 9 The case then returned to the Supreme
Court for a second time. The Court held that even though tribal
sovereign immunity may provide a complete defense, and even
though the scope of tribal sovereign immunity is governed by federal

213 Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908); see also GoldWashing &Water Co. v. Keyes, 96 U.S. 199,203-04 (1877) (citing to Chitty to determine what
allegations are proper in well-pleaded complaint).
214 Mottley, 211 U.S. at 152.
215 Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 494.95 (1983); Osborn v. Bank of
the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 819 (1824).
2,6 489 U.S. 838 (1989).
2,1 Id. at 839.
218 Id.

219

Id. at 839-40.
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law, the suit did not "arise under" federal law for purposes of section
1331 in light of the well-pleaded complaint rule.22 The Court noted
that Congress has provided by statute for removal when it desires
federal courts to adjudicate defenses based on federal immunities,
and Congress had not so legislated with respect to tribal sovereign
immunity. 2 ' Accordingly, under the well-pleaded complaint rule if
a party sues an Indian tribe in state court on a state-law claim, the
federal defense of tribal sovereign immunity is an insufficient basis
for the tribe to remove the action to federal court; likewise, the
plaintiff cannot anticipate the defense of tribal sovereign immunity
and file the case in federal court in the first instance.222
Faced with the prospect that a failure to exercise jurisdiction over
an Indian Law dispute will result in the "no forum" problem, most
federal courts have nonetheless dismissed these suits, reasoning
that the lack of an alternative forum does not suffice to raise a
federal question. 8 A few lower federal courts have rejected this
reasoning and have strained to find federal question jurisdiction in
what facially appear to be run-of-the-mill tort disputes.
In OneidaIndianNation v. County of Oneida,24 two Indian tribes
brought suit in federal district court against two New York counties,
alleging that the tribes' cession of land to the state in the late 1700s
lacked the consent of the federal government and was thus contrary
to the tribes' federal right of possession. 225 The district court
dismissed the action for want of subject matter jurisdiction, holding
that the cause of action was created under state law and required
only allegations of the tribes' possessory rights and the state's
interference therewith and that the possible need to interpret a

Id. at 841-42.
Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) (federal officer removal statute) and 28 U.S.C. §
1330(a) (foreign sovereign immunities act removal statute)).
222 Id. at 841.
' See, e.g., Owens Valley Indian Hous. Auth. v. Turner, 185 F.3d 1029, 1034 (9th Cir.
1999) ("It is not at all anomalous that § 1360(b)'s preclusion of state jurisdiction would be
greater than § 1331's grant of federal jurisdiction. Congress limits state jurisdiction over
Indians in order to protect tribal sovereignty."), withdrawn, 192 F.3d 1330 (9th Cir. 1999);
Minn. Chippewa Tribal Hous. Corp. v. Reese, 978 F. Supp. 1258, 1263-64 (D. Minn. 1997)
(ruling that lack of alternative forum is insufficient to invoke federal subject matter
jurisdiction).
2
414 U.S. 661 (1974).
2'sId.
at 663-65.
2

930

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:895

federal statute or treaties to resolve a potential defense was
insufficient to sustain jurisdiction under section 1331.226 The Court
of Appeals affirmed, 227 noting that, under the well-pleaded complaint rule, a case does not "arise under" federal law unless reliance
on a federal right appears on the face of a well-pleaded complaint.2 25
The court of appeals characterized the tribes' action as "basically
[one] in ejectment" under state law, and cited to a series of Supreme
Court cases holding that a complaint in an ejectment action
presents no federal question (even when a plaintiffs title is founded
on a federal statute, patent or treaty) and stating that the basis on
which one's title is founded is not a necessary element to a complaint in ejectment.2 29
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed."' The Court
found that the tribe was asserting a right to possession arising
under federal and not merely state law, and thus that federal law
created the tribe's cause of action.2"' The Court distinguished
Taylor v. Anderson,212 an earlier case on which the court of appeals
relied heavily, where the Court had found jurisdiction lacking in a
suit by individual Indians concerning lands patented to them
individually with a temporary restriction on the right of
alienation. 3 Unlike Taylor, the dispute in Oneida involved land to
which the claimant Indian tribes held aboriginal title guaranteed by
treaty and protected by federal statute. 2 4 Accordingly, the Court
reasoned that, while local property law governs the incidents of
ownership of land that has been patented to individual Indians, a
tribe's possessory interest in tribal lands is an interest that has
been continuously protected by federal law wholly apart from any
protections available under local law.2 35
226

Id.
Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 464 F.2d 916, 924 (2d Cir. 1972).

228 Id. at 920.

Id. (citing Florida Cent. & Peninsular R.R. Co. v. Bell, 176 U.S. 321 (1900); Filhiol v.
Maurice, 185 U.S. 108 (1902); Filhiol v. Torney, 194 U.S. 356 (1904); Taylor v. Anderson, 234
U.S. 74 (1914); White v. Sparkhill Realty Corp., 280 U.S. 500 (1930)).
23
Oneida,414 U.S. at 666.
231 Id.
m 234 U.S. 74 (1914).
2'3 Id. at 74-76.
"

Oneida, 414 U.S. at 676.
Id. at 677.
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The Tenth Circuit has given an expansive reading to, the scope of
the federal right of possession, extending it beyond ejectment
actions of the sort involved in Oneida-where the parties are
actually disputing title to the subject property-to trespass
actions 2 6 and even nuisance actions 287 brought by an Indian tribe in
which there is no dispute as to the tribe's title to the property but
only a dispute as to liability for damages. The Tenth Circuit's broad
interpretation of the federal right of possession appears in part to
be motivated by a fear of relegating the tribes to state court, where
238
their ability to vindicate their claims is subject to some doubt.
The Tenth Circuit's view of the federal right to possession under
Oneida thus clearly provides jurisdiction over some tort actions
brought by Indian tribes that one would not have thought sustainable in federal court prior to Oneida, and thus, to some extent,
reduces the "no forum" and "biased forum" Indian Law problems.
In All Mission IndianHousingAuthority v. Silvas,"9 one federal
district court-facing a potential "no forum" dilemma in the context
of an unlawful detainer action-sought to extend substantially the
Supreme Court's decision in Oneida. In All Mission, the Housing
Authority-a federally funded entity organized by seventeen
California Indian tribes to provide low-income housing for Indian
families on the tribes' reservations-brought an unlawful detainer
240
action to evict Indian tenants who had failed to pay their rent.
The property at issue was unallotted tribal trust land of one of the
tribes that had been leased to the Housing Authority which, in turn,
leased it to the families. 4 ' Evidently for economic reasons, none of
the tribes had established a tribal court with jurisdiction over such

See Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Burgett Floral Co., 503 F.2d 336, 337-38 (10th Cir.
1974) (finding right to sue in trespass is itself possessory right, and refusing to draw
distinction between ejectment and trespass actions).
' See Pueblo of Isleta v. Universal Constructors, Inc., 570 F.2d 300, 300-02 (10th Cir.
1978) (finding suit brought by tribe against company that had engaged in blasting activities
outside of reservation boundaries that resulted in damage to property within reservation's
boundaries was possessory right).
*' See id. at 302 ("If we were to relegate these plaintiffs to State court ... there is no
assurance that they would be allowed to assert their rights there.").
23 680 F. Supp. 330 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
240 Id. at 331.
241 Id.
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matters, 242 and the encumbrance proviso in Public Law 280
precluded jurisdiction in the state court.243
To avoid the "no forum" problem, the All Mission court broadly
read Oneida as standing for the proposition that "an action asserting a right to possession of Indian lands arises under federal law."2 "
From this the court reasoned that, since the unlawful detainer
action brought by the Housing Authority was asserting a right to
possess Indian trust lands, it too arose under federal common law
for purposes of section 1331 and, accordingly, that the federal court
could exercise subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute.245
Most courts have rejected the All Mission court's application of
Oneidato run-of-the-mill unlawful detainer actions. These courts,
relying on the Oneida Court's distinction of Taylor, reason the
federal common law cause of action identified in Oneidacovers only
suits in which the tribe itself is asserting its right of possession, and
not where some other entity or individual is asserting a right to
possess tribal trust land.246 The stumbling block for these courts
appears to be the fact that it is an intermediary-the tribal housing
authority-and not the tribe itself that is seeking to regain possession of the tribal trust property. 247 This suggests that they might
hold otherwise were the tribe itself operating the rental property
directly involved in tenant disputes.

242

Id.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1360(b) (1994) (providing that nothing contained in § 1360 "shall confer
jurisdiction upon the State to adjudicate. . the ownership or right to possession of such
property [i.e., property of any Indian tribe held in trust by the United States] or any interest
therein."). See supranotes 177-81 and accompanying text (discussing encumbrance proviso
in Public Law 280).
2" All Mission, 680 F. Supp. at 332.
245 Id. at 331-32. The court also concluded that, in applying federal common law, it could
look to and incorporate by reference state law on the subject. Id. at 332.
21 See Owens Valley Indian Hous. Auth. v. Hunter, 185 F.3d 1029,1032-33
(9th Cir. 1999)
(tribal housing authority seeking to regain possession ofhousing unit from individual Indian
tenant who had failed to pay rent); Minn. Chippewa Tribal Hous. Corp. v. Reese, 978 F. Supp.
1258, 1266 n.9 (D. Minn. 1997) (tribal housing authority that had loaned money seeking to
take possession of mortgaged property for failure to satisfy loan agreement); Round Valley
Indian Hous. Auth. v. Hunter, 907 F. Supp. 1343, 1346-49 & n.4 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (same);
supra notes 232-35 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court treatment of Taylor
in Oneida opinion).
247 Owens Valley, 185 F.3d at 1032-33.
242
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In Richardson v. Malone,1 8 a non-Indian plaintiff brought suit
against two members of the Osage Indian Tribe, alleging that they
fraudulently induced him into loaning them money to purchase a
trailer house and an automobile, both located on tribal lands.249 A
tribal court did not exist on the Osage Reservation, so the plaintiff
brought suit in federal district court, seeking judgment and a
constructive trust.2 " The court first held that the Oklahoma state
courts lacked jurisdiction over the dispute. According to the court
the state had disclaimed all jurisdiction over Indian lands in the
Oklahoma Enabling Act, the state had never asserted jurisdiction
over Indian lands when given the opportunity to do so without tribal
consent under the original Public Law 280, and since the 1968
amendments to Public Law 280 requiring tribal consent, the Osage
Tribe had not consented to the exercise of state jurisdiction over the
reservation.25'
The court strained to find federal jurisdiction on policy grounds,
noting that a failure to find jurisdiction would discourage commercial interaction between Indians and non-Indians and create a "zone
of piracy., 25 2 The Court found that the case arose under federal
common law.253 The court reasoned that Congress's statutory
scheme-whereby it has given states the option to assert both
criminal and civil jurisdiction over tribal lands, provided for the

248 762 F. Supp. 1463 (N.D. Okla. 1991).
249 Id. at 1464.
2W Id.
25! Id. at 1465-66.
252 See id. at 1466 & n.3.

Native Americans could enter into contracts to purchase goods outside
Indian Country, renege on payment, remove the property to Indian
Country, claim immunity from state process and sit "unmolested" legally,
inside the bounds of Indian Country. If such a zone of legal immunity
were recognized non-Indians would soon be loathe to contract with Native
Americans, fearing breach ofcontract and loss ofpurchased property upon
its removal to Indian Country. More to the point, a ruling which declines
federal jurisdiction effectively creates a jurisdictional vacuum where
neither state nor federal courts will tread. Such a vacuum could well
become a virtual "zone of piracy" where civil law does not exist. Such a
result is clearly contrary to the fundamental principles which undergird
this nation, and, as evinced by a long line of Congressional legislation.
Id. at 1466.
2

Id. at 1467.
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creation of C.F.R. courts,254 and legislated with the backdrop
knowledge that the Supreme Court has recognized tribal authority
to establish tribal courts-evinced a congressional intent to ensure
that some entity could always exercise judicial jurisdiction and thus
to avoid leaving a jurisdictional vacuum.255 The court recognized
that it had two options: to recognize a narrowly defined zone of
federal common law in those situations in which neither the federal,
state, nor tribal court had jurisdiction or to create a "zone of civil
lawlessness." 56 Finding that the federal courts had the authority
to create federal common law to fill the interstices of the statutory
and constitutional scheme in place for federal governance of Indian
territories, 5 ' the court concluded that:
[i]n the absence of the exercise of jurisdiction by the
state courts, or the existence of C.F.R. or Tribal
courts, there nevertheless exists a residue of federal
common law which the judicial branch can recognize
to fill the vacuum created by 'the inevitable incompleteness presented by [this body of] legislation. 58
No federal court to date has followed Richardson.5 ' Moreover,
its precise holding is unclear. The court did not definitively
establish whether it was asserting jurisdiction over this type of
dispute as a matter of federal common law or whether federal
common law governed the underlying substantive dispute, giving
the court federal question jurisdiction. If the former interpretation
For a discussion of C.F.R. courts, see infra notes 453-78 and accompanying text.
2 See Richardson, 762 F. Supp. at 1468-69.
Under Pub. L. 280, Congress gave States the option to assert both
criminal and civil jurisdiction over those trust lands.... Congress did not
intend there to be a vacuum, where no law held sway. Thus the Court
may properly find that Congressional intent was quite clearly not the
creation of a jurisdictional vacuum ....Congress intended that there be
a continuous exercise of law.
Id.; see also id. at 1469 ("Congress intended there to be rule of law in such lands .....
"

2
2

Id. at 1469.
Id. at 1467-68.

2"
See id. at 1468-69 (quoting United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580,
593 (1973)).
2'
The Richardsoncourt itself acknowledged that its holding was out-of-step with cases
such as Schantz. Id. at 1469 n.8
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is correct, the case is certainly suspect, for it fails to identify a
constitutional basis for exercising federal jurisdiction. However, the
decision may have some merit if the court was asserting that federal
common law governed the underlying dispute. The Supreme Court
has found it appropriate to fashion federal common law in areas
involving "uniquely federal interests."2 6 The Court has hardly been
clear on what qualifies as a "uniquely federal interest"; however the
Court has identified U.S. foreign relations as being such an area,
due to the uniformity needed in relations with other countries. 2 6 ' It
would thus appear as though Indian commerce, the regulation of
which is committed to the federal government in the Constitution,26 2
might likewise be an area involving a "uniquely federal interest,"
thus justifying the federal courts creating federal common law in
this area. However, if that is the case, it would seem to justify a
federal common law rule of decision in all cases, not merely in those
cases in which no alternative forum exists, unless the federal
interest is merely the assurance of some forum in which to adjudicate disputes involving Indians.
Of the remaining statutory provisions, section 1362, the Indian
tribe provision, would appear to be the most promising means of
exercising subject matter jurisdiction over run-of-the-mill actions
involving Indian tribes. Yet section 1362 grants jurisdiction only
where the Indian tribe is a plaintiff, the tribe is recognized by the
Secretary of the Interior, and the dispute "arises under" federal
law.26 Accordingly, it would appear at first glance to add little more
20 Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 500 (1988). This stands in contrast to the
Court's general reluctance to fashion federal common law in litigation involving private
parties (as opposed to actions involving the government itself). See, e.g., Miree v. DeKalb
County, 433 U.S. 25, 31 (1977); Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63,67-68 (1966);
Bank of Am. Nael Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29, 33 (1956).
See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 426-27 & n.25 (1964). See
generally MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF
JUDICIALPOWER 135-36 (2d ed. 1990) (discussing judicial treatment of foreign relations and
Sabbatinodecision).
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 ("The Congress shall have Power ... [to regulate
Commerce... with the Indian Tribes .. ").
2'
See 28 U.S.C. § 1362 (1994) (CThedistrict courts shall have original jurisdiction of all
civil actions, brought by any Indian tribe or band with a governing body duly recognized by
the Secretary of the Interior, wherein the matter in controversy arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."). A tribe that has incorporated as a federally
chartered corporation under the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, infra notes 344-46 and

936

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:895

than what is already available under section 1331, which provides
for federal question jurisdiction. At one time, however, the provision served a rather important purpose. At the time section 1362
was adopted, section 1331 contained a jurisdictional amount-incontroversy requirement of $10,000.264 The purpose of section 1362
was "merely [to] authorize the additional jurisdiction of the [federal]
court[s] over those cases where the tribes are not able to establish
that the amount in controversy exceeds that amount. '2 5 Although
today, section 1331 contains no jurisdictional amount, thus seemingly making section 1362 obsolete, a series of decisions leaves open
the possibility that section 1362 may reach some cases that section
1331 does not.
One way in which section 1362 may differ from section 1331 is
that the former, unlike the latter, may not be subject to the wellpleaded complaint rule. Recall that the well-pleaded complaint rule
is not required by Article III-it is merely a longstanding interpretation of section 1331.266 Recall further that the Supreme Court has
interpreted other statutory grants of federal question jurisdiction as
not being subject to the well-pleaded complaint rule.2 67 In the
Oneida case, discussed above,2 68 the Indian tribes had invoked both
sections 1331 and 1362.26' The court of appeals, in affirming the
district court's dismissal of the suit, assumed that the only difference between the two sections was that section 1362 contained no
jurisdictional minimum.2 7 Because the Supreme Court reversed the

accompanying text, is still considered to be an 'Indian tribe" within the meaning of § 1362.
See United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians v. Oklahoma ex rel. Moss, 927 F.2d 1170,
1174 (10th Cir. 1991); Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes v. Oklahoma, 618 F.2d 665, 666 (10th Cir.
1980).
2
Act of July 25, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-554, § 1, 72 Stat. 415.
2
H.R. REP. No. 89-2040 (1966), reprintedin 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3145, 3146.
Verlinden B.V.v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 494-95 (1983); see Osborn v. Bank
of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 823-25 (1824) (noting Article I only requires
federal "ingredient').
See Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Graham, 489 U.S. 838, 841-42 (1989) (citing 28 U.S.C. §
1442(a)(1) (federal officer removal statute) and 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (foreign sovereign
immunities act removal statute)); Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 136 (1989) (interpreting
28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1)); Verlinden B.V., 461 U.S. at 494-95 (interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a)).
268 See supranotes 224-35 and accompanying text.
Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 665 (1974).
21
Oneida Indian Nation of New York State v. County of Oneida, 464 F.2d 916,920 & n.4
(2d Cir. 1972), rev'd, 414 U.S. 661 (1974).
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case on the ground that the tribe's cause of action was derived from
federal law, the Court found it unnecessary to reach the question of
whether jurisdiction pursuant to section 1362 is broader than
jurisdiction under section 1331 and thus, inter alia,not subject to
the well-pleaded complaint rule.27 '
One court of appeals decision appears to have implicitly determined that the well-pleaded complaint rule does not apply to actions
brought pursuant to section 1362. In United Keetoowah Band of
Cherokee Indians v. Oklahoma ex rel. Moss, 27 2 the State of

Oklahoma brought suit against a tribe in state court to enjoin the
tribe's operation of a gaming hall, which violated Oklahoma gaming
laws.
The tribe responded by bringing suit in federal district
court, seeking a declaratory judgment that the state was without
legislative jurisdiction and seeking an injunction against further
proceedings in the state court.2 '4 The federal court held that where
the tribe asserts immunity from enforcement of state laws, it states
27 5
a controversy within section 1362 that arises under federal law.
To be sure, the suit brought by the tribe in United Keetoowah
raised a federal question on its face-whether the state had
legislative jurisdiction over the tribe. 6 Typically, however, when
suit is brought pursuant to the Federal Declaratory Judgment
Act,277 the presence or absence of federal jurisdiction is determined

by looking to whether the federal court would have had jurisdiction
over the coercive suit that could have been brought absent the
existence of the Act under the Supreme Court's decision in Skelly
Oil Co. v. PhillipsPetroleum Co.1 7 ' The purpose of this rule is to

OneidaIndian Nation, 414 U.S. at 682 n.16.
2 927 F.2d 1170 (10th Cir. 1991). Two other courts of appeals cases have squarely faced
the matter since Oneida. One left the question open while the other simply assumed without
deliberation that the well-pleaded complaint rule applied to section 1362. Mescalero Apache
Tribe v. Martinez, 519 F.2d 479,481 (10th Cir. 1975) (leaving question open); Morongo Band
of Mission Indians v. Cal. State Bd. of Equalization, 858 F.2d 1376, 1383-84, 1386 (9th Cir.
1988) (applying well-pleaded complaint rule to section 1362).
27
United Keetoowah Band, 927 F.2d at 1171-72.
271

"' Id. at 1172.

Id. at 1173-74.
2" Id. at 1173.
2
28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202 (1994).
278 339 U.S. 667, 671-72 (1950) (The operation of the Declaratory Judgment Act is
proceduralonly. Congress enlarged the range of remedies available in the Federal courts but
2'
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prevent a party from circumventing the well-pleaded complaint rule
via the Declaratory Judgment Act." 9 Since in United Keetoowah,
the coercive suit that could have been brought in the absence of the
Act was the very state enforcement proceeding that the tribe sought
to enjoin, and since the federal question of the state's legislative
jurisdiction likely would enter such a dispute only by way of a
defense, there would normally be no federal court jurisdiction over
the declaratory judgment action under Skelly Oil. But since the rule
in Skelly Oil is a mere extension of the well-pleaded complaint
rule, 280 the fact that United Keetoowah found jurisdiction over the
case implies that the well-pleaded complaint rule does not apply to
actions brought pursuant to section 1362.
Yet even assuming that section 1362 would allow for federal
court jurisdiction where a federal question enters the dispute only
by way of a defense, it is unclear that it would have a significant
effect on federal court jurisdiction, particularly where contract or
tort actions are concerned. Suppose that any party other than an
Indian tribe wishes to institute a contract or tort action against an
Indian tribe and anticipates that the tribe will raise the defense of
tribal sovereign immunity. The absence of a well-pleaded complaint
rule would appear to allow such a case to be brought in federal
court. However, the plain language of section 1362 precludes such
actions for it provides jurisdiction over only those cases brought by
a tribe-it does not provide jurisdiction over actions brought by
tribal members, 281 tribal entities, 282 or non-Indians. 21 Conversely,

did not extend their jurisdiction.") (internal quotations omitted).
27 See id. at 673-74.
To sanction suits for declaratory relief as within the jurisdiction of the
District Courts merely because, as in this case, artful pleading anticipates
a defense based on federal law would contravene the whole trend of
jurisdictional legislation by Congress, disregard the effective functioning
of the federal judicial system and distort the limited purpose of the
Declarators Judgement Act.
Id.
Id.

United States v. State Tax Comm'n, 505 F.2d 633,638 (5th Cir. 1974); Quinault Tribe
of Indians v. Gallagher, 368 F.2d 648, 656 (9th Cir. 1966).
'
See Navajo Tribal Util. Auth. v. Ariz. Dep't of Revenue, 608 F.2d 1228, 1230-33 (9th
Cir. 1979) C"e are convinced that section 1362 does notcover subordinate, semi-autonomous
tribal entities."); All Mission Indian Hous. Auth. v. Silvas, 680 F. Supp. 330, 331 (C.D. Cal.
1987). However, where a tribe and a tribal entity jointly bring suit, one federal court has held
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where a tribe wishes to suesomeone in contract or in tort, the lack
of a well-pleaded complaint rule under section 1362 is not likely to
make a difference. Unless the tribe is suing another sovereign, the
defendant is not going to have the federal defense of sovereign
immunity, and thus no federal question
will arise either on the face
284
of the complaint or as a defense.

A second way in which section 1362 may differ from section 1331
is suggested by language in a Supreme Court opinion intimating
that the former provides jurisdiction over any suit by a tribe that
could have been brought on the tribe's behalf by the United States
as its trustee. In Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of
FlatheadReservation,285 the Supreme Court held that section 1362
creates an exception to the Tax Anti-Injunction Act 286 where a tribe
wishes to challenge a state's levy or collection of taxes against a
tribe.28 The basis for this holding was the Court's finding that
section 1362 was designed not only to eliminate the jurisdictional
minimum, but that its implicit purpose was that "a tribe's access to
federal court... would be at least in some respects288as broad as that
of the United States suing as the tribe's trustee."

Seeking to extend this logic, two Alaskan native villages argued
in Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak289 that section 1362
overrides the Eleventh Amendment bar to a tribe's ability to bring
suit against a state.29 The villages contended that, because the
Eleventh Amendment does not bar the United States from bringing
suit against a state291 and the United States has standing to sue a

jurisdiction over the suit proper under § 1362. Tohono O'Odham Nation v. Schwartz, 837 F.
Supp. 1024, 1028 (D. Ariz. 1993).
' Hickey v. Crow Creek Hous. Auth., 379 F. Supp. 1002, 1004 (D.S.D. 1974); Enter. Elec.
Co. v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 353 F. Supp. 991, 992-93 (D. Mont. 1973).
' See, e.g., Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Martinez, 519 F.2d 479, 481 (10th Cir. 1975)
C'Even if the broader approach be followed in the instant case, there would still be no federal
question presented... . [There is still nothing whatsoever in the instant case to suggest that
we have anything here but a simple breach of contract case.").
2 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
m 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994).
281 Moe, 425 U.S. at 470-75.
2 Id. at 473.
2"501

21

US. 775 (1991).

Id. at 782-84.

United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 626-27 (1892).
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state on behalf of an Indian tribe,292 and because Moe held that the
purpose of section 1362 was to allow a tribe to bring suit where the
United States could sue as the tribe's trustee but opted not to,293 the

logical conclusion was that state sovereign immunity could not bar
a suit brought under section 1362 by a tribe.294 The Supreme Court
distinguished Moe, noting that in that case section 1362 was held to
override a limitation contained in another congressional statute,
while in Blatchford, the villages were asking the Court to read
section 1362 so as to override a provision of the Constitution.295
While distinguishing the special case of state sovereign immunity
from the rule announced in Moe, the Blatchford Court did not
otherwise suggest a limited reading of Moe or section 1362.296 Some

lower federal courts have thus construed section 1362 as providing
federal courts with jurisdiction over any suit that could have been
brought by the United States as trustee but was not, save for those
instances in which suit is brought against a state. Of course, when
the United States is a party to a suit, the federal courts always have
subject matter jurisdiction, unless excepted by statute,2 7 so this
reasoning would substantially expand federal court jurisdiction over
suits brought by Indian tribes.
In Salt RiverPima-MaricopaIndian Community v. Arizona Sand
& Rock Co.,29 8 a tribe brought suit in federal court against a group

of defendants, alleging that they trespassed on reservation lands. 99
The defendants moved to dismiss, contending that the case raised
no federal question."' The district court refused to dismiss the
action.30' The Court noted that, under federal law, the U.S.
Attorney has authority to represent tribes in lawsuits,102 but that its
exercise of this authority is discretionary.0 3 The Court concluded

2'

United States v. Minnesota, 270 U.S. 181, 195 (1926).
Moe, 425 U.S. at 473.
Blatchford, 501 U.S. at 782-84.
Id. at 784-85.
Id. at 785.

28 U.S.C. § 1345 (1994).
m 353 F. Supp. 1098 (D. Ariz. 1972).

2'

Id.
Id.
o Id.
Id.

'o

at
at
at
at

1098.
1099.
1100.
1099.

o Id. (citing Rincon Band of Mission Indians v. Escondido Mut. Wat. Co., 459 F.2d 1082
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that since the federal government declined to exercise its discretionary authority to bring an action the tribe could thus bring the
suit."0 4 Based on the legislative history of section 1362, the court
reasoned that "[u]nder § 1362 any case which might have been
brought by the United States is deemed to be one arising under the
Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States if it is brought on
behalf of an Indian tribe by their own attorneys. ' ' 8°5
In a subsequent case, FortMojave Tribe v. Lafollette,30 the Ninth
Circuit appeared to endorse this logic. There, the Court of Appeals
found that a federal court had subject matter jurisdiction over a
quiet title action involving Indian lands, stating "Congress intended
by § 1362 to authorize an Indian tribe to bring suit in federal court
to protect its federally deprived property rights in those situations
where the United States declines to act."0 7 Yet, perhaps in
realization of the fact that this view of section 1362 could allow
virtually all claims involving Indian tribes into federal court, the
Ninth Circuit subsequently pulled back. In Gila River Indian
Community v. Henningson, Durham & Richardson,"'8 a tribe
brought suit against an architectural firm and a building contractor
for damages caused by the defendants' alleged negligent design and
construction of a youth center built on the reservation.0 9 The Ninth
Circuit distinguished the Tenth Circuit's decisions in Mescaleroand
Pueblo"'0 as well as the district court's decision in Salt River and its
own prior decision in Fort Mojave on the ground that they all fell
within the federal right of possession identified in Oneida."1 '
Characterizing the case before it as "a simple breach of contract
case," the court refused to read these precedents so broadly as to

(9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Gila River Pima-Maricopa Indian Cmty., 391 F.2d 53 (9th
Cir.3NId.
1958); Siniscal v. United States, 208 F.2d 406 (9th Cir. 1953)).
at 1100.
Id.
478 F.2d 1016 (9th Cir. 1973).
'o

Id. at 1018.

o 626 F.2d 708 (9th Cir. 1980).
309Id. at 709.
310 See discussion supranotes 236-38 and accompanying text.
3" Gila River, 626 F.2d at 712-14.
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encompass any case that could have been brought by the United
3 12
States but was not.
The domestic diversity statute-28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1)-appears
to provide a means by which run-of-the mill tort or contract actions
involving tribes, tribal entities, or tribal members can be heard in
federal court. Under section 1332(a)(1), a federal court can exercise
subject matter jurisdiction over a non-federal cause of action,
provided that the suit is between "citizens of different States" and
the amount in dispute exceeds $75,000.' While the Achilles heel
of federal question jurisdiction is the well-pleaded complaint rule,
that of diversity jurisdiction is the "complete diversity" rule, under
which no plaintiff can be from the same state as any defendant. 14
In the context of disputes involving tribes, tribal entities, and
tribal members, there are two major questions regarding a federal
court's ability to exercise diversity jurisdiction. First, for purposes
of the diversity statute, what is the citizenship of tribes, tribal
entities, and tribal members? Second, what effect, if any, do the
limits imposed on state courts by the Williams non-infringement
test and Public Law 280 have on the ability of a federal court sitting
in diversity to exercise jurisdiction over a dispute arising in Indian
Country?
Every federal court of appeals that has considered the matter has
held that an Indian tribe is not a citizen of any state, and thus
cannot sue or be sued in federal court under the statutory grant of
diversity jurisdiction. 15 Yet few of these decisions provide much
rationale for their holdings, instead relying directly or indirectly on
Id. at 714.
3'3 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
3," Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267-68 (1806), overruled on other
grounds by Louisville, Cincinnati, & Charleston R.R. Co. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497
(1844). And just as the "well.pleaded complainf' rule is a statutory rather than a constitutional mandate, so too is the "complete diversity" rule. Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger,
437 U.S. 365, 373 n.13 (1978); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530-31
(1967).
" Akins v. Penobscot Nation, 130 F.3d 482, 485 (1st Cir. 1997); Romanella v. Hayward,
114 F.3d 15, 16 (2d Cir. 1997); Gaines v. Ski Apache, 8 F.3d 726, 729 (10th Cir. 1993);
Standing Rock Sioux Indian Tribe v. Dorgan, 505 F.2d 1135, 1140 (8th Cir. 1974); Calumet
Gaming Group-Kan., Inc. v. Kickapoo Tribe, 987 F. Supp. 1321, 1324-25 (D. Kan. 1997); Abdo
v. Fort Randall Casino, 957 F. Supp. 1111, 1112 (D.S.D. 1997); Whiteco Metrocom Div. of
Whiteco Indust., Inc. v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 902 F. Supp. 199,201 (D.S.D. 1995); GNS, Inc.
v. Winnebago Tribe, 866 F. Supp. 1185, 1191 (N.D. Iowa 1994).
312
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the Second Circuit's decision in Oneida IndianNation v. County of
Oneida311 to justify their result. 17 Accordingly, it is worth reexamining the Oneida decision. 8 '
In Oneida, the Oneida Indian Nation of New York and the
Oneida Indian Nation of Wisconsin brought suit against the
counties of Oneida and Madison in New York state.319 In assessing
diversity jurisdiction, the district court assumed without deciding
that the Oneida Indian Nation of Wisconsin was a citizen of
Wisconsin, and focused its discussion on the citizenship of the
Oneida Indian Nation of New York. 20 The court found diversity
jurisdiction lacking, analogizing an Indian tribe to an unincorporated association. 2 ' The result was that, under the Supreme
Court's decisionin UnitedSteelworkers of America v. R.H.Bouligny,
Inc.,322 diversity was defeated because some of the Nation's members
were citizens of New York.323 Because the defendant-counties were
both citizens of New York for purposes of the diversity statute, 24
complete diversity would be destroyed if any member of the
plaintiff-tribes were a citizen of New York.
In Bouligny, a North Carolina corporation brought a defamation
suit in a North Carolina state court against the United Steelworkers

316 464 F.2d 916 (2d Cir. 1972), overruled on othergrounds by 414 U.S. 661 (1974).

3" See Gaines, 8 F.3d at 729 ("[A]vailable authority holds that Indian tribes are not
citizens of any state for purposes of diversity jurisdiction.") (citing StandingRock, 505 F.2d
at 1140 and Oneida,464 F.2d at 922-23); StandingRock, 505 F.2d at 1140 ("[]t is clear that
an Indian tribe is not a citizen of any state and cannot sue or be sued in federal court under
diversity jurisdiction") (citing Oneida,464 F.2d 916); Calumet Gaming,987 F. Supp. at 132425 ("Indian tribes are not citizens ofany state for purposes of diversity jurisdiction.") (quoting
Gaines, 8 F.3d at 729; citing StandingRock, 505 F.2d at 1140); Abdo, 957 F. Supp. at 1112
("There is no diversity jurisdiction in this case because Indian tribes are not citizens of any
state for purposes of diversity jurisdiction.") (citing Gaines,8 F.3d at 729); GNS, Inc., 866 F.
Supp. at 1191 C[T]he Tribe is not a citizen of any state and cannot sue or be sued in federal
court under diversity jurisdiction") (citing Gaines,8 F.3d at 729; Oneida,464 F.2d at 922-23).
"S The basic facts in Oneida are recounted above. See supra notes 224-35 and
accompanying text.
319 Oneida, 464 F.2d at 918.
m Id. at 922.
m1 Id.
382 U.S. 145 (1965).
Oneida, 464 F.2d at 922.
a See Moor v. Alameda County, 411 U.S. 693,720 (1973) (treating California counties as
corporations for citizenship determination).
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labor union."' The union, which alleged its principal place of
business to be in Pennsylvania, claimed diversity and removed the
case to federal court. 26 However, because some of the members of
the union were North Carolina residents, complete diversity would
be lacking if the citizenship of the individual union members were
taken into account. 27 Accordingly, the question before the Supreme
Court was whether an unincorporated labor union is to be treated
as a citizen in its own right for purposes of federal diversity
jurisdiction, without regard to the citizenship of its members, akin
to the treatment of corporations.
The Court concluded that
although there were sound policy reasons for so treating unincorporated associations, that decision should be left to Congress. 29 The
Court distinguished its prior decision regarding corporations on the
ground that the state of incorporation was a natural choice for the
citizenship of corporations, while there was no correlative natural
choice for labor unions.3 0
In Oneida,the Oneida Indian Nations of New York and Wisconsin contended on appeal that the district court's analogy to the labor
unions at issue in Bouligny was a false one because an Indian nation
is something unique that is entitled to be treated differently from a
run-of-the-mill labor union.3 3 ' The Second Circuit, without deciding
whether the citizenship of the tribe would be based on the citizenship of its members, concluded that complete diversity would be
lacking in any case:
The Oneida Nation of New York is surely not a citizen
of a state different from New York, and the case
under § 1332(a)(1) thus fares no better on plaintiffs'
theory than on that of the district judge since the

a' United Steelworkers v. R.H. Bouligny, Inc., 382 U.S. 145, 146 (1965).
32 Id.
32? Id.

Id. at 147.

Id. at 150-51.

'2

Id. at 152-53.

Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 464 F.2d 916, 922 (2d Cir. 1972), overruled
on other grounds by 414 U.S. 661 (1974).
'

20021

NO MAN'S LAND

945

Nation's lack of citizenship in a state other than New
York would equally defeat diversity jurisdiction. '2
Oneida is thus more interesting for what it did not decide than
for what it did. It did not even question, let alone decide, whether
an Indian tribe could sue or be sued in federal district court under
diversity jurisdiction. It also did not decide whether the citizenship
of an Indian tribe for the purposes of diversity jurisdiction would be
determined by the citizenship of its individual members (akin to an
unincorporated association) or without regard to the citizenship of
its individual members (akin to a corporation). It merely applied
the long-standing rule that complete diversity is required, and found
it lacking regardless of how the citizenship of an Indian tribe is
determined 33
At least one court has rejected treating Indian tribes like counties
or other political subdivisions of a state for purposes of diversity
334
jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held in Moor v. Alameda County
that political subdivisions of a state are citizens of that state for
purposes of diversity jurisdiction, unless they are merely the alter
ego of the state.3 ' In Gaines v. Ski Apache,3 ' a plaintiff brought
suit against the Mescalero Apache Tribe, relying on the Alameda
County Court's focus on the independent status of a political
subdivision relative to the state for the general proposition that any
independent self-governing entity within a state is a citizen of that
state. 337 However, the Gaines court concluded that the focus in
m3Id. at 923. When Oneida was reviewed by the Supreme Court, the Court did not
review the lower courts' holdings with respect to diversityjurisdiction. Oneida Indian Nation
v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 664 n.2 C'Jurisdiction under § 1332 was rejected by the
District Court and the Court of Appeals and is not at issue here.").
m Oneida,464 F.2d at 922-23. One district court case that predates the Supreme Coures
decision in Bouligny appears to have treated the citizenship of an Indian tribe as akin to that
ofan unincorporated corporation. InDeere v. StateofNew York, 22 F.2d 851 (N.D.N.Y. 1927),
a member of the St. Regis Tribe brought suit in federal court on behalf of all members of the
tribe against several corporations, which were deemed to be citizens of New York. Id. at 85152. The court noted that Indians were citizens of the state in which they reside. Id. at 852
(citing Boyd v. Nebraska, 143 U.S. 135, 162 (1892), and In re Heff, 197 U.S. 488 (1905)).
Because all of the tribal members resided in New York, diversity was lacking. Id.
, 411 U.S. 693 (1973).
Id. at 717-20.
8 F.3d 726 (10th Cir. 1993).
'3 Id. at 730.
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Alameda County on the county's independent status was merely to
show that the county was not a mere alter ego of the state.3 ' Thus,
Alameda County did not stand for the broader proposition that "any
independent self-governing entity should be treated as a citizen for
purposes of diversity jurisdiction."33' 9
Even assuming the validity of those lower court decisions that
have determined that an Indian tribe is not a citizen of any state for
purposes of diversity jurisdiction, the case law suggests that this is
at most a gloss on the diversity statute and not a restriction
mandated by Article III. For example, in Akins v. Penobscot
40 the court,
Nation,"
after stating the general "rule" that Indian
tribes are not usually subject to the diversity jurisdiction of the
federal courts,3 4 ' went on to hold that Congress-in enacting the
Settlement Act between Maine and Indian tribes within the
boundaries of Maine-had subjected such tribes to the diversity
jurisdiction of the federal courts by deeming them to be citizens of
the State of Maine.8 42
While the weight of current authority is against the exercise of
diversity jurisdiction over tribes themselves, the courts have shown
a far greater willingness to treat tribal entities as citizens of the
states in which they are incorporated or have their principal place
of business.3 4 3 The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934344 enables a

'
If the political subdivision were a mere alter ego of the state, it would not be a "citizen"
of the state because a state is not a citizen of any state for diversity purposes. Alameda
County, 411 U.S. at 717.
Gaines, 8 F.3d at 730.
'o 130 F.3d 482 (let Cir. 1997).
'
Id. at 485 (citing Romanella v. Hayward, 114 F.3d 15 (2d Cir. 1997)).
'4 Id. ("The Settlement Act subjects the Maine tribes to diversity jurisdiction: 'the
Penobscot Nation ...may sue and be sued in the courts of the... United States to the same
extent as any other entity or person residing in the State of Maine may sue and be sued in
[that] court.' ") (citations omitted); accord Ninigret Dev. Corp. v. Narragansett Indian
Wetuomuck Hous. Auth., 32 F. Supp. 2d 497, 502 (D.R.I. 1999) ("Perhaps the Narragansett
Tribe could be considered a citizen of Rhode Island for diversity jurisdiction under the Rhode
Island Indian Claims Settlement Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1708.") (citing Akins, 130 F.3d at 485),
vacated on other grounds, 207 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2000). This is analogous to Congress's
designation of corporations as citizens of their states of incorporation and principal place of
business by statutory fiat. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (1994).
"' But see Weeks Constr., Inc. v. Oglala Sioux Hous. Auth., 797 F.2d 668, 672-73 & n.6
(8th Cir. 1986) (holding tribal corporation is not citizen of any state for purposes of diversity
jurisdiction because to exercise jurisdiction over such suit would infringe on tribal selfgovernment). While the Weeks court may well have been correct in holding that deference
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tribe to incorporate as a federal corporation (known as a Section 17
corporation) that is subordinate to and distinct from the constitutional body governing the tribe itself (which simultaneously may be
organized as a Section 16 organization). 45 To the extent a tribe is
acting in its capacity as a Section 17 corporation, it is deemed to be
a citizen of the state of its principal place of business for purposes
of diversity jurisdiction.3 46 Alternatively, a tribe may charter
corporations pursuant to its own tribal laws (instead of pursuant to
federal law), in which case, the corporation is likewise deemed to be
a citizen of the state of its principal place of business, 47 and
according to one court, the state in whose borders the tribal
48
reservation is located.1
As to the citizenship of individual Indians, Congress enacted a
statute in 1924 declaring all Indians born in the United States to be
citizens of the United States,149 and the courts have since held that

to the tribal court was required, see generally infra notes 365-91 and accompanying text, it
was not necessary for it to hold that the tribal corporation was not a citizen of a state for
diversity purposes, as the question whether a federal court has subject matter jurisdiction
over a dispute and the question whether it should exercise that jurisdiction are distinct.
3" 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-79 (1994).
m 25U.S.C. §§ 476-77; GNS, Inc. v. Winnebago Tribe, 866 F. Supp. 1185,1188 (N.D. Iowa
1994).
' Gaines v. Ski Apache, 8 F.3d 726, 729 (10th Cir. 1993); Parker Drilling Co. v.
Metlakatala Indian Comty., 451 F. Supp. 1127, 1137-38 (D. Alaska 1978); Enter. Elec. Co. v.
Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 353 F. Supp. 991, 992 & n.5 (D. Mont. 1973).
" R.J. Williams Co. v. Fort Belknap Hous. Auth., 719 F.2d 979, 982-83 & n.2 (9th Cir.
1983); Snowbird Constr. Co. v. United States, 666 F. Supp. 1437, 1441-42 (D. Idaho 1987);
R.C. Hedreen Co. v. Crow Tribal Hous. Auth., 521 F. Supp. 599, 601-03 (D. Mont. 1981).
"
See Stock West, Inc v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, 873 F.2d 1221,
1226 (9th Cir. 1989) ('lAin Indian corporation is a citizen of the state in whose borders the
reservation is located."). There is good reason to believe that the Stock West court was not
creating an alternative means of exercising jurisdiction over a corporation organized under
tribal law but rather merely misstated existing law. In support of its conclusion, it cited to
R.C. Hedreen Co., 521 F. Supp. at 602-03, R.J. Williams Co., 719 F.2d at 982 n.2, and Parker
DrillingCo., 451 F. Supp. at 1138, all of which state that a tribal corporation is a citizen of
the state of its principal place of business and none of which state that it is a citizen of the
state in whose borders the reservation is located. As a practical matter, this made little
difference in these particular cases, as in each of them, the state of the tribal corporation's
principal place of business and the state in whose borders the reservation is located are one
in the same. However, there may be instances in which treating a tribal corporation as a
citizen of the state in whose borders the reservation is located could raise difficult questions.
Consider, for example, a corporation chartered by the Navajo Nation. The Navajo reservation
is located within four states-Utah, Colorado, Arizona, and New Mexico. Would a Navajo
corporation be deemed to be a citizen of all four states?
"9 Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1401 (1994)).
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individual Indians are citizens of the state in which they reside. 50
Treating individual Indians as citizens of the states in which they
reside, however, produces some rather perverse results to the extent
that the goal of the diversity statute is to prevent local court bias.
For example, in a dispute between two members of the Standing
Rock Reservation, which straddles the border between North
Dakota and South Dakota, a suit brought by a member of the tribe
residing on the North Dakota side of the reservation against a
member of the tribe residing on the South Dakota side of the
reservation falls within the diversity jurisdiction of the federal
courts,8 51 even though there is unlikely to be a significant risk of

local bias. On the other hand, no federal diversity jurisdiction exists
in a dispute between a non-Indian plaintiff from Oklahoma and
defendants who are members of the Osage Indian Tribe where the
latter's reservation is physically located within the geographic
boundaries of Oklahoma,35 although the likelihood that either a
state or tribal court will be biased in favor of one or the other party
in such a situation is far more likely.
In Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins,53 the Supreme Court
held that a federal court sitting in diversity must apply the
substantive law of the state in which it sits and not general federal
common law, reasoning that if the federal courts did not apply the
same law to state-created causes of action as did the state courts,
the result would be an unfair advantage to those parties able to
invoke the diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts.354 In Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 55 the Court further explained that "since a
federal court adjudicating a state-created right solely because of the
diversity of citizenship of the parties is for that purpose, in effect,

' Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 18 n.10 (1987) (citing Act of June 2, 1924,
ch. 233,43 Stat. 253 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1401 (1994)); Poitra v. Demarrias, 502 F.2d 23,24,
29 (8th Cir. 1974); Richardson v. Malone, 762 F. Supp. 1463, 1466-67 (N.D. Okla. 1991); Deere
v. New York, 22 F.2d 851, 852 (N.D.N.Y. 1927).
3" Poitra,502 F.2d at 24, 29.
382 Richardson, 762 F. Supp. at 1466-67.
m 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
Id. at 78-79.
326 U.S. 99 (1945).
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only another court of the State, it cannot afford recovery if the right
to recover is made unavailable by the State." 5 6
In Woods v. Interstate Realty Co.,"'7 the Supreme Court considered the effect of Erie and York where a party had a state-created
right but no available state judicial forum. In Woods, a Tennessee
corporation brought a diversity action on a real estate contract
against a Mississippi resident in a federal court in Mississippi to
collect on a real estate commission due for a sale that took place in
Mississippi.5 8 As a matter of Mississippi law, the plaintiff would
have been barred from enforcing the contract in the state
courts-even though it had a right to that commission under state
law-as a sanction for being an out-of-state corporation doing
business in the state that had failed both to register with the state
and to designate an agent for service of process pursuant to state
law. 59 Citing York, the Woods Court concluded that:
a right which local law creates but which it does not
supply with a remedy is no right at all for purposes of
enforcement in a federal court in a diversity case;
that where in such cases one is barred from recovery
he should likewise be barred in the
in the state court,
3 60
federal court.
The Woods court reasoned that a contrary result would lead to the
same unfairness that Erie was designed to eliminate. 6 '
The Woods decision led to a great deal of confusion over the
ability of federal courts sitting in diversity to exercise jurisdiction
over state-created causes of action where one of the parties to the
suit is a tribal entity or a tribal member. As discussed above,3 6
Id. at 108-09.
a 337 U.S. 535 (1949).
3'

Id. at 535-36.

Id. at 536 n.1.
Id. at 538.
" Id.; accordAngel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 191-92 (1947) ("If North Carolina has
authoritatively announced that deficiency judgments cannot be secured within its borders,
it contradicts the prescriptions ofdiversity jurisdiction for a federal court in that state to give
such a deficiency judgment.").
m See supra notes 113-81 and accompanying text.
3
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state courts in many instances lack judicial jurisdiction over actions
arising in Indian Country involving Indian parties under federal
statutory and common law, to wit, the Williams non-infringement
test and Public Law 280. The question thus arose whether Woods
barred a federal court sitting in diversity from exercising jurisdiction over such suits. One line of lower court cases held that it did,
reasoning that where a state court is barred from exercising
jurisdiction under Williams and Public Law 280, a federal court
sitting in diversity is likewise ousted of jurisdiction. 6
But a
competing line of lower court decisions held otherwise, reasoning
that where, as here, no state substantive policy closes the state
courthouse doors to litigants, a federal court sitting in diversity is
not barred from exercising jurisdiction over the dispute, even though
a federal policy may bar state court jurisdiction over the dispute.3 64
In Iowa Mutual InsuranceCo. v. LaPlante,6 5 the Supreme Court
rejected the applicability of Woods where Williams and Public Law
280 bar state court jurisdiction, but simultaneously created a new
barrier to the exercise of federal diversity jurisdiction over suits
arising in Indian Country. LaPlante, a member of the Blackfeet
tribe in Montana and an employee of the Welman Ranch Co. (a
Montana corporation located on the reservation) was injured in an
accident at work."6 6 Iowa Mutual, the insurer of Wellman Co. and
the Wellman family, unsuccessfully attempted to settle the case
through Midland Claims Service, its agent."6 7 The LaPlantes filed
suit in the Blackfeet tribal court against the Wellman Ranch, the
Wellman family, Iowa Mutual, and Midland."6 ' Iowa Mutual and
Midland moved to dismiss the suit for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, but the tribal court held it had jurisdiction over suits

m Romanellav. Hayward, 114 F.3d 15, 16 (2d Cir. 1997); Begayv. Kerr-McGee Corp., 682
F.2d 1311, 1317 (9th Cir. 1982); R.J. Williams Co. v. Fort Belknap Hous. Auth., 719 F.2d 979,
982-83 (9th Cir. 1983); Hot Oil Serv., Inc. v. Hall, 366 F.2d 295, 297 (9th Cir. 1966); Little v.
Nakai, 344 F.2d 486, 489-90 (9th Cir. 1965).
'S Weeks Constr., Inc. v. Oglala Sioux Hous. Auth., 797 F.2d 668, 672-74 & n.7 (8th Cir.
1986); Poitra v. DeMarrias, 502 F.2d 23, 27 & n.6, 29 (8th Cir. 1974); Bethel v. Janis, 597 F.
Supp. 56, 58 (D.S.D. 1984); Showers v. Sasse, 588 F. Supp. 1297, 1299 (D.S.D. 1984).
480 U.S. 9 (1987).

Id. at 11.
367

3

id.
Id.
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involving the conduct of non-Indians engaged in commercial
relations with Indians on the reservation.8 9
While the tribal action was pending, Iowa Mutual filed suit in
federal district court against the LaPlantes, the Wellmans, and the
Wellman Ranch, invoking the district court's diversity jurisdiction
and seeking a declaration that it had no duty to defend or indemnify
the Wellman family or the Wellman Ranch because the injuries
were outside of the scope of the insurance coverage. ° The
LaPlantes moved to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction." ' The district court held that the tribal court must
first be given an opportunity to determine its own jurisdiction."7 2 It
further held that since the Montana state courts lacked jurisdiction
over the suit because Public Law 280 required tribal consent to state
civil jurisdiction, and the tribe had not consented, the.federal court
over the dispute under
likewise lacked subject matter jurisdiction
374
Woods. ' The Ninth Circuit affirmed.
In affirming the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court noted that,
like the exercise of state-court jurisdiction at issue in Williams, a
federal court's exercise of jurisdiction over matters relating to
reservation affairs can also impair the authority of tribal courts." 5
The Court thus concluded that the federal court should abstain and
let the tribal courts, all the way through the appellate tribal courts,
first determine their own jurisdiction. 7 6 The Court stressed that
the decision did not deprive the federal courts of subject matter
jurisdiction; rather, it merely set forth an exhaustion rule as a
matter of comity. 377 The Court noted that if tribal courts ultimately
determine that they have jurisdiction, that determination can be
challenged in a federal district court,17 ' but that if the federal court
determines that the tribal court indeed had jurisdiction, the merits

369
37'

Id. at 12.
Id. at 12-13.

371 Id.
372 Id.
37

Id. at 13 & n.4.

7'

Id. at 13.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 16-17.

'

Id. at 16 n.8.

7'
37

378 Id. at 19.
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of the underlying dispute could not be relitigated in the subsequent
federal court proceedings."7 9
Finally, in a "dismissive footnote,"8 ' the Court considered the
effect of Woods in such cases. The Court noted that the lower courts
had assumed that Woods barred the exercise of diversity jurisdiction
as long as the courts of the state in which the federal court sits could
not entertain the suit."' The Court noted that this conclusion
presupposes that the exercise of federal jurisdiction would contravene a substantive state policy, but that in this case, it is not clear
that such a state policy exists, since state court adjudication is
precluded by the application of the federal noninfringement policy
and not any state substantive policy.3 8 The Court thus concluded
that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over the
dispute but, as a matter of comity, it should defer in favor of tribal
court adjudication. 8 3
Lower courts have held that the abstention rule articulated in
Iowa Mutual applies with equal force where an Indian plaintiff
seeks to bring suit against a non-Indian defendant in a federal
forum. 8 4 Where the suit is between two non-Indians, the courts are
not unanimous, with some deeming this a factor that weighs against
abstention 8 5 and others finding abstention appropriate where the
suit has a strong connection to the tribe. 386 Moreover, while Iowa
Mutual involved a diversity action filed directly in federal court, the

Margery H. Brown & Brenda C. Desmund, Montana Tribal Courts: Influencing the

Development of ContemporaryIndian Law, 52 MONT. L. REV. 211, 259-60 (1991).
' Iowa Mut. Ins. Co., 480 U.S. at 20 n.13.
382 Id.

Id. at 15; see also Lynn H. Slade, DisputeResolution in Indian Country: Harmonizing
National Farmers Union, Iowa Mutual, and the Abstention Doctrinein the Federal Courts,
71 N.D. L. REV. 519, 524 (1995) C'Justice Marshall's opinion makes clear, however, that the
federal district court had subject matter jurisdiction under the diversity statute. Ninth
Circuit cases rejecting diversity jurisdiction over cases cognizable in tribal court were
'[r]elegated to a dismissive footnote' of Iowa Mutual.") (quoting Brown &Desmund, supranote
380, at 259-60).
See Wellman v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 815 F.2d 577, 578-79 (9th Cir. 1987) (abstaining
in suit brought by member of Blackfeet Indian Tribe against non-Indian Pennsylvania
corporation for breach of contract in which plaintiff was to build access road for defendant on
reservation).
Vance v. Boyd Miss., Inc., 923 F. Supp. 905, 911 (S.D. Miss. 1996).
Tom's Amusement Co., Inc. v. Cuthbertson, 816 F. Supp. 403,405-06 (W.D.N.C. 1993).
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abstention rule applies with equal force when a case arrives in
federal court by way of removal from a state court.8 7
One commentator has noted that the Supreme Court's rejection
of the applicability of Woods should make little difference in
practice: since Iowa Mutual requires exhaustion of tribal remedies,
tribal courts will be insulated from competing federal court jurisdiction when parties to an action have diverse citizenship. 88 But since
the Iowa Mutual exhaustion rule can without question be modified
by Congress, while an argument can be made that the Woods
rule-as an outgrowth of Erie--cannot be modified (to the extent
that Erie is in any sense constitutionally required), this decision
makes it easier for Congress to vest such disputes in a federal court
should it choose to do so. Moreover, LaPlante does not require
abstention by a federal court where no tribal court exists8 9 or where
no tribal court action is pending,9 0 while under Williams and Public
Law 280, state courts are barred from exercising jurisdiction
without regard to the existence of a tribal court or the pendency of
a tribal court action.3 9 '
The final significant cause of the "no forum" problem in Indian
Law is the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity. As a matter of
federal law, Indian tribes enjoy sovereign immunity and are thus
immune from suit in any court-federal, state, or tribal-unless
Congress has authorized the suit or the tribe itself has waived its
sovereign immunity. 9 2 While Congress has plenary authority to
Crawford v. Genuine Parts Co., Inc., 947 F.2d 1405, 1406, 1408 (9th Cir. 1991).
Brown & Desmund, supra,note 380, at 259-60.
Krempel v. Prairie Island Indian Cmty., 125 F.3d 621, 622-23 (8th Cir. 1997).
See Altheimer & Gray v. Sioux Mfg. Corp., 983 F.2d 803, 814 (7th Cir. 1993) (finding
abstention unwarranted where no pending tribal court action, no issue of tribal law is raised,
and no attack is being made on tribal court jurisdiction); Vance v. Boyd Miss., Inc., 923 F.
Supp. 905, 911 (S.D. Miss. 1996) (finding abstention unwarranted where no pending tribal
court action, no attack is being made on tribal court jurisdiction, no issue of tribal law, and
suit is between two non.Indians). But see United States ex reL. Kishell v. Turtle Mountain
Hous. Auth., 816 F.2d 1273, 1276 (8th Cir. 1987) (holding exhaustion of tribal remedies is
appropriate); Tom's Amusement Co. v. Cuthbertson, 816 F. Supp. 403, 407 (W.D.N.C. 1993)
(abstaining pending determination by tribal court of whether it has jurisdiction).
"l See supranotes 113-81 and accompanying text.
S2 Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Techs., Inc, 523 U.S. 751,754 (1998) (citingThree Affiliated Tribes
of Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Engg, 476 U.S. 877, 890 (1986); Santa Clara Pueblo v.
Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978); United States v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506, 512
(1940)).
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abrogate a tribe's sovereign immunity (in contrast to its authority
vis-a'-vis the states), 9 ' Congress must "unequivocally" express that
purpose before the courts will find abrogation. 9 4 Similarly, a waiver
of sovereign immunity by a tribe will be found only when that
waiver is "clear."89 Moreover, by bringing suit, a tribe does not open
itself up to counterclaims, even if they are "compulsory" counterclaims.39
As with state sovereign immunity, however, tribal
sovereign immunity is not a shield from suit brought against the
tribe by the United States. 9 ' Moreover, suit can be brought to
enjoin individual tribal officials who are alleged to be violating
federal law under the Exparte Young39 8 doctrine.
The Supreme Court has held that tribes have sovereign immunity
3 99
for their on-reservation as well as their off-reservation activities,
and has refused to distinguish between the governmental and
commercial activities of a tribe.4"' Accordingly, absent a waiver of
sovereign immunity or abrogation of the same by Congress, tribes
that operate casinos are immune in any court from tort actions
brought against the tribes for personal injuries sustained by patrons

'3

Compare id. at 759, and Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58-59 (1978)

(providing Congress has authority to abrogate sovereign immunity of Indian tribes), with
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706,712 (1999) (providing that Congress cannot abrogate sovereign
immunity of states except when exercising its powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment), and Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72-73 (1996) (noting Eleventh
Amendment bars congressional authority if suit by private party against "unconsenting
state").
'
See C & L Enters., Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 532 U.S. 411, 418
(2001) (citing Martinez, 436 U.S. at 58).
' See id. (quoting Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe, 498 U.S. 505,
509 (1991)).
'9s Okla. Tax Comm'n, 498 U.S. at 509.
United States v. Yakima Tribal Court, 806 F.2d 853,861 (9th Cir. 1986); United States
v. Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, 827 F.2d 380, 382 (8th Cir. 1987).
209 U.S. 123 (1908).
Puyallup Tribe v. Dep't of Game, 433 U.S. 165, 171-77 (1977).
400

Id.
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at their gaming facilities,4"' as well as from suit by casino employees
alleging employment discrimination.4 2
Arguably, market forces will give tribes an incentive to waive
their sovereign immunity when they enter into contractual relations. If tribes earn a reputation for dishonoring contracts and then
invoking the defense of sovereign immunity when sued on the
contract, it will impact their business reputation, and those
contracting with them will either demand a contractual waiver of
sovereign immunity or a higher contract price.40 ' However, even
assuming perfect information and markets with respect to such

4o See Doe v. Oneida Indian Nation, 717 N.Y.S.2d 417, 418 (App. Div. 2000) (holding
sovereign immunity barred suit against tribe when patron at tribe's gaming resort hotel was
pierced by hypodermic needle); Gross v. Omaha Tribe, 601 N.W.2d 82, 82-83 (Iowa 1999)
(holding sovereign immunity barred suit against tribe by patron who was knocked down by
another patron at tribe's gambling casino); Trudgeon v. Fantasy Springs Casino, 84 Cal.Rptr.
2d65, 66 (Ct. App. 1999) (holding tribal sovereign immunity extended to for-profit corporation
organized by tribe to operate casino, where patron sought damages for injuries he sustained
from fight in casino parking lot). See generally Krista L. Twesme, Let the Games Begin:
Proposed Amendment to Indian Gaming RegulationAct LimitingNative American Tribes'
Sovereign Immunity, 17 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & PoLy 187 (1995) (discussing tribal sovereign
immunity as it applies to Native American casinos).
I Gavle v. Little Six, Inc., 555 N.W.2d 284, 294-96 (Minn. 1996); Twesme, supra note
401, at 196.
IzSee Bank of Okla. v. Muskcogee (Creek) Nation, 972 F.2d 1166, 1169 (10th Cir. 1992)
(rejecting plaintiffs argument that dismissal of their suit on sovereign immunity grounds
would chill commercial relations between Indian tribes and non-Indians, reasoning "[t]his
policy argument precisely misses the point of sovereign immunity, which is the power of selfdetermination. We decline the Bank's invitation to second-guess the wisdom of the Nation's
business decisions under the guise ofjudicial review."); Ninigret Dev. Corp. v. Narragansett
Indian Wetuoumuck Hous. Auth., 32 F. Supp. 2d 497, 506 (D.R.I. 1999) ("[P]laintiffcontracted
to settle its contract disputes utilizing the Narragansett Tribe's justice system. Now plaintiff
must live with its bargain, just as the Tribe will have to live with its reputation when it deals
with outside contractors in the future."), vacated by 207 F.3d 21, 30 (lst Cir. 2000); Calvello
v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 899 F. Supp. 431, 438 (D.S.D. 1995).
[Tihe Courts decision .. reaches an inequitable result. Plaintiff Calvello
conferred valuable services upon the Tribe for which he did not receive
adequate compensation. The Tribe's refusal to abide by the arbitration
decision after its counsel participated fully in the entire proceeding...
shows a lack of good faith. This kind of action although not prohibited by
law, may well increase the cost and diminish the availability of qualified
contractors to perform services desired by the Tribe.
Id.; Laurie Reynolds, Exhaustion of Tribal Remedies: Extolling Tribal Sovereignty While
ExpandingFederalJurisdiction,73 N.C. L. REV. 1089, 1155 (1995) CIoreover, many tribes
are actively seeking non-Indian partners in economic development projects; the availability
of a tribal forum perceived as fair and efficient by outsiders will enhance the marketability
of those projects").
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contractual relations as employment, it is not clear that market
forces will necessarily work as well in the context of tort actions
brought against the tribe.40 4 However, market forces could work
even in that context to the extent that casino patrons-realizing
that they will not be compensated for injuries sustained at the
casino-may choose to take their business elsewhere, assuming, of
course, that competitors exist.
In Talton v. Mayes,4" 5 a Cherokee who was convicted in a
Cherokee Nation tribal court of murdering another Cherokee and
sentenced to death filed for a writ of habeas corpus in a federal
district court in Arkansas, alleging that the Cherokee grand jury
that indicted him did not conform to the due process requirements
of the Fifth Amendment. "° Noting that the Fifth Amendment
applies only to the exercise of federal powers,4 the court reasoned
that whether the Fifth Amendment would apply turned on whether
or not the powers of government exercised by the Cherokee Nation
were federal powers created by the Constitution.4" 8 While noting
that the right of Indian tribes to self-govern remains subject to
plenary congressional authority,4 ' the Court concluded that tribal
powers of self-government nonetheless antedated the Constitution.4 10 Therefore, tribal legislative actions did not constitute the
exercise of federal power, and thus were not subject to the strictures
of the Fifth Amendment.4 1 ' Subsequent lower court decisions have
extended the rationale of Talton to other provisions of the Constitu4 12
tion.

'4' See Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751,766 (1998) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(noting rule of sovereign immunity is unjust because tort victims generally do not have an
opportunity to negotiate waiver of sovereign immunity).
"
163 U.S. 376 (1896).
408

Id. at 376-79.

'07 Id. at 382.
'8
4
410

Id. at 382-83.
Id. at 384.

Id.
See id. However, if Congress extinguishes a tribe's sovereign authority to prosecute
crimes and later reinstitutes its authority to prosecute crimes, some cases view the
reinstitution as a delegation of federal power, and the Double Jeopardy clause bars a federal
prosecution subsequent to a tribal prosecution for the same offense. E.g., United States v.
Long, 183 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1113-15 (E.D. Wis. 2002).
412 See, e.g., Native Am. Church v. Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F.2d 131, 1134-35 (10th Cir.
1959) (holding freedom of religion protection under First Amendment inapplicable to Indian
41
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In 1968, Congress enacted Title I of the Indian Civil Rights Act
("ICRA"), 413 whereby it imposed certain restrictions on tribal
governments analogous, but not identical to, the restrictions
contained in the Bill of Rights.4 14 The goal of these restrictions was
to provide individuals with similar protections against the wrongful
actions of tribal governments as they are afforded vis-A-vis state and
federal governments,4 1 5 thus, to some extent, blunting the force of
the Talton decision. In addition, ICRA provided the federal courts

tribes); Martinez v. S. Ute Tribe, 249 F.2d 915, 919 (10th Cir. 1957) (holding Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause inapplicable to Indian tribes).
413 Act ofApr. 11, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, §§ 201-03,82 Stat. 77-78 (codified at25 U.S.C.
§§ 1301-1303 (1994)).
414 25 U.S.C. § 1302.
No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall-(1) make
or enforce any law prohibiting the free exercise of religion, or abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably
to assemble and to petition for a redress of grievances; (2) violate the right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable search and seizures, nor issue warrants, but upon
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized;
(3) subject any person for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy; (4)
compel any person in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,
(5) take any private property for a public use without just compensation;
(6) deny to any person in a criminal proceeding the right to a speedy and
public trial, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, to
be confronted with the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process
for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and at his own expense to have the
assistance of counsel for his defense; (7) require excessive bail, impose
excessive fines, inflict cruel and unusual punishments, and in no event
impose for conviction of any one offense any penalty or punishment
greater than imprisonment for a term of one year and a fine of $5,000, or
both; (8) deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
its laws or deprive any person of liberty or property without due process
of law; (9) pass any bill of attainder or ex post facto law; or (10) deny to
any person accused of an offense punishable by imprisonment the right,
upon request, to a trial by jury of not less than six persons.
Id. The Act differs from the Bill of Rights itself in that it does not prohibit the establishment
of religion, does not require jury trials in civil cases, does not require the appointment of
counsel for indigents in criminal cases, does not require indictment by grand jury, and does
not provide for any of the protections contained in the Second, Third, and Seventh
Amendments. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 62-63 & n.14 (1978).
"I See Martinez,436 U.S. at 61 C[A] central purpose of the ICRAand in particular of Title
I was to 'secur[e] for the American Indian the broad constitutional rights afforded to other
Americans,' and thereby to 'protect individual Indians from arbitrary and unjust actions of
tribal governments.'") (quoting S. REP. NO. 90-841, at 5-6 (1967)).
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with jurisdiction to entertain writs of habeas corpus for those
challenging the legality of their detention by a tribal government. 416
In Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 417 the Supreme Court
considered the enforceability of ICRA in federal court. At issue was
a tribal ordinance which barred from membership children of female
members of the tribe who marry outside the tribe, but permitted
membership to children of male members who marry outside the
tribe. 41" The effect of the ordinance was to preclude the children of
a female member who marries outside the tribe from voting in tribal
elections, holding secular office, or inheriting their mother's home
and possessory interest in tribal communal lands.419 After unsuccessfully attempting to persuade the tribe to change the ordinance,
a member of the tribe who had married outside the tribe and had
two children, brought a class action suit against the tribe and its
officials, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief and claiming that
the ordinance, by discriminating on the basis of both gender and
ancestry, denied equal protection of the laws in violation of ICRA.420
The Court concluded that suits against a tribe for violations of
ICRA were barred by the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity.421
The Court noted that Indian tribes possess common-law immunity
from suit.422 While Congress has the power to override this
immunity, legislative intent to do so must be express, and there was
no such express intent in ICRA.428
See 25 U.S.C. § 1303.
4'7 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
418 Id. at 52-53 & n.2.
416

419

Id.

Id. at 51-53. See also 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8) ("No Indian tribe in exercising powers of selfgovernment shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its
laws.. ").
42
Martinez,436 U.S. at 59.
'2

Id.

at 58.

Id. at 59. Because tribal officials themselves are not protected by the tribe's sovereign
immunity, the Court then turned to the amenability of the tribal officials to suit under ICRAK
Id. While indicating that Congress undoubtedly has the power to authorize civil actions to
be brought in federal court against tribal officers for violations of ICRA, the Court noted that
Congress had expressly provided only the remedy of a writ of habeas corpus for those held in
tribal custody in violation of the Act. Id. at 59-60. The Court further noted that Congress had
considered, but rejected, various proposals that would have authorized other causes of action
for violations of the Act. Id. at 67-70. Finding that the overallAct had the purpose of not only
strengthening the position of individual tribal members vis-.vis the tribe, but also of
promoting the policy of protecting tribal self-government, the Court concluded that creating
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A number of tribal courts have held that ICRA does not abrogate
a tribe's sovereign immunity in tribal court and have declined to
entertain suits brought against tribes under ICRA.424 Accordingly,
even for violations of ICRA, injured parties find themselves without
a forum in which to adjudicate their claims against these tribes. In
Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. v. Arapaho and Shoshone Tribes,425 the Tenth
Circuit sought to remedy this "no forum" problem. In Dry Creek,
non-Indian owners of land within the boundaries of the tribes'
reservation in Wyoming built a guest lodge for hunting after
receiving assurances from tribal authorities that there would be no
problems with access from the principal highway running through
the reservation to their property via an existing access road.426 The
day after the lodge opened for business, the tribes closed the access
road, and as a result, the plaintiffs' property was eventually
foreclosed upon. 42' Before resorting to federal court, the non-Indian
plaintiffs8 sought a remedy in the tribal court, but were refused
access.

42

In Dry Creek the Tenth Circuit narrowly construed Santa Clara.
The court characterized that case as being "entirely an internal
matter concerning tribal members," noting that "[t]he members of
the Tribe who were seeking relief also had access to their own
elected officials and their tribal machinery to settle the problem"
and that "there were no non-Indians concerned."42' According to the

Tenth Circuit, Santa Claraplaced great emphasis on the availability of tribal courts and on the intratribal nature of the problem. The

a federal cause of action for the enforcement of the rights contained in the Act would be

contrary to the Congressional goal of furthering tribal self-government. Id. at 60-65. The
Court'concluded Congress' objective of extending constitutional norms to tribal selfgovernment did not necessarily imply a federal remedy because existing tribal courts and
non-judicial tribal institutions were obligated to apply the provisions of ICRA. Id. at 65-66.
4u REPORT OF THE U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 63-67

(1991); Robert J. McCarthy, CivilRightsin TribalCourts: The IndianBill of Rights atThirty
Years, 34 IDAHO L. REV. 465, 480-83 (1998); Mark D. Rosen, Multiple Authoritative
Interpretersof Quasi-ConstitutionalFederalLaw: Of Tribal Courts and the Indian Civil
Rights Act, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 479, 509 (2000).
40 623 F.2d 682 (10th Cir. 1980).
4
Id. at 683-84.
4 Id. at 684.
4
Id.
4 Id. at 685.
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court held that "in the absence of such other relief or remedy," or
"when the issue relates to a matter outside of internal tribal affairs
and when it concerns an issue with a non-Indian," the limitations of
Santa Claradisappear.43 ° Since there was no remedy in state or
tribal court, the Dry Creek court concluded that the limitations of
Santa Clara could not apply. The court rejected self-help or no
forum as a suitable alternative, concluding that "[tihere has to be a
forum where the dispute can be settled."4"'
Subsequent cases in the Tenth Circuit have narrowed the scope
of Dry Creek, holding that it only applies when there is no tribal
remedy, judicial or otherwise, and that mere allegations of futility
would not suffice. In order for Dry Creek to apply, the aggrieved
party must have actually sought and been denied a tribal remedy.4"2
No other circuits have followed the decision, either rejecting it
outright433 or leaving the question open.434
3. Prior Congressional Efforts to Eradicate the 'No Forum"
Problem in Indian Law. In the past, Congress has taken a variety
of measures to remedy the "no forum" problem in Indian Law,
including allowing state courts to exercise jurisdiction over disputes
arising in Indian Country, vesting existing Article III courts with
jurisdiction over such disputes, and providing for the creation of
specialized courts for Indian Country.
As discussed in detail above,435 Congress sought to eradicate the
"no forum" problem in Indian Country to some extent by allowing
the state courts to exercise civil and criminal jurisdiction over
430 Id.

" See id. ("To hold that they have access to no court is to hold that they have
constitutional rights but have no remedy. The self-help which was suggested ...does not
appear to be a suitable device to determine constitutional rights.").
' Bank of Okla.v. Muscogee (Creek) Nation, 972 F.2d 1166,1170 (10th Cir. 1992); White
v. Pueblo of San Juan, 728 F.2d 1307, 1311-12 (10th Cir. 1984).
4w Shortbull v. Looking Elk, 677 F.2d 645,650 (8th Cir. 1982); Whiteco Metrocom Div. of
Whiteco Indus., Inc. v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 902 F. Supp. 199, 202 (D.S.D. 1995).
' Hein v. Capitan Grande Band of Diegueno Mission Indians, 201 F.3d 1256, 1260 n.5
(9th Cir. 2000); Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians, 85 F.3d 874, 884 n.14 (2d Cir.
1996); see Boudman v. Aroostook Band of Micmac Indians, 54 F. Supp. 2d 44, 49 n.3 (1999)
(noting First Circuit has not created such exception); Williams v. Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe
of the Pyramid Lake Reservation, 625 F. Supp. 1457, 1459 n.3 (D. Nev. 1986) (leaving open
possibility of exercising jurisdiction over ICRA claim should tribal court opt not to exercise
jurisdiction over claim).
4' See supra notes 113-81 and accompanying text.
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disputes arising there. However, the 1968 Amendments to Public
Law 280 requiring tribal consent to future acquisitions of jurisdiction by the states pursuant to Public Law 280, and the failure of any
tribes subsequently to consent to such acquisitions of jurisdiction,
has eliminated this as an effective means of remedying the existing
"no forum" problem. Moreover, as discussed below,4" 6 Public Law
280 serves at best to replace the "no forum" problem with a "biased
forum" problem.
By steadily expanding federal court jurisdiction over crimes
committed in Indian Country, Congress has, in the past, practically
eliminated the "no forum" problem with respect to criminal
jurisdiction. General federal criminal statutes of nationwide
applicability, such as the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act, are applicable to crimes committed by Indians
and non-Indians alike in Indian Country.487 In addition, however,
Congress has taken measures to ensure that the many types of
crimes typically punished throughout the nation in state courts
under state law are likewise punishable when committed in Indian
Country but generally subject to enforcement in federal court.
Early on, Congress protected Indians from crimes committed
against them by non-Indians in Indian Country, providing for the
punishment of the non-Indians in federal court.4 8 In 1817,
Congress enacted the Indian Country Crimes Act, which provides
that federal criminal laws are applicable to federal enclaves-i.e.,
post offices, federal courthouses, forts, and other areas falling within
the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the federal government-are
likewise applicable to offenses committed in Indian Country.4"' The
statute excepts crimes committed by one Indian against another in
Indian Country when the Indian has been punished by local tribal
law or where, by treaty stipulation, such offenses are within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the tribe.44
See infra notes 479-97 and accompanying text.
U.S. v. Juvenile Male, 118 F.3d 1344, 1347 (9th Cir. 1997).
43 Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137, 138; Act of Mar. 3, 1799, ch. 46, 1 Stat. 743;
Act of Mar. 30, 1802, ch. 13, 2 Stat. 139.
41 See Act of Mar. 3, 1817, ch. 92, 3 Stat. 383 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1152
"'

(1994)).
440 18 U.S.C. § 1152. This exception applies only to federal enclave law, and not to federal

criminal laws of general application. U.S. v. Yannott, 42 F.3d 999, 1003 (6th Cir. 1994); U.S.
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Among the "general laws of the United States" made applicable
to Indian Country by the Indian Country Crimes Act is the
Assimilative Crimes Act, which incorporates state substantive
criminal law into federal criminal law for any matter not already
unlawful under federal law but that would be unlawful under the
law of the state within which the reservation or other federal
enclave is located. 4 1 Law so incorporated becomes "federal law" for
purposes of Article III "arising under" jurisdiction, 44 2 and the federal
courts are not bound by state case law in interpreting such state
laws.44 3 While the statute contains no explicit exception for crimes
committed by one non-Indian against another in Indian country, a
line of cases has held that such matters fall within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the state courts.4 44
The Supreme Court has held that, absent federal law to the
contrary, Indian tribes have exclusive jurisdiction over crimes
committed by one Indian against another.4 45 In response to this
holding, Congress enacted the Major Crimes Act, which provides for
the punishment of certain major crimes committed by an Indian
within Indian Country under federal enclave law or, if no such law
exists, under incorporated state law. 446 Thus, this provision acts as

v. Blue, 722 F.2d 383, 384 (8th Cir. 1983); U.S. v. Cowboy, 694 F.2d 1228, 1234 (10th Cir.
1982).
44
18 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1994); Acunia v. U.S., 404 F.2d 140, 142 (9th Cir. 1968); U.S. v.
Sosseur, 181 F.2d 873, 874-75 (7th Cir. 1950).
"2 Johnson v. Yellow Cab Transit Co., 137 F.2d 274,276 (1943), affid, 321 U.S. 383 (1944).
443 Yellow Cab TransitCo., 321 U.S. at 391; Kay v. United States, 255 F.2d 476, 477 (4th
Cir. 1958); U.S. v. Hopp, 943 F. Supp. 1313, 1315 (D. Colo. 1996). But see U.S. v. Smith, 965
F. Supp. 756, 761-62 (E.D. Va. 1997) (reasoning state law is binding on federal court because
it was assimilated under ACA); United States v. Guyette, 382 F. Supp. 1266, 1268 (E.D. Va.
1974) (applying state principles of statutory construction).
"
New York ex rel. Ray v. Martin, 326 U.S. 496,499 (1946); United States v. McBratney,
104 U.S. 621, 624 (1881). See generally Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 240 (1896)
(acknowledging state court authority but no federal court authority).
445 ExParteCrow Dog, 109 U.S. 556,557-58 (1883); see also United States v. Kagama, 118
U.S. 375, 383-84 (1886) (upholding Congress's authority to enact Major Crimes Act).
"6 See 18 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (1994).
Any Indian who commits against the person or property of another Indian
or other person anyofthe following offenses, namely, murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, maiming, a felony under chapter 109A [rape and other
like offenses], incest, assault with intent to commit murder, assault with
a dangerous weapon, assault resulting in serious bodily injury (as defined
in section 1365 of this title), an assault against an individual who has not
attained the age of 16 years, arson, burglary, robbery, and a felony under
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an exception to the proviso in the Indian Country Crimes Act that
gives tribal courts exclusive jurisdiction over crimes committed in
Indian Country by one Indian against another.4 4 7 The Major Crimes
Act has been upheld as constitutional, based on Congress's plenary
power over Indians.445
As discussed above,4 49 Public Law 280 allows certain states to
exercise criminal jurisdiction over all crimes committed in Indian
Country. Public Law 280 provides that neither the Indian Country
Crimes Act nor the Major Crimes Act apply within those sections of
Indian Country that were given criminal jurisdiction in the original
Public Law 280.450 Under the Indian Civil Rights Act ("ICRA"),
Congress limited the authority of tribal courts to punish criminal
offenders, with a maximum sentence of one year's imprisonment, a
$5,000 fine, or both.45 ' In theory, this is not a problem, since
Congress has the authority under the Major Crimes Act to punish
crimes committed by one Indian against another. However, U.S.
Attorneys, unlike state prosecutors, typically decline to prosecute in
a far greater percentage of cases. Thus, in practice, ICRA's limits
on tribal authority to punish criminal offenders results in the
underenforcement of criminal laws in Indian Country.4 52
In 1883, the Bureau of Indian Affairs ("BIN") commenced a
practice of establishing Courts of Indian Offenses on reservations,
with judges selected by the Indian agent assigned by the BIA to the

section 661 of this title within the Indian country, shall be subject to the
same law and penalties as all other persons committing any of the above
offenses, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States.
Id.; see also id. § 1153(b) CAny offense referred to in subsection (a) of this section that is not
defined and punished by Federal law in force within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United
States shall be defined and punished in accordance with the laws of the State in which such
offense was committed....").
44 United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 648 n.9 (1977).
44 United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383-84 (1886).
449 See supra notes 113-81 and accompanying text.
"0 See 18 U.S.C. § 1162(c) (1994) ("The provisions of sections 1152 and 1153 of this
chapter shall not be applicable within the areas of Indian country listed in subsection (a) of
this section as areas over which the several States have exclusive jurisdiction.). While it is
not clear from the text of the Act, it would seem as though this provision should apply with
equal force to those states that otherwise accepted Public Law 280 jurisdiction.
4"1 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7) (1994).
4 2 See GETCHES ET AL., supra note 17, at 475-76 (quoting NATIONAL AMERIcAN INDIAN
JUDGES ASS'N, INDIAN COURTS AND THE FUTURE 33-35 (1978) (David Getches, ed.)).
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reservation 45 for the purpose of providing adequate machinery of
law enforcement where tribal agencies had broken down and no
substitute had been provided under state or federal law. 454 The
legitimacy of these courts has historically been questioned, as they
have never been expressly authorized by Congress. 45 5 Additionally,
such courts have historically been attacked as an effort forcibly to
assimilate Indians and to destroy tribal customs and institutions.4 56
In 1888, however, Congress implicitly recognized the legitimacy of
these courts when it began appropriating funds to operate them.4 5 7
An early court challenge to the authority of the BIA to establish the
courts was rejected on the ground that Congress's statutory
delegation to the President of general authority to manage Indian
affairs was sufficiently broad to encompass the authority to create
such courts.4 58
Today, the legitimacy of the BIA courts is based on long-standing
congressional ratification and acquiescence,4 59 but this still leaves
open the constitutional authority of Congress to establish such
courts.
Their judges lack life tenure and guaranteed

453 See COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF INDIAN LAW, supra note 46, at 333; Robert D. Cooter &
Wolfgang Fikentscher, Indian Common Law: The Role of Customs in American Tribal
Courts: PartI, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 287, 300 (1998).
4
See Tillett v. Lujan, 931 F.2d 636, 638 (10th Cir. 1991) (citing 25 C.F.R. § 11.1(b)); see
also 25 C.F.R. § 11.100(b) (2001) ("[The purpose of the regulations in this part to provide
adequate machinery for the administration ofjustice for Indian tribes in those areas of Indian
country where tribes retain jurisdiction over Indians that is exclusive of state jurisdiction but
where tribal courts have not been established ....
").

455COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF INDIAN LAW, supra note 46, at 333; Gloria Valencia-Weber,

Tribal Courts: Custom and Innovative Law, 24 N.M. L. REV. 225, 236 (1994).
4.'See COHENWS HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 46, at 333 n.12 (noting
courts were used to suppress Indian dances, polygamy, and certain practices of medicine
men); Blake A.Watson, The Curious Caseof DisappearingFederalJurisdictionOver Federal
Enforcement ofFederalLaw: A Vehicle forReassessmentofthe TribalExhaustionlAbstention
Doctrine,80 MARQ. L. REV. 531, 550-51 (1997) (explaining courts forced assimilation and
destroyed tribal culture and institutions); Peter Tasso, Note, Greywaterv. Joshua and Tribal
JurisdictionOver Nonmember Indians, 75 IOWA L. REV. 685, 697-98 (1990) (stating courts
eradicated tribal customs and authority).
'7 COHEN'S HANDBOOKOF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw, supra note 46, at 333 n.15
; Tasso, Note,
supra note 456, at 697.
'' United States v. Clapox, 35 F. 575, 577 (D. Or. 1888).
49 Tillett v. Hodel, 730 F. Supp. 381, 382-83 (W.D. Okla. 1990), affd, 931 F.2d 636 (10th
Cir. 1991); COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 46, at 333; ValenciaWeber, supra, note 455, at 236.
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compensation4 60 as required by Article III.461 They have been held
not to be Article III courts,462 and, although no court has directly
considered the matter, they likely would be upheld as legislative
courts under Congress's powers under the Indian Commerce and
Treaty Clauses.46 A few commentators have argued that they are
not federal courts at all, but derive their authority from the inherent
sovereignty of the tribe, with the federal government merely
providing financial and structural support.4 6 4 If such is the case,
Article III arguably imposes no constraints whatsoever.
In 1900, there were Courts of Indian Offenses on nearly twothirds of the reservations under the BIA's jurisdiction.4 65 Today,
they operate on just a handful of reservations. 466 Each such court is
composed of a trial and an appellate division,4 67 with appeals heard
468
by a panel of three magistrates who were not involved in the trial.
There is no appeal available from the decisions of the appellate
division. 469 A tribe can supplant the Court of Indian Offenses
located on its reservation by adopting a legal code that establishes
a court system. 470 A tribe can also enact laws that, if approved by
o The Courts of Indian Offenses are composed of magistrates appointed by the Assistant
Secretary for Indian Affairs and confirmed by a majority vote of the governing body of the
tribe over which the court will exercise jurisdiction. 25 C.F.R. § 11.201(a) (2001). In the case
of multi-tribal courts, confirmation is by a majority of the tribal governing bodies of the tribes
under the jurisdiction of the court. Id. They serve for a term of four years, id. § 11.201(b),
and the Assistant Secretary for Indian affairs may suspend or remove a magistrate for cause
in his own discretion or based on a recommendation by the tribe's governing body. Id. §
11.202.
461 U.S. CONsT.art. I, § 1.
4"
United States v. Clapox, 35 F. Supp. 575, 577 (D. Or. 1888) ("These 'courts of Indian

offenses' are not the constitutional courts provided for in section 1, art. 3, Const., which
congress only has the power to 'ordain and establish.' ").

' L. Scott Gould, The Congressional Response to Duro v. Reina: Compromising
Sovereignty and the Constitution,28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 53, 161 n.424 (1994). See generally
infra notes 1020-36 and accompanying text.
464 COHEN'SHANDBOOKOFFEDERALINDIANLAW, supranote 46, at 251 & n.69; Kevin J.

Worthen, Shedding New Light on an Old Debate: A FederalIndian Law Perspective on
CongressionalAuthorityto Limit FederalQuestion Jurisdiction,75MINN. L.REV. 65, 84 n.90
(1990).
Valencia-Weber,supra note 455, at 235.

€' For a list of the tribes which continue to have Courts of Indian Offenses, see 25 C.F.R.
§ 11.100(a) (2001).
4-725 C.F.R. § 11.200(a) (2001).
4"Id. § 11.200(c).
46 Id. § 11.200(d).
417

Id. § 11.100(c); COHEN, supra note 453, at 333-34.
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the Secretary of the Interior, will supplant those in the Code of
Federal Regulations.4 7 1
Both the criminal and civil jurisdiction of the Courts of Indian
Offenses are severely limited. Their criminal jurisdiction is limited
to crimes committed by an Indian that occurred within that portion
of Indian Country subject to the court's jurisdiction.4 72 Furthermore,
they cannot impose prison sentences of more than six months or
fines in excess of $500."' Their civil jurisdiction extends to civil
actions arising within the territorial jurisdiction of the court where
the defendant is an Indian,4 74 as well as to all other civil actions
between an Indian and a non-Indian, but only if the parties all agree
to have the case adjudicated in the court.47 5 It is this latter proviso
that has contributed to the "no forum" problem in those civil cases
discussed above, since it is unlikely that a defendant will consent to
jurisdiction when the alternative is to have no suit brought against
him.4 76 Moreover, tribes may not be sued in a Court of Indian
Offenses unless the tribal governing body has explicitly waived its
sovereign immunity,4 77 likewise contributing to the no forum
problem. 47' Thus, although the establishment of the Courts of
Indian Offenses has to some degree reduced the likelihood of a "no
forum" situation, the limited scope of their jurisdiction limits their
effectiveness in remedying the "no forum" problem.
B. THE "BIASED FORUM" PROBLEM IN INDIAN LAW

1. Illustrationof and Causes of the 'Biased Forum"Problem.As
demonstrated above, absent federal law to the contrary, under the
Williams non-infringement test tribal courts will have jurisdiction

4, 25 C.F.R. § 11.100(e). As a default, the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure also apply to proceedings taking place in the Courts of Indian
Offenses. Id. §§ 11.503, 11.504.
"72
113

Id.

§ 11.102(a).

470
476

Id.

§ 11.103(a).

Id. § 11.315(a)(i)-(2). They may, however, require a convicted defendant to perform
labor for the benefit of the tribe and to pay restitution to the victim. Id. § 11.315(a)(3), (b).
474 Id. § 11.103(a).
See supra notes 182-86 and accompanying text.
47 25 C.F.R. § 11.104(e).
478 See supra notes 392-434 and accompanying text.
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exclusive of the state courts in some civil suits between Indians and
non-Indians arising in Indian Country.479 Additionally, as a result
of Public Law 280, some state courts will have jurisdiction over civil
disputes between Indians and non-Indians arising in Indian
Country, as well as criminal jurisdiction over Indian defendants
alleged to have committed crimes against non-Indians.480 Moreover,
state courts have civil jurisdiction over all disputes involving
Indians that arise outside of Indian Country4 1 -including those
between an Indian and a non-Indian-as well as criminal jurisdiction over Indian defendants alleged to have committed crimes
outside of Indian country 482 -including those committed by an
Indian against a non-Indian.
At least in the civil context, to avoid the risk of state court bias
against out-of-state citizens, 483 Congress has provided for federal
diversity jurisdiction over most disputes between citizens of
'different states. 48 4 Given the historical backdrop of deep-seated
animosity and distrust between Indians and their non-Indian
neighbors,485 the rationale for diversity jurisdiction is at least as
strong in suits between Indians living on reservations and citizens
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959).
See supranotes 113-81 and accompanying text.
"! See, e.g., Smith Plumbing Co. v Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 720 P.2d 499, 506 (Ariz. 1986)
(holding suit involving tribe's business activities outside reservation made case proper for
adjudication by state courts); see generally COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW,
supra note 46, at 348-49 (explaining state jurisdiction over Indians outside of Indian
Country).
' See Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 421-22 (1964) (upholding exercise of state court
jurisdiction over Indian who committed crime outside of Indian Country).
4
See THE FEDERALIST No. 80,at 497 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
("[In order to the inviolable maintenance of that equality of privileges and immunities to
which the citizens of the Union will be entitled, the national judiciary ought to preside in all
cases in which one State or its citizens are opposed to another State or its citizens.').
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
See United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312,329 (W.D. Wash. 1974) (discussing
violence between Indians and non-Indians over treaty rights); Katharine F. Nelson, Resolving
NativeAmericanLand ClaimsandtheEleventhAmendment" ChangingtheBalanceofPower,
39 VILL. L. REV. 525, 550 (1994) CTribal land suits also generate hostility and exacerbate
existing antagonism among native Americans, local residents and the state."); Nell Jessup
Newton, Tribal Court Praxis: One Year in the Life of Twenty Indian TribalCourts, 22 AM.
INDIANL.REV. 285,351 (1998) ("[Clritics of tribal courts make the basic assumption that nonIndians ... will not get a fair trial in tribal courts."); Reynolds, supra note 27, at 593
("Commentators confirm a pervasive judicial distrust oftribal court adjudicatory jurisdiction
over non-Indians.").
479

4
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of states. Therefore, a neutral federal forum ought to be available

in civil suits between Indians and non-Indians, and in criminal
actions in which the victim is an Indian and the perpetrator is a
non-Indian, or vice-versa. State court judges, lacking life tenure and
often subject to popular election, are more likely to be influenced by
populist sentiments,486 including local anti-Indian sentiment.
Similarly, tribal court judges are also subject to political pressure to
dispose of cases in particular ways.4"'
To be sure, the Indian Country Crimes Act provides a form of
federal court criminal "diversity" jurisdiction over criminal offenses
committed in Indian Country by an Indian against a non-Indian, or
by a non-Indian against an Indian.488 However, the Indian Country
Crimes Act does not apply in those sections of Indian Country over
which the state courts were given criminal jurisdiction by Public
Law 280.489 Furthermore, in the civil context, no diversity jurisdiction exists where a suit is between a non-Indian and an Indian
where the latter's reservation is physically located within the
boundaries of the former's state.490 Moreover, even if diversity
exists as a formal matter, where the action arises in Indian country,
the tribal abstention doctrine announced in LaPlante usually
requires federal courts to abstain from the exercise of diversity
jurisdiction over the dispute.491
There are other structural limitations that prevent disputes
between Indians and non-Indians that raise federal questions from
being adjudicated in a federal court. The well-pleaded complaint
rule, for example, deprives federal district courts ofjurisdiction over
disputes where the federal issue comes in only by way of a defense.
As an example, this could force an Indian tribe sued in state court

'
See generallyHenry J. Friendly, The HistoricBasisof DiversityJurisdiction,41 HARv.
L. Rsv. 483, 484, 493 (1928) (explaining Framers supported diversity jurisdiction to avoid
state prejudice).
'8

REPORT OF THE U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 44 (June

1991).
4
See supra notes 440-44 and accompanying text. Of course, unlike in civil diversity
jurisdiction, federal rather than local law is applied (unless it is local law incorporated as the
federal rule of decision). Id.
48
18 U.S.C. § 1162(c) (1994).
"
Richardson v. Malone, 762 F. Supp. 1463, 1466-67 (N.D. Okla. 1991).
49
See supra notes 365-91 and accompanying text.
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to raise its defense of sovereign immunity in state court and to
appeal an adverse determination all the way through the state's
appellate system, even when the suit is brought against it by the
state itself or by an arm of the state.4 92 Although the decision is
theoretically subject to Supreme Court review,4 9 the potential for a
grant of certiorari is an inadequate substitute for original federal
jurisdiction.4 94 And of course, no Supreme Court review is available
495
of state court decisions in which no federal issue is raised.
Moreover, the federal removal statute makes no provision for the
removal of cases from tribal to federal court, even where the suit
arises under federal law or the parties are diverse, 9 6 and the
Supreme Court-has not been given statutory authority to review the
49 7
decisions of tribal courts, even when a federal question is raised.
2. The JudicialResponse to the '2Biased Forum" Problem. The
Supreme Court's response to the "biased forum" problem has itself
been biased. While making no efforts to rectify the "biased forum"
problem when a threat of bias exists against an Indian party, the
Supreme Court has been very active in taking measures to protect
non-Indian parties from the threat of bias in tribal courts. Some
decisions have attempted to rectify the problem by allowing for
collateral federal court attack on tribal court decisions. Others have
addressed the problem by substantially cutting back on the scope of
tribal court jurisdiction, a line of reasoning which threatens
severely to erode tribal sovereignty.
In National Farmers Union Insurance Co. v. Crow Tribe of
4 9 a child who was a member of the Crow Tribe was hit by
Indians,
a motorcycle in his school parking lot while returning from a school

492 Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Graham, 489 U.S. 838, 841 (1989).

4" Seegenerally Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821) (providing for Supreme
Court review of state court judgments in certain circumstances).
"'4 Cf. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465,534 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ('[O]ur certiorari
jurisdiction is inadequate for containing state criminal proceedings within constitutional
bounds....").
'95 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) (1994); Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590,635-36
(1875) (stating whether federal question is raised is essential to Supreme Court jurisdiction).
"s Nevada v. Hicks, 121 S. Ct. 2304,2323 (2001) (Souter, J., concurring); El Paso Natural
Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, 526 U.S. 473, 486-88 (1999); Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438,459
& n.13 (1997).
49 Hicks, 121 S. Ct. at 2323.
498 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
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activity.499 The child, through his guardian, brought suit in the
tribal court and obtained a default judgment against the school
district (a political subdivision of the state)."' The school district
and National, the district's insurer, filed suit in federal district
court, naming as defendants the tribe, the tribal council, the tribal
court, judges of the tribal court, the chairman of the tribal council,
and subsequently, the child and his guardian.50 ' In this attempted
collateral attack, the district court issued a temporary restraining
order and later a permanent injunction, finding that the tribal court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the suit.02 On appeal, the
Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that the district court erred in
exercising jurisdiction.0 3
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that "[t]he
question whether an Indian tribe retains the power to compel a nonIndian property owner to submit to the civil jurisdiction of a tribal
court... is a 'federal question' under § 1331, "504 and accordingly
that federal district courts had subject matter jurisdiction over such
challenges. However, the Court further held that the federal courts
should refrain from adjudicating the matter until the tribal courts,
including the tribal appellate courts, have considered the question
of their jurisdiction. 5 Accordingly, to remedy the lack of direct
Supreme Court review of tribal court decisions in which a challenge
is raised as to the tribal courts' jurisdiction over the dispute, the
Supreme Court created de facto appellate review by way of a
collateral proceeding brought in federal district court.
4" Id. at 847.

0 Id.

60' Id. at 847-48.

Id. at 848-49.
Id. at 849.
504 Id. at 852-53. The Court's rationale for this was that the petitioners had alleged that
federal law deprived the tribal courts of this aspect of their sovereignty. Id.
' Id. at 855-57. The Court went on to hold, however, that exhaustion would not be
required "where the assertion of tribal jurisdiction 'is motivated by a desire to harass or is
conducted in bad faith,' where [it] is patently violative of express jurisdictional prohibitions,
or where exhaustion would be futile because of the lack of adequate opportunity to challenge
the courts jurisdiction." Id. at 856 n.21 (citing Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 338 (1977)). The
Court has subsequently added that "[w]hen... it is plain that no federal grant provides for
tribal governance of nonmembers' conduct on land covered by Montands main rule," such
that the exhaustion requirement "would serve no purpose other than delay," exhaustion is
not required. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 459 n.14 (1997).
-

03
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Under the Price-Anderson Act,5" 6 federal district courts have
original and removal jurisdiction over all suits for liability arising
out of or resulting from a nuclear incident.1 7 In El Paso Natural
Gas Co. v. Neztsosie,"8 two members of the Navajo Nation filed a
tort action in a Navajo tribal court against two companies that had
operated open pit uranium mines on the reservation, alleging that"
the mines contaminated their drinking water and caused them
injuries. 0 9 The companies collaterally attacked the tribal court
action by filing suit in federal court to enjoin the tribal court
action.510 The case eventually reached the Supreme Court, which
held that Congress's statutory scheme under the Price-Anderson Act
"expressed an unmistakable preference for a federal forum, at the
5,
The Court rejected the argument
behest of the defending party."
that a negative inference could be drawn from Congress's failure
statutorily to provide for removal from tribal to federal court (as
opposed to its provision for allowing removal from state to federal
court), reasoning that "Congress probably would never have
expected an occasion for asserting tribal jurisdiction over claims like
these."512 The Court concluded that the appropriate remedy was to
allow the defendant to obtain an injunction against the tribal
proceedings in federal court and require the plaintiffs to refile their
suit in state or federal court.5" 3 In effect, the Court thus provided
for a de facto form of removal from tribal to federal courts in an
effort to replicate the statutory scheme providing for removal from
state to federal courts.
Other cases seek to protect non-Indian parties from bias in tribal
courts through cutbacks in tribal court jurisdiction. For example,
in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,5" 4 the Supreme Court
considered the scope of tribal court criminal jurisdiction over nonIndians. In Oliphant,two non-Indians were arrested and arraigned
42 U.S.C. § 2210(a)(2) (1994).
w Id.

526 U.S. 473 (1999).
Id. at 477.
Id. at 478.
"" Id. at 484.
512 Id. at 487.
1,3 Id. at 485.
5

510

514

435 U.S. 191 (1978).
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in tribal court for violations of the Suquamish Indian tribe's law and
order code for offenses committed on the tribe's Port Madison
Reservation. 515 Under the tribe's law and order code only
Suquamish tribal members could serve as jurors in tribal court.516
The defendants filed petitions for writs of habeas corpus in federal
district court, contending that the tribal court lacked criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians, but their petitions were denied by the
lower federal courts.51' The Supreme Court granted certiorari and
reversed.518 The Court held that, in submitting to the overriding
sovereignty of the federal government, Indian tribes gave up any
inherent power they possessed to try non-Indians in their courts for
criminal offenses. 19 The Court concluded that, absent an affirmative Congressional delegation of such power, the tribal courts lack
any criminal jurisdiction whatsoever over non-Indians.52 ° The Court
recognized that there was an increase of non-Indian crime being
committed on reservations, but concluded
that it was for Congress
521
problem.
this
remedy
to
how
to decide
A series of Supreme Court decisions have likewise eroded the
civil "jurisdiction" of tribes. Those trained in the law often speak
loosely of the existence of "jurisdiction" or lack thereof without
specifying precisely which among the myriad forms of jurisdiction
they mean to reference, and an understanding of the various
categories of "jurisdiction" aids in the analysis of cutbacks in tribal
5 22
court jurisdiction in the civil context. Under International Law,

616
616

Id. at 192-94.
Id. at 194 & n.4.

5 Id. at 194-95.
618 Id. at 195.
5 Id. at 207-10.
520 Id.
521 Id. at 212. In Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990), the Court extended Oliphant,holding
that tribal courts also lacked jurisdiction over nonmember Indians (i.e., Indians of other
tribes), but Congress overrode Duro and specifically provided for tribal criminal jurisdiction
over nonmember Indians. 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (1994).
' Although the relationship among the federal, state, and tribal governments in the
United States is not itself dictated by International Law, the categories of jurisdiction
described therein are analogous to the separation of powers and federalism principles
inherent in the United States Constitution, and domestic law is generally construed to
conform with international law. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 401 crts. a, b (1987). Thus while the categories of power are the same in
the domestic context, the constraints on that power are imposed by constitutional, statutory,
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there are three broad categories of jurisdiction-prescriptive,
adjudicative, and enforcement 52 -- that roughly correspond to the
traditional division of governmental authority in the United States
into legislative, judicial, and executive power. 524 Prescriptive, or
legislative, jurisdiction refers to a sovereign's power to make its
laws apply to particular persons and circumstances.5 2 5 Adjudicative
jurisdiction refers to a sovereign's power to subject persons or
objects to the process of its judicial tribunals.5 2' Lastly, enforcement
jurisdiction refers to a sovereign's power to induce or compel
compliance or to punish noncompliance with its laws. 527 In the
United States, adjudicative jurisdiction is further broken down into
two major categories: subject matter jurisdiction5 28 and personal
jurisdiction, with the former referring to a court's power to hear
particular categories of disputes and the latter referring
to a court's
5 29
power over the defendant's person and his assets.
5 30
.The seminal Indian Law cases of Cherokee Nation v. Georgia
and Worcesterv. Georgia"'aptly demonstrate the distinction among
the many categories of jurisdiction. In Cherokee Nation, the
Cherokee Nation brought suit against the State of Georgia in the
U.S. Supreme Court to enjoin Georgia from executing and enforcing
its laws against the Cherokee people. 3 2 The Court dismissed the
action for want of jurisdiction. According to the Court, it lacked
adjudicative jurisdiction over the dispute because the Cherokee
and decisional law rather than international law.
"23 Id. § 401(a)-(c).
52 Id. § 401, cmt. a. In line with contemporary practice, international law recognizes that
courts exercise prescriptive and enforcement as well as adjudicative power, and that
executives exercise prescriptive and adjudicative as well as enforcement powers. Id. § 401(a)(e) & cmt. a.
"' Id. § 401(a), introductory cmt.
5- Id. § 401(b).
• Id. § 401(c).
Although the category of adjudicative jurisdiction in the Restatement of Foreign
Relations Law does not include subject matter jurisdiction, id..§ 421, cmt. j, the category as
used in this Article does include it.
529 GARYB. BORN, INTERNATIONALCIVILLITIGATIONINUNITED STATES COURTS 1-2 (3ded.
1996). Subject matter and personal jurisdiction are not, however, the only constraints on
adjudicative jurisdiction. See supra notes 95-434 (discussing various other jurisdictional
limitations).
su 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
5"

31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 14-15.
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Nation was neither a "State" nor a "foreign State" within the
meaning of Article III, section 253 -more specifically, the Court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction." 4 In contrast, the merits of the
case raised the questions whether the State of Georgia could
exercise legislative535 and enforcement.. jurisdiction over the
Cherokee territory, and whether its courts could exercise
adjudicative jurisdiction over disputes arising in the Cherokee
territory.53
Worcester, decided the following year, picked up where Cherokee
Nation left off, and likewise demonstrates the distinctions among
adjudicative, legislative, and enforcement jurisdiction. In Worcester,
Samuel Worcester and Elizur Butler-missionaries on the Cherokee
territory-were arrested, convicted and sentenced to four years in
a Georgia penitentiary for violating a Georgia law prohibiting nonIndians from residing in the Cherokee territory unless licensed by
the state.538 After their case made its way through the Georgia state
courts, Worcester and Butler petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for
a writ of certiorari, contending that Georgia's application of its laws
to the Cherokee territory violated the Constitution, laws, and
treaties of the United States.3 9

' Article III, § 2, cl. 2 provides that "In all Cases ... in which a State shall be Party, the
Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction." However, the Supreme Court had previously
held that its original jurisdiction over actions in which a State is a party did not extend to
every case in which a State is a party, but only to those instances in which clause 1 grants
power over a case because a State is a party. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 398
(1821). Thus, the mere fact that a federal question is involved is not enough to invoke the
Court's original jurisdiction merely because a state is a party to the action. Article III, § 2,
cl. 1 provides in relevant part that "The judicial Power shall extend. .. to Conioversies
between two or more States... and between a State ... and foreign States." The Court had
no difficulty in holding that Georgia, as a state, "could unquestionably be sued in [the
Supreme Court]," leaving open only the question whether the Cherokee nation could bring
an original suit in the Supreme Court. CherokeeNation, 30 U.S. at 15-16.
' CherokeeNation, 30 U.S. at 16-19.
See id. at 7-8 (noting "[t]he effect of (the challenged] laws... [is] to extend all the laws
of Georgia over [the territory of the Cherokees]").
5m See id. at 8 (noting challenged laws "authori[ze] the calling out of the militia of Georgia
to enforce process").
'
See id. (noting that challenged laws "extend[] the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace
of Georgia into the Cherokee territory").
'5 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 529-31 (1832).
539 Id. at 516.
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The Supreme Court found that because a federal question was
involved, it could review the case.540 In other words, the Court had
adjudicative jurisdiction-specifically subject matter jurisdiction-over the dispute. On the merits of the case, the Court ruled
that the laws of Georgia had no force in the Cherokee
territory54'"-in other words, that Georgia lacked legislative
jurisdiction over the Cherokee territory. Finally, due to procedural
defects in the Judiciary Act of 1789, the Supreme Court lacked the
ability to order the federal marshals to release Worcester and Butler
from prison.54 2 The procedural limitations on the Court's ability are
an example of limitations on enforcement jurisdiction: there was no
means by which the Supreme Court could order the marshals to
release Worcester and Butler, and no basis for the marshals to do so
absent an order.
In the Indian Law context, we are concerned primarily with the
distinction between legislative jurisdiction and subject matter
jurisdiction. The difference between these two forms of jurisdiction
has aptly been summarized as follows:

540Id. at 561-62. Unlike the parties in Cherokee Nation, the Worcesters were not
attempting to invoke the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, but rather were invoking
its appellate jurisdiction. Id. at 515-16. Among the grants of judicial power contained in
Article III, § 2, cl. 1 is that over cases "arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United
States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority." Although this is
not one of the types of cases for which the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction, see supra
note 533, it is one for which the Court has appellate jurisdiction. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl.
2. The Court had previously held that the 11th Amendment, which provides that "[t]he
judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or
equity commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States, by citizens of another
State, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state," U.S. CONST. amend. XI, did not effect
the Supreme Coures appellate review over state-court judgments involving federal questions.
See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 405-30 (1821) (establishing superiority of
federal judiciary over state courts in federal questions). Accordingly, had the Cherokee
Nation brought suit against Georgia in the Georgia state courts, the Supreme Court would
similarly have been empowered to review the case.
"1 Worcester,31 U.S. at 539.
"
GETCHES ETAL., supranote 17, at 122 (citing Burke, The Cherokee Cases: A Study in
Law, Politics,and Morality, 21 STAN. L. REV. 500, 525-26 (1969)). In fact, it is this case of
which President Andrew Jackson is alleged to have said, "John Marshall has made his
decision; now let him enforce it." Id. at 523 (citing HORACE GREELEY, AMERICAN CONFLICT
106 (1864)).
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Subject matter jurisdiction is a court's power to hear
a category of disputes without necessary regard to the
substantive rules that are applied. In contrast,
legislative jurisdiction deals with the power of a state
to prescribe substantive law, without necessary
regard to the forum in which that law is applied.5 4
Typically, it is perfectly permissible for the courts of one sovereign, such as those of a given U.S. state, to exercise adjudicative
jurisdiction over a dispute even though it lacks the power under the
due process clause to apply its own substantive laws to the
dispute. 44 Yet, in the Indian Law context, the Supreme Court has
recently tied tribal adjudicative jurisdiction to tribal legislative
jurisdiction, making an understanding of the limits on tribal
legislative jurisdiction salient to an understanding of the scope of
tribal adjudicative jurisdiction.
In Montana v. United States,54 5 the Supreme Court considered
the scope of a tribe's civil legislativejurisdiction over non-Indians on
tribal lands. In Montana, the Crow Tribe enacted an ordinance
prohibiting hunting and fishing on the reservation by anyone not a
member of the tribe.54 The Supreme Court upheld the tribe's
authority to prohibit nonmembers of the tribe from hunting or
fishing on land owned by the tribe or held in trust for the tribe by
the federal government.5 4 However, the Court concluded that the
tribe lacked legislative authority to regulate hunting and fishing by
non-Indians on lands within the tribe's reservation owned in fee
simple by non-Indians. 4 8 The Court held that, with respect to
nonmembers of an Indian tribe, the "exercise of tribal power beyond
what is necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control
internal relations is inconsistent with the dependent status of the

BORN, supra note 529, at 2.
' E.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985) (holding Kansas courts can
exercise judicial jurisdiction over nationwide class action, but cannot apply Kansas law to all
claims).
450 U.S. 544 (1981).
54

546

Id. at 548-49.

Id. at 557.
5" Id. at 566-67.
47
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tribes, and so cannot survive without express congressional delegation."549
The Court construed Oliphant as standing for the general
proposition that the "inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe
do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe."550 Still,
the Court set forth two exceptions to this general proposition,
situations in which the tribe retains inherent authority to regulate
non-Indians on their reservations, even with respect to activities
taking place on non-Indian fee lands.55 ' First, tribes retain inherent
regulatory authority over non-Indians who enter into consensual
relationships with the tribe or its members through commercial
dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements. 5 2 Second, tribes
retain inherent authority to regulate the conduct of non-Indians
that threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the
economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.5 53 Moreover,
Congress may expressly delegate civil legislative jurisdiction over
non-member conduct to the tribes.5 54 Finding no delegation by
Congress and that the instant regulation did not fall within either
of the two announced exceptions, the Court held that the tribe
lacked legislative jurisdiction over hunting and fishing by nonmembers on land owned in fee by non-Indians. 5
In Stratev. A-1 Contractors,556 the Supreme Court tied its holding
in Montanawith respect to the civil legislative jurisdiction of tribal
courts to the limits on the adjudicative jurisdiction of tribal courts.
Strate involved a traffic accident between two non-Indians that
occurred within the boundaries of the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation, but on a portion of a public highway maintained by the State
of North Dakota under a federally granted right-of-way through the
reservation.5 57 The tribal court ruled that it had jurisdiction over

' Id. at 564.
6' Id. at 565.
51 Id. at 565-66.
Id. at 565.
a Id. at 566.
Id. at 564.
Id. at 566-67.
520 U.S. 438 (1997).
Id. at 442-43.
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the case, and the tribal court of appeals affirmed.55 8 The tribal court
defendants then filed suit in federal district court, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, contending that, as a matter of federal
law, the tribal court lacked adjudicative jurisdiction over the
dispute.559 The district court found that the tribal court had
jurisdiction, and the court of appeals affirmed, but the court of
appeals en banc reversed, holding that Montanaprecluded the tribal
court from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute.560
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed. According
to the Court, a tribe's adjudicative jurisdiction does not exceed its
legislative jurisdiction, and thus the restrictions in Montana with
respect to tribal court civil regulatory adjudication likewise limit a
tribal court's civil adjudicative jurisdiction.5 61 The Court classified
the right-of-way as analogous to alienated, non-Indian fee land and
held that tribal regulation of nonmember conduct over that land was
thus subject to the restrictions in Montana.562 The Court held that
the tortious conduct alleged in the case did not fall within the first
Montanaexception reaching the activities of nonmembers who enter
consensual relationships with the tribe or its members."'
Turning to the second Montana exception, the Court conceded
that those who drive carelessly on a public highway running
through the reservation endanger tribal members in the vicinity,
but held that "if Montana'ssecond exception requires no more, the
'
exception would severely shrink the rule."564
Therefore, the Court
limited the second exception, holding that it goes only to those
activities that threaten tribal self-government or the tribe's ability
to control internal relations, including its power to punish tribal
offenders, to determine tribal membership, to regulate domestic
relations among members of the tribe, and to prescribe rules of
inheritance for members. 565 The Court made clear that it was
leaving open the question whether the tribal court would have had
m Id. at 444.
559 Id.

"0 Id. at 444-45.
'2Id.

Id. at 453.
at 454.56.
Id. at 456-57.
Id. at 457-58.
Id. at 458-59.
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adjudicative jurisdiction had the accident occurred on a tribal
road, 66 and noted that the
plaintiff in this case was free to pursue
567
her claim in state court.
The Strate Court clearly seemed concerned with the lack of
removal jurisdiction, noting that the defendants should not be
required to defend the claim in an "unfamiliar court," and that when
an analogous situation occurs outside of a reservation, i.e., when
nonresidents are the sole defendants in a suit filed in state court,
the defendants may remove the case to federal court.56
The Supreme Court returned to the issue of tribal court civil
adjudicative jurisdiction over non-member conduct on tribal lands
in Nevada v. Hicks.5 69 In Hicks, a member of the Fallon PaiuteShoshone Tribes brought suit in tribal court against state game
wardens who had searched his home for evidence of an off-reservation crime pursuant to search warrants obtained by both state and
tribal courts, alleging trespass to land and chattels, abuse of
process, and federal civil rights claims under section 1983.570 The
tribal court held that it had jurisdiction over the claims, and the
tribal appeals court affirmed.57 ' The state officials then filed suit in
federal district court, seeking a declaratory judgment that the tribal
court lacked jurisdiction.572 The district court held that the tribal
court had jurisdiction and that the state officials were further
required to exhaust any claims of qualified immunity in tribal
court.57 The court of appeals affirmed, finding that the fact that
Hicks's house was located on land owned by the tribe within the
reservation was sufficient to support tribal jurisdiction over civil
claims against nonmembers of the tribe arising from their activities
5 75
on that land.7 4 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.

5
'

Id. at 442.
Id. at 459.

56 Id. at 459 & n.13. There was a dispute in the case over whether the tribal court
plaintif%a non-Indian widow ofa member of the tribe, resided on the reservation at the time
of the accident. Id. at 443 n.2.
" 121 S. Ct. 2304 (2001).
570 Id. at 2306.
57

Id.

572

Id.

$73Id.
57

Id.
575Id.
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The Court first considered whether the tribal court had jurisdiction over the claims arising under tribal law. 576 The Court noted
that under Strate, a tribe's adjudicative jurisdiction does not exceed
its legislative jurisdiction, and thus that if it found that the tribe
lacked authority to regulate-either as an exercise of its inherent
sovereignty or delegated federal authority-state wardens executing
search warrants for evidence of an off-reservation crime, then the
tribal court clearly lacked adjudicative jurisdiction.577
Turning to the Montana analysis, the Court rejected the argument that Montana applied only to conduct occurring on non-Indian
fee land. 7 The Court held that "the general rule of Montana
applies to both Indian and non-Indian land," and that "the ownership status of land ...

is only one factor to consider," with the

absence of tribal ownership being "virtually conclusive of the
absence of tribal civil jurisdiction," but tribal ownership not
implying the opposite.51 9 Noting that its previous decisions had held
that states have criminal jurisdiction over reservation Indians for
crimes committed off the reservation,58 ° the Court held that this
jurisdiction entails a "corollary right to enter a reservation.., for
enforcement purposes, ' and that tribal authority to regulate state
officers in executing process related to the violation of state laws
committed by tribal members off of the reservation is not essential
to tribal self-government or internal relations."' Thus, under
Montana and Strate, the tribe lacked inherent authority to legislate
with respect to such conduct, and the tribal court lacked inherent
authority to adjudicate civil actions arising out of such conduct.583
The Court noted that tribal ownership of the land on which the
incident took place may at times be dispositive,58 4 but in this case,

576 Id. at 2309.
677

id.

578

Id. at 2309-10.

s79 Id.

at 2310.

6 Id. at 2312 (citing Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148-49 (1973)).
68' Id. at 2312.
'8
Id. at 2313.
8
Id. at2311-13. The Court noted that the states' inherent jurisdiction in this regard can
be stripped by Congress, but found nothing in the federal statutory scheme that did so. Id.
at 2313.
-

Id. at 2310.
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the Court did not find that factor dispositive when weighed against
interest in pursuing off-reservation violations of its
the state's
85
laws.6

Turning to the section 1983 claim, the court rejected the argument that tribal courts, like state courts, are courts of general
jurisdiction with authority to entertain federal claims, noting that
there was a "historical and constitutional assumption" associated
with concurrent state-court jurisdiction that was "completely
missing with respect to tribal courts."' 6 Because a tribe's inherent
adjudicative jurisdiction can be no broader than its inherent
legislative jurisdiction, the section 1983 claim dealingwith the same
conduct as the claims arising under tribal law-which the Court
found to be outside the scope of the tribe's inherent legislative
jurisdiction--could not fall within the tribal court's jurisdiction
absent a congressional grant of jurisdiction to tribal courts over
section 1983 claims, which the Court found lacking. 87 In making its
determination, the Court was clearly troubled by the lack of removal
jurisdiction from tribal courts to federal courts when a federal claim
is brought in state court,88 and declined to extend its holding in El
PasoNaturalGas Co. v. Neztsosie.89 to the instant situation, holding
that its decision in that case was an interpretation of the provisions
of the Price-Anderson Act rather than the general federal removal
statute.5 90
In dicta, the Court suggested that tribal courts might not ever
have jurisdiction over nonmember defendants. The Court stated
that it had "never held that a tribal court had jurisdiction over a
nonmember defendant," noting that its cases dealing with tribal
court jurisdiction, such as Williams, have typically involved suits
brought against tribal defendants, and stated that it was "leav[ing]

Id. at 2313.
s Id. at 2314 (citing Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455,458 (1990); THE FEDERALIST NO. 82,
at 492-93 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); U.S. CONST. art. DIL).
587 Id.
See id. C'Mribal-court jurisdiction would create serious anomalies ... because the
'
general federal-question removal statute refers only to removal from state court .... Were
§ 1983 claims cognizable in tribal court, defendants would inexplicably lack the right
available to state-court § 1983 defendants to seek a federal forum.").
5 526 U.S. 473 (1999).
5"o Hicks, 121 S. Ct. at 2315.
'a
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open the question of tribal-court jurisdiction over nonmember
defendants in general."5"9 ' The Court noted that the holding in
Stratethat" '[a]s to nonmembers... a tribe's adjudicative jurisdiction does not exceed its legislative jurisdiction'.., leaves open the
question whether a tribe's adjudicative jurisdiction over nonmember
defendants equals its legislative jurisdiction."59' 2
Justice Souter, writing for himself and Justices Kennedy and
Thomas, concurred.59 Justice Souter would have gone further than
the majority opinion in one respect and would have held that, "as a
presumptive matter, tribal courts lack civil jurisdiction over
nonmembers, 594 subject to the Montana exceptions.59 5 He would
thus emphasize that the primary jurisdictional fact is the membership status of the parties, and that the status of the land on which
the acts took place matters only secondarily in applying the
Montana exceptions. 9 Justice Souter noted that tying the tribal
court's authority to land status "would produce an unstable
jurisdictional crazy quilt," and stressed that a number of factors
made certainty important for nonmembers: that the Bill of Rights
and the Fourteenth Amendment do not of their own force apply to
tribes; that while ICRA provides analogous protections, they are not
identical, and that in any event there is a trend in tribal courts of
interpreting the provisions of ICRA without regard to the Supreme
Court's precedents for the analogous constitutional rights; and that
tribal courts differ from state and federal courts in their structure,
the substantive law that they apply, and the independence of their
judges from the political branches of the tribes.5 97 Moreover, he
stressed the fact that there is no effective mechanism in place to
review a tribal court's decisions on matters of state or federal law,

59'

Id. at 2309 n.2.

Id. at 2309 (emphasis added). Justice Ginsberg wrote a separate concurrence, making
clear her understanding that the Coures decision was leaving open the question of tribalcourt jurisdiction over nonmember defendants in general, including state officials engaged
"in a venture or frolic of their own." Id. at 2324 (Ginsberg, J., concurring).
5M Id. at 2318 (Souter, J., concurring).
r

"94

Id. at 2319.

5 Id. at 2318. Justice Souter pointed out that because the Court was dealing with
inherent authority, and not that authority expressly delegated to the tribes by statute, the
Duro distinction between members and nonmembers applied. Id. at 2319 n.2.
59
"91

Id. at 2322 & n.4.
Id. at 2322-23.
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since cases can neither be removed to nor reviewed by federal or
state courts.598
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Breyer, wrote a separate
concurrence.59 Justice Stevens disagreed with the Court's conclusion that tribal courts may not exercise their jurisdiction over claims
seeking relief under section 1983, arguing that they should be free
to do so, and that such claims could be "removed," as suggested by
the government, by allowing a defendant to obtain a federal-court
injunction against the action, which has the effect of forcing the suit
to be refiled in federal court.600 In his view, absent federal law to
the contrary, the question of whether a tribal court is one of general
jurisdiction is, as with state courts, a matter of state law.6 01
The dicta in Hicks is no doubt a preview of things to come, and it
is thus only a matter of time before the lower courts rely on that
dicta to conclude that tribal courts lack jurisdiction over nonmember
civil defendants. To avoid such a blow to tribal sovereignty, tribal
leaders must work with Congress to integrate the tribal courts into
the federal system to allay the sorts of concerns motivating the
Supreme Court's decisions in Strate and Hicks. Accordingly, Part
III of this Article examines the ways in which Congress has
addressed the "no forum" and "biased forum" problems in the
past.602 Part IV then suggests specific solutions to the "no forum"

and "biased forum" problems in Indian Law.60 3

598 Id.

at2332.

599 Id.

Id. at 2332-33.

"1 Id. at 2333. Justice O'Connor wrote a concurrence, joined by Justices Stevens and
Breyer, in which she 'agreed with the majority that the Montana analysis governed
nonmember conduct both on and off tribal land, but wrote separately to express her
disagreement with the application of Montana in the case before the Court. Id. at 2325
(O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor believed that the majority's decision gave too
little weight to the fact that the state officials' activities occurred on land owned by the tribe
and incorrectly treated as dispositive the fact that the nonmembers in this case were state
officials enforcing state law. Id. at 2327. Justice O'Connor would have resolved the case by
treating the qualified immunity defenses of the defendants as "jurisdictional," and thus
allowing the lower federal court to dispose of the case by deciding the question of qualified
immunity, which would allow it to avoid reaching the question of tribal court jurisdiction per
se. Id. at 2330-32.
See infra notes 604-1019 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 1020-1102 and accompanying text.
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III. CONGRESSIONAL SOLUTIONS TO THE No-FoRuM AND BIASED
FORUM PROBLEMS IN OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES
Historically, Congress has shown itself to be creative in making
use of the existing Article III courts and creating specialized federal
courts where necessary both to fill jurisdictional gaps and to provide
a neutral federal forum where there exists a risk of bias in local
courts. This Part examines the various ways in which Congress has
provided a federal forum to adjudicate disputes arising in U.S.
territories and possessions,' 4 in foreign countries, and in federal
enclaves within the boundaries of U.S. states, as well as the ways
in which Congress has provided for federal court adjudication of
cases that would otherwise be adjudicated in state courts. In
addition to examining the various models used by Congress to fill
jurisdictional gaps and to provide a neutral federal forum, this Part
also examines Congress's constitutional authority to vest the
existing Article III courts with such jurisdiction, as well as its
authority to create specialized, non-Article III courts to adjudicate
such disputes.
A. CREATION OF NEW, SPECIALIZED FEDERAL COURTS

1. U.S. Territoriesand Possessions. The text of Article III of the
U.S. Constitution provides a limitation on the sorts of tasks and
cases that Congress can ask the federal courts to take on as well as
certain protections for the judges who sit on such courts. First,
Article III speaks of "[t]he judicial power" being vested in the U.S.
Supreme Court and the inferior federal courts created by
Congress. 6 5 The Supreme Court has held that this limits Congress
to vesting federal courts with "judicial," as opposed to administrative or legislative power. 6 8
' A "possession" differs from a territory in that it lacks a permanent population, is not
self-governing, and does not have inhabitants who seek self-determination. JonM.VanDyke,

The Evolving Legal Relationships Between the United States and its Affiliated U.S.-Flag
Islands, 14 U. HAW. L. REV. 445, 447 (1992).

See U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1-2.
' See Fed. Radio Comm'n v. Gen. Elec. Co., 281 U.S. 464,469 (1930) C'[The Court] cannot
give decisions which are merely advisory; nor can it exercise or participate in the exercise of
functions which are essentially legislative or administrative."); Keller v. Potomac Elec. Power
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Second, Article III limits the scope of the "judicial power" to
particular, enumerated categories of cases and controversies,
including cases "arising under" federal law and controversies
between citizens of different states.0 7 Thus, the plain text of Article
III would seem to limit Congress's ability to vest federal courts with
suits not falling within the enumerated categories, such as a dispute
between two citizens of the same state that is grounded solely in
state law.
Third, Article III contains important protections for the judges
appointed to the federal courts. Article III provides that the judges
of the Supreme Court and the inferior federal courts have life tenure
and that their salaries cannot be decreased during their tenure in
office.60 8 While the direct effect of these provisions is to provide
federal judges with a high degree of security, their purpose is to
insulate federal judges from political and popular pressure and thus
to ensure their independence and objectivity.0 9
Yet the Supreme Court has upheld the authority of Congress to
create specialized federal courts for the territories-so-called
'legislative courts"-that adjudicate matters falling outside of the
enumerated categories in Article III, and whose judges lack the
protections of life tenure and guaranteed compensation.
In
61
°
American Insurance Co. v. Canter, the Supreme Court reasoned
that Congress derives its authority to create courts for the territories from the Territory Clause of the Constitution, which provides
that "Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful

Co., 261 U.S. 428,443-45 (1923) ([Tihe jurisdiction ofthis court and of the inferior courts...
does not extend to an issue of constitutional law framed by Congress for the purpose of
invoking the advice of this court without real parties or a real case, or to administrative or
legislative issues or controversies."); accord Boggess v. Berry Corp., 233 F.2d 389,392 (1956)
(declining to review revocation of a liquor license because it was a legislative and not a
judicialfunction). The Courthas deemed the rendering ofadvisory opinions to be non-judicial
in character. Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 408, 410-14 (1792).

U.S. CONST.art. Il1,§ 2.
U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 1.
See THE FEDERALISTNo. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)

("In a monarchy [life tenure] is [an] .. .excellent barrier to the encroachments and
oppressions of the representative body. And it is the best expedient which can be devised in
any government, to secure a steady, upright, and impartial administration of the laws."); THE
FEDERALIST NO. 79, at 472 (Alexander Hamilton) ('A Power Over a Man's Subsistence

Amounts to a Power OverHis Will.").
610 26 U.S. 511 (1828).
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Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property
belonging to the United States," 61 1 not from Article III. Thus the
restrictions contained in Article III do not apply to the territorial
courts.612 While the Supreme Court has more recently attempted to
set limits on Congress's authority to create non-Article III courts, in
doing so, it has re-affirmed Congress's authority to create specialized courts for the territories free of the constraints imposed by
Article 111.613

When Congress has created specialized courts for the adjudication of disputes arising in the U.S. territories and possessions, it has
employed one of three models. The first model, perhaps best
described as the "classic" model, is to create a single, non-Article III
61 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
61 See Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. 511, 546 (1828).
These Courts, then, are not constitutional Courts, in which the judicial
power conferred by the Constitution on the general government, can be
deposited. They are incapable of receiving it. They are legislative Courts,
created in virtue of the general right of sovereignty which exists in the
government, or in virtue of that clause which enables Congress to make
all needful rules and regulations, respecting the territory belonging to the
United States. The jurisdiction with which they are invested, is not a part
ofthat judicial power which is defined in the 3d article of the Constitution,
but is conferred by Congress, in the execution of those general powers
which that body possesses over the territories of the United States.
Id.; see also Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 544-45 (1962) (plurality opinion) C([1n the
territories cases and controversies falling within the enumeration of Article III may be heard
and decided in courts constituted without regard to the limitations of that article; courts, that
is, having judges of limited tenure and entertaining business beyond the range of conventional cases and controversies.").
61 See N. Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 63-64, 75-76 (1982)
(plurality opinion) ("[There are] a series of cases in which this Court has upheld the creation
by Congress of non-Art. III 'territorial courts.' This exception from the general prescription
of Art. HI dates from the earliest days of the Republic .... ."). Not every justice agreed that
the case law necessarily supports "a general proposition and ... tidy exceptions." Id. at 91
(Rehnquist, J., concurring). The dissent viewed the issue generally as requiring a balancing
of the values Congress hopes to serve through the use of Article I courts against the value of
judicial independence expressed in Article III. Id. at 113-18 (White, J., dissenting).
Subsequent cases appear to endorse the balancing test. See generally CFTC v. Schor, 478
U.S. 833 (1986) (holding Congress's empowerment of Commodity Futures Trading
Commission to entertain state law counterclaims in reparation proceedings did not violate
Article III); Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985) (holding Article
III did not prohibit Congress from selecting binding arbitration with limited judicial review
as mechanism for resolving disputes among participants in pesticide registration scheme of
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act). However, none of these subsequent
cases question Congress's authority to create non-Article III courts for geographic areas
outside of the states.
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federal court and vest it with the regular jurisdiction of a typical
federal district court along with the general jurisdiction typically
exercised by a state court. Such courts not only exercise jurisdiction
over disputes raising federal questions and diversity cases, but also
adjudicate run-of-the-mill tort, contract, and other disputes between
two non-diverse citizens arising in the territory. A prototypical
example of the "classic" model arose in the District of Alaska, where
Congress created a territorial court in 1884.614 This federal court
was vested with both Article III powers and with general jurisdiction.6 15 Unlike typical Article III judges, its judges were appointed
for four-year terms.6 16 Because Alaska, like many other western
territories, lacked a pre-existing local sovereign government, it was
necessary for Congress to create a forum with jurisdiction to
adjudicate matters that typically would have been brought in state
court.
Congress took a somewhat different approach-herein referred
to as the "state" model-when creating federal courts for the
territories of Hawaii and Puerto Rico. Unlike the largely uninhabited and ungoverned western territories, prior to its annexation as
a U.S. territory, Hawaii was an independent Republic with a threetiered judicial system consisting of district courts for minor cases,
courts of general jurisdiction known as circuit courts, and a supreme
court. 61 After Hawaii was annexed as a territory to the United
States, 618 Congress provided for the continuation of Hawaii's threetiered system of local territorial courts,6 19 except that the President
had the authority to appoint the judges, subject to Senate approval,

14

Act of May17, 1884, ch. 53, §§ 1, 3, 23 Stat. 24.

" See McAllister v. United States, 141 U.S. 174 (1891) ("[Ihe district court for Alaska
was invested with the powers of a district court and a circuit court of the United States, as
well as with general jurisdiction to enforce in Alaska the laws of Oregon...
616

§ 9, 23 Stat. at 24.

6

C. Nils Tavares, The Administration of Justice in Hawaii Today, 5 HAW. B.J. 18, 18

(1967). For an overview of the development of the Hawaiian judicial system prior to its
annexation by the United States, see WALTER FRANCIS FREAR, THE EVOLUTION OF THE
HAWAIIAN JUDICIARY, PAPERS OF THE HAWAIIAN HISTORICAL SOCIETY No.7 (1894).,
61' J.Res. 55, 55th Cong., 30 Stat. 750 (1898).
6'9 See Act of Apr. 30, 1900, ch. 339, § 81, 31 Stat. 141, 157 ('[T]he judicial power of the
Territory shall be vested in one supreme court, circuit courts, and in such inferior courts as

the legislature may from time to time establish....").

988

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:895

and to remove justices of the Hawaiian Supreme Court.62 0 In
addition, Congress established a district court for the Territory of
Hawaii, vested with the powers of a typical Article III federal
district court, with judges appointed for six-year terms.62 ' Congress
further provided that the relationship between the local territorial
courts in Hawaii and the federal courts was to be governed by the
same rules as the relationship between state and federal courts,622
thus providing for removal of cases from the local courts to the
federal territorial court in diversity and federal question cases. This
scheme made Hawaii one of the few organized territories in the
United States at the time to have separate6 2court
systems for local
3
territorial matters and Article III matters.
Congress took a similar approach in providing for the territory of
Puerto Rico. In 1898, Puerto Rico624 was ceded to the United States
by Spain in a treaty between the two nations, 62 5 and became an
unincorporated626 territory of the United States.627 In 1900,
Congress enacted a statute providing for the establishment of local
territorial courts for Puerto Rico as well as a federal district court.628
The Act provided for the appointment of a single judge for the

6" Id. § 82; see also id. § 80 (discussing appointment, removal, tenure, and salaries of
officers). The terms of the local judges and justices and the manner in which they were
appointed was a sharp departure from the practice that existed when Hawaii represented an
independent republic. Tavares, supra note 617, at 18-20.
621 Act of Apr. 30, 1900, ch. 339, § 86, 31 Stat. at 158 (calling for establishment of district
court with judge appointed by President for six-year term and having same jurisdiction and
powers of United States district and circuit courts).
622

Id.

6' Tavares, supranote 617, at 18 n.5.
' Until 1932, Puerto Rico was referred to as "Porto Rico," at which point its name was
changed by Congress. S.J. Res. 36, 72d Cong. (1932).
625 Treaty of Peace, Dec. 10,1898, U.S.-Spain, art. 11,30 Stat. 1754, 1755 (ceding to United
States "Porto Rico" as well as other West Indies islands then under Spanish rule).
62 Under the incorporation doctrine, the U.S. constitution is fully applicable only in those
territories that have formally been "incorporated" into the United States. In unincorporated
territories, only so-called "fundamental" constitutional rights are applicable. See Balzac v.
Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 313 (1922) (deciding Congress did not incorporate Puerto Rico). All
of the modern U.S. territories are deemed to be unincorporated. See Stanley K. Laughlin, Jr.,
The Constitutional Structure of the Courts of the United States Territories: The Case of
American Samoa, 13 U. HAW. L. REV. 379, 424 (1991) (discussing incorporation doctrine).
627 See Balzac, 258 U.S. at 312-13 (deciding Congress did not incorporate Puerto Rico);
Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 287 (1901) (holding Puerto Rico is territory appurtenant and
belonging to United States, but not part of United States).
628 Act of Apr. 12, 1900, ch. 191, §§ 33-34, 31 Stat. 77, 84.
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federal court by the President for a term of four years.6 29 The Act
also provided that the relationship between the local and federal
courts in Puerto Rico for removal and the like was to be governed by
the same rules operating as between the federal and state courts.6 80
In most respects, the U.S. District Court for the District of Puerto
Rico exercised no more jurisdiction than a typical Article III district
court. However, diversityjurisdiction was broader in one significant
respect. In 1901, Congress vested the district court with jurisdiction
over any civil case in which the amount in controversy exceeded
$1,000 and any party was a U.S. or foreign citizen.63 ' In 1917,
Congress slightly modified the statute, granting the District of
Puerto Rico jurisdiction over all controversies where the amount in
dispute exceeded $3,000 and all the parties on either side of the
dispute were non-domiciliaries of Puerto Rico.6 8
Under this
6
3
scheme, jurisdiction was proper between two aliens and in many
other instances not typically covered by diversity jurisdiction.3 4 The
statute was thus held by the Supreme Court to allow jurisdiction
over disputes wherein both parties were citizens of Spain, 3 5 even
though traditional Article III courts would lack jurisdiction over
such matters because of the Diversity Clause of Article 111.636 The
Supreme Court has never discussed the constitutional issue, but
lower federal courts have construed this as permissible on the
ground that the District of Puerto Rico is an Article IV legislative
' Id. § 34. In 1913, Congress provided that when the district judge of the district of
Puerto Rico was absent from the district or disqualified from a case, the governor of Puerto
Rico had the authority to designate a justice of the Puerto Rico Supreme Court to act as a
temporary or special judge for the federal court. Act of Jan. 7, 1913, ch. 6, 37 Stat. 648. In
1917, Congress shifted the responsibility for appointing a temporary replacement to the
President. Act of Mar. 2, 1917, ch. 145, § 41, 39 Stat. 966. Congress extended the term to
eight years in 1938. Act ofMar. 26, 1938, ch. 51, § 2, 52 Stat. 118.
6
Act of Apr. 12, 1900, ch. 191, § 34, 31 Stat. 77, 84.
6"
Act of Mar. 3, 1901, ch. 812, § 3, 31 Stat. 953.
63
Act of Mar. 2, 1917, ch. 145, § 41, 39 Stat. 965.
' See Sanfeliz v. Bank of N.S., 74 F.2d 338, 338-39 (lst Cir. 1934) (noting Federal
District Court for Puerto Rico is not court of United States, but legislative court, so Congress
can confer unlimited judicial power upon it).
' See 32B AM. JUR. 2D Federal Courts § 2578 (1996) (providing examples of special
additional jurisdiction).
"
Ortega v. Lara, 202 U.S. 339, 344 (1906). The Court, however, found itself without
appellate jurisdiction over the matter. Id.
' Hodgson v. Bowerbank, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303, 304 (1809); Mossman v. Higginson, 4
U.S. (Dall.) 12, 13-14 (1800).
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court and thus not constrained by the limiting clauses in Article
7
111.63
Congress has since made a number of changes to the District
Court for the District of Puerto Rico that have made it indistinguishable from typical Article III district courts. In 1966, Congress
provided that the judges of the District of Puerto Rico would have
life tenure, 63" and, in 1970, provided that their salaries would not be
diminished and made the court's jurisdiction identical to that of the
Article III district courts in the states. 639 As a result, several
commentators and courts now refer to the court as an Article III
court,6 4 although the matter has yet to be conclusively determined.
With three of the territories in existence today-Guam, 4 ' the
Virgin Islands, 42 and the Northern Mariana Islands6 4 -- Congress
63' Sanfeliz, 74 F.2d at 338; see also Balzac v. People of Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312
(1922) ('The United States District Court is not a true United States court established under
Article III of the Constitution .... The resemblance of its jurisdiction to that of true United
States courts ... does not change its character as a mere territorial court.").
638 Act of Sept. 12, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-571, 80 Stat. 764.
Act of June 2, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-272, § 13, 84 Stat. 294, 298.
Corp. of the Presiding Bishop v. Hodel, 830 F.2d 374,385 n.69 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Mitsui
& Co., Inc. v. P.R. Water Res. Auth., 558 F. Supp. 116, 117 & n.1 (D.P.R. 1983); 17 CHARLES
ALAN WRIGHT &ARTHURR. MILLER, FEDERAL PRAcrICE AND PROCEDURE § 4107 (2d ed. 1988);
Jose Julian Alvarez Gonzalez, The Empire Strikes Out. CongressionalRuminations on the
Citizenship Status of Puerto Ricans, 27 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 309, 332 n.91 (1990). But see 13
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra at § 3528 (suggesting that it may be legislative court).
'" The Island of Guam is an unincorporated territory of the United States. 48 U.S.C. §
1421a (1994); see also United States v. Seagraves, 100 F. Supp. 424, 425 (D. Guam 1951)
(discussing constitutional protections in Guam). Spain ceded Guam to the United States in
1898 pursuant to a treaty between the two nations. 48 U.S.C. § 1421 (1994) (rhe territory
ceded to the United States in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty of Peace between
the United States and Spain ... and known as the island of Guam in the Marianas Islands,
shall continue to be known as Guam.") (treaty codified at 30 Stat. 1754 (1898)). By Executive
Order, Guam was placed under the control of the Department of the Navy. Exec. Order No.
108-A (Dec. 23, 1898). The Department exercised judicial authority over Guam via a Naval
Governor. Seagraves, 100 F. Supp. at 425. By Executive Order, President Truman
transferred the authority to administer Guam from the Department of the Navy to the
Department of the Interior in 1949. Exec. Order No. 10077, 3 C.F.R. 279 (Sept. 7, 1949). In
1950, Congress enacted the Organic Act of Guam, Act of Aug. 1, 1950, ch. 512, 64 Stat. 384
(1950), designed to provide for local self-government in Guam through the creation and
election of a local legislature. 48 U.S.C. § 1423.
' The Virgin Islands are an unincorporated territory of the United States, 48 U.S.C. §
1541(a) (1994), ceded to the United States by Denmark in 1917 pursuant to a treaty between
the two nations. Treaty for Cession of Danish West Indies, Aug. 4, 1916, U.S.-Den., 39 Stat.
1706. In 1917, Congress delegated authority to administer the Virgin Islands to the
President. Act of Mar. 3, 1917, ch. 177, § 1, 39 Stat. 1132. In 1936, Congress enacted the
Organic Act of the Virgin Islands providing for the creation of a territorial legislature with
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has employed what is herein referred to as a "transitional" model.
Congress created a District644 Court of Guam,64 a District Court of
the Virgin Islands,646 and a District Court for the Northern Mariana
Islands64 and vested them all with both the jurisdiction of a regular
Article III federal district court and with general original jurisdiction over all local causes of action over which no local court estab-

the power of self-government. S.4524, 74th Cong., 49 Stat. 1807 (1936). Congress also
enacted a Revised Organic Act in 1954. Act of July 22, 1954, ch. 558, 68 Stat. 497.
' In 1947, the United States was given the authority as trustee to administrate the
United Nations Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, consisting of the Northern Mariana
Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, and Palau. Trusteeship
Agreement for the Former Japanese Mandated Islands, July 18, 1947, 61 Stat. 3301. In 1976,
the United States and the Northern Mariana Islands entered into a covenant whereby the
Northern Mariana Islands would become a self-governing commonwealth under the
sovereignty of the United States. Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern
Mariana Islands in Political Union with the United States of America, Pub. L. No. 94-241, §
1, 90 Stat. 263, 264 (1976) (codified at 48 U.S.C. § 1801 (1994)). The United States has
subsequently entered into compacts with the Federated States ofMicronesia, the Marshall
Islands, and Palau, but those agreements provide that these islands are independent self.
governing entities not subject to the sovereignty of the United States, terminating the U.S.
Trusteeship of the Pacific Islands. See Compact of Free Association Between the Government
of the United States and the Governments of the Marshall Islands and the Federated States
of Micronesia, Pub. L. No 99-239, § 201, 99 Stat. 1773 (1986) (codified as amended at 48
U.S.C. § 1901 (1994)) (establishing relationship of free association among governments);
Compact of Free Association Between the United States and the Government of Palau, Pub.
L. No. 99-658, § 101, 100 Stat. 3673 (1986) (codified as amended at 48 U.S.C. § 1931 (1994))
(terminating trusteeship and establishing relationship of free association between
governments). See also Proclamation No. 6726, 59 Fed. Reg. 49, 777 (Sept. 27, 1994)
(terminating trusteeship agreement with Palau). The United States previously provided for
a High Court of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, but the court was eliminated when
the Trusteeship ended. Nahnken v. United States, 126 F.3d 1433, 1435-36 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
Under the terms of the covenant between the United States and the Northern Mariana
Islands, the legislature for the Northern Mariana Islands was given the authority to create
local courts, 90 Stat. at 265. The United States was given the authority to create a District
Court for the Northern Mariana Islands. Id. at 266.
' Congress chose to refer to the federal court as the "District Court of Guam" instead of
the "United States District Court of Guam" since it was created under Article IV, § 3 rather
than Article I,and was vested with original jurisdiction to decide both Article III and local
matters. See Guam v. Olsen, 431 U.S. 195, 196 n.1 (9th Cir. 1977) (citing S. REP. No.81-2109,
12 (1950)). A similar rationale no doubt justifies the naming of the District Court of the
Virgin Islands and the District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands.
w 48 U.S.C. § 1424 (1994). Originally, the statute did not expressly mention diversity
jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court held that the District Court of Guam lacked such
jurisdiction. Chase Manhattan Bank v. S. Acres Dev., 434 U.S.-236, 239 (1978). The statute
was amended in 1984 to make clear that the District Court of Guam could exercise diversity
jurisdiction. Act of Oct. 5, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-454, § 801, 98 Stat. 1741.
6'
48 U.S.C. §§ 1611(a), 1612(a)-(b) (1994).
"7 Id. §§ 1821(a), 1822(b).
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lished by the territorial legislature had jurisdiction. Under this
scheme, the jurisdiction of the federal territorial court gradually
shrinks as local territorial courts are created to adjudicate local
matters until its docket becomes indistinguishable from that of a
typical Article III district court.648 Such a model is thus respectful
of local territorial self-government, yet simultaneously avoids the
risk of jurisdictional gaps while the territorial government takes
time to organize itself.
Similarly, Congress has created an appellate division of the
District Court of Guam,649 the District Court of the Virgin Islands, 50
and the District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands 651 to which
appeals can be brought from the local courts created by the territorial legislatures until such time as the local legislatures establish
local appellate courts. Again, while respecting the right of the
territorial legislatures to create their own appellate courts to hear
appeals from the local territorial courts, this model ensures that
some form of appellate jurisdiction exists pending the creation of a
local appellate court.
The local territorial courts created by the territorial legislatures
in the Virgin Islands, the Northern Mariana Islands, and Guam are,
like most state courts, courts of general jurisdiction, with the ability
to exercise jurisdiction not only over purely local disputes, but also
over diversity and federal question cases.6'5 As a result, Congress
has provided for removal from the local territorial courts to the

'
For example, in 1990, the Virgin Islands legislature vested in the Territorial Court of
the Virgin Islands original general jurisdiction in all civil actions, regardless of the amount
in controversy. 4 V.I. CODE ANN. § 76(a) (1997). As of 1994, the legislature vested in the
Territorial Court original jurisdiction over all criminal actions. Id. § 76(b). Accordingly, the
District Court of the Virgin Islands is divested of its jurisdiction over any civil actions that
would not otherwise fall within the concurrent jurisdiction of a federal district court (such as
diversity and federal question suits), Brow v. Farrelly, 994 F.2d 1027, 1033 (3d Cir. 1993),
except that it retains jurisdiction, pursuant to a special statutory grant over, local criminal
offenses that are part of the same transaction as a criminal offense for which the District of
the Virgin Islands is vested withjurisdiction. 48 U.S.C. § 1612(c) (1994) (investingin District
Court ofVirgin Islands concurrent jurisdiction with courts established by local law over acts
which are felonies or misdemeanors).
48 U.S.C. §§ 1424-1(a), 1424-3(a), (d).

Id. § 1613a(a).

Id. § 1823(a).
See e.g., id. § 1611(b) (authorizing legislature ofVirgin Islands to vest CourtsofVirgin
Islands with "local law jurisdiction").
'
2
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federal territorial courts in those instances in which the general
jurisdiction of the local territorial courts overlaps with the core
Article III jurisdiction of the federal territorial court.653
As with most of the federal territorial courts, the judges of the
District Court of Guam,654 the District Court of the Virgin Islands,655
and the District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands65 6 lack life
tenure and are appointed only for a term of ten years.
2. District of Columbia. Just as Congress has the authority to
create specialized, non-Article III courts for the outlying territories,
so it has similar jurisdiction to create specialized, non-Article III
courts for the District of Columbia. However, the constitutional
authority justifying Congress's creation of non-Article III federal
courts in the District of Columbia is found in Article I. Congress has
created both Article III and Article I courts in the District of
Columbia, and an examination of the history of the federal courts in
the District of Columbia is in order to understand the current status
of these courts and Congress's constitutional authority to create
them.
In 1801, Congress created a circuit court for the District of
Columbia. 657 The court served as an original court of general
jurisdiction,"' and its judges were appointed for life.659 In 1863,
Congress abolished the circuit court for the District of Columbia66
and created the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia as an
original court of general jurisdiction.661 Like those of its predeces-

' Id. § 1424-2 (Guam); id. § 1613 (Virgin Islands); id. § 1824(a) (Northern Mariana
Islands); see also Brown v. Francis, 75 F.3d 860,864 (3d Cir. 1996) (discussing jurisdictional
prerequisite to removal).
" See 48 U.S.C. § 1424b(a). The statute also gives the Chief Judge of the Ninth Circuit
and the Chief Justice of the United States authority temporarily to assign judges to serve on
the District Court of Guam. Id.
. Id. § 1614(a). The act also gives the Chief Judge of the Third Circuit and the Chief
Justice of the United States authority temporarily to assign judges to serve on the District
Court of the Virgin Islands. Id.
65 Id. §§ 1821(b)(1)-(2). The act also gives the Chief Judge of the Ninth Circuit, and the
Chief Justice of the United States authority temporarily to assign judges to serve on the
District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands. Id. § 1821(b)(2).
6
Act of Feb. 27, 1801, ch. 15, § 3, 2 Stat. 103, 105.
m Id. § 5, 2 Stat. at 106.
6
66
661

Id. § 3, 2 Stat. at 105.

Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 91, § 16, 12 Stat. 762, 764.
Id. § 1, 12 Stat. at 762-63. The Court was vested with the powers of the former circuit
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sor, the judges of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia
were appointed for life.6 62 In 1893, Congress established a District
of Columbia Court of Appeals, 66 1 with appellate jurisdiction over the
decisions of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia 66 4 and
665
with its judges appointed for life.
In a series of early twentieth century cases, the U.S. Supreme
Court held that the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia and
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals were legislative courts
created pursuant to Congress's Article I power over the District of
Columbia. 666 As such, those courts could be vested with the
authority to undertake administrative as well as judicial tasks.66 7
In 1933, however, the Supreme Court did an about-face, holding in
O'Donoghue v. United States6 ' that both the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia
were Article III courts and that the judges of those courts were
entitled to the protections of the Tenure and Compensation
Clauses.6 69
O'Donoghueinvolved a suit brought by a justice of each of the two
courts, challenging the application to them of a congressional
statute reducing the salaries of all judges "except judges whose
compensation may not, under the Constitution, be diminished
during their continuance in office. '67 ° The Court held that both
courts were in fact Article III courts, and thus that the judges

court for the District of Columbia, and any single justice of the court was given the power of
a district court of the United States. Id. § 3, 12 Stat. at 763.
Id. § 1, 12 Stat. at 763.
6

Act of Feb. 7, 1893, ch. 74, § 1, 27 Stat. 434.

Id. § 7, 27 Stat. at 435-36. The Act further provided for appeal from the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals to the United States Supreme Court. Id. § 8,27 Stat. at 436.
6 Id. § 1, 27 Stat. 434, 434-35.
6
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17 (rhe Congress shall have Power... To exercise
exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles
square) as may, by Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the
Seat of the Government of the United States ....
").
' See Fed. Radio Comm'n v. Gen. Elec. Co., 281 U.S. 464, 468 (1930) C'[The function
assigned to the courts of the District in the statutory proceeding was not judicial in the sense
of the Constitution, but was legislative and advisory... it is recognized that the courts of the
66

District of Columbia are ... legislative courts, . .

6
6
670

289 U.S. 516 (1933).
Id. at 551.
Id. at 525.29.
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appointed to these courts held their offices during good behavior and
that their compensation could not be diminished.6"' The Court
distinguished the territories from the District of Columbia on the
ground that the former are transitory in character (as they would
inevitably become states) while the District of Columbia is to remain
in perpetuity in its special status.672 The Court rationalized its prior
holdings approving the vesting of administrative authority in the
District of Columbia courts on the ground that these courts were
vested with both Article III authority and authority pursuant to the
District Clause,67 thus giving them the authority to exercise both
Article III and Article I jurisdiction. 4
Shortly after the O'Donoghue decision, Congress changed the
name of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals to the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.6 5 The court's
name was later changed to the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit.676 Congress also changed the name

671 Id. at 551.

672Id. at 536-38.

A sufficient foundation for these decisions in respect of the territorial
courts is to be found in the transitory character of the territorial
governments... it is not unreasonable to conclude that the makers ofthe
Constitution could never have intended to give permanent tenure of office
or irreducible compensation to a judge who was to serve during this
limited and sometimes very brief period under a purely provisional
government which, in all cases probably and in some cases certainly,
would cease to exist during his incumbency of the office .... How
different are the status and characteristics of the District of
Columbia ....The District, as the seat of the national government, is as
lasting as the States from which it was carved or the union whose
permanent capital it became.
Id. Id
U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 8,cI. 17.
4 O'Donoghue,289 U.S. at 546.
But the clause giving plenary power of legislation over the District enables
Congress to confer such jurisdiction in addition to the federal jurisdiction
which the District courts exercise under Art. I,notwithstanding that
they are recipients of the judicial power of the United States under, and
are constituted in virtue of, that article ....
The two powers are not
incompatible; and we perceive no reason for holding that the plenary
power given by the District clause of the Constitution may be used to
destroy the operative effect of the judicial clause within the District.
Id.
67 Act of June 7, 1934, ch. 426, 48 Stat. 926.
676 Act of Dec. 29, 1942, ch. 835, § 1(d), 56 Stat. 1094.
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of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia to the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia.6" In addition to
these courts, prior to 1970, there existed in the District of Columbia
a separate, local court system of limited jurisdiction created by
Congress with three different types of trial courts and an intermediate appellate court; however, the U.S. District Court and the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia continued to exercise
jurisdiction over purely local matters.6 78
In 1970, Congress enacted the District of Columbia Court Reform
and Criminal Procedure Act,679 in which it substantially restructured the judicial system of the District of Columbia. The Act
replaced the pre-existing trial courts in the local court system with
the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, 8 ' which was vested
with original jurisdiction over nearly all civil and criminal matters
arising under laws applicable solely to the District of Columbia (i.e.,
local matters)."' The Act provided for the continuation of the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals,8 2 vested it with appellate
jurisdiction over the Superior Court,68 3 and provided for U.S.
Supreme Court review of its decisions.6 84 The Act also removed
much of the jurisdiction that the U.S. District Court for the District
of Columbia and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
exercised over local criminal and civil matters.8 5 The Act specifically designated the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit and the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia as Article III courts and designated the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals and the Superior Court of the District of
Columbia as Article I courts. 6 The Act further provided that
judges of the District of Columbia Court ofAppeals and the Superior

Act of June 25, 1936, ch. 804, 49 Stat. 1921.
" See generally Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 393 n.2 (1973); 14AWRIGHT &

6"

MILLER, supra note 640, § 3681 (1998).
69

Pub. L. No. 91-358, 84 Stat. 473 (1970).

68

Id. at 482 (codified at D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-901 (2001)).

61

D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 11-921, 11-923(b).

6n

Pub. L. No. 91-358, 84 Stat. 473, 478 (codified at D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-701(a)).
84 Stat. at 480 (codified at § 11-721).
84 Stat. at 475 (codified at § 11-102).

6"
6"' See D.C. CODEANN. §§ 11-301, 11-501, 11-502.
6

Pub. L. No. 91-358, 84 Stat. 475 (codified at D.C. Code § 11-101).
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Court of the District of Columbia were to be appointed by the
President 87 for a term of 15 years.688
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of this arrangement in Palmore v. United States. 89 The Court distinguished
O'Donoghueon the ground that, with respect to the courts at issue
in that case, Congress evinced an intent to create an Article III
court, as contrasted with the congressional intent with respect to
69 ° The Court
the creation of the Superior Court at issue in Palmore.
also distinguished O'Donoghue on the ground that the court there
had jurisdiction over both purely local matters as well as truly
federal matters, while here, the court at issue had jurisdiction solely
over local matters. 691' The Court concluded that "the requirements
of Art. III, which are applicable where law of national applicability
and affairs of national concern are at stake, must in proper
circumstances give way to accommodate plenary grants of power to
Congress to legislate with respect to specialized areas having
6 92
particularized needs and warranting distinctive treatment."
Accordingly, notwithstanding the long and somewhat complicated
history of the District of Columbia courts, it is clear that Congress
has the authority under the District Clause to create specialized
federal courts for the District of Columbia that are not subject to the
constraints of Article HI.
3. Foreign Countries. Congress has also created a number of
courts in foreign nations including a legislative court in China.
Beginning in 1842, China adopted a system of granting foreign
nationals a right of extraterritoriality by treaty, under which China
relinquished criminal and most civil jurisdiction over foreign
nationals, leaving to the foreign national's own government
responsibility for punishing its nationals for crimes committed in
China and for adjudicating most civil disputes involving their own
nationals.69 In 1844, the United States entered into the Treaty of

84 Stat. at 491 (codified at § 11-1501(a)).
Id. (codified § 11-1502).
411 U.S. 389, 410 (1973).
'0

Id. at 406-07.

6"1 Id. at 405-07.
692

Id. at 407, 408.
LOBINGIER, supra note 15, at 1.
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Wang Hiya, which secured the right of extraterritoriality for U.S.
citizens residing in China.6 94 The rationale for entering into the
treaty was to protect U.S. nationals from what was perceived to be
"barbarous and cruel punishments inflicted" by the courts of nonChristian countries, such as China. 95
Under the terms of the treaty, citizens of the United States who
committed any crime in China could be tried and punished only by
U.S. authorities.6 96 The treaty further provided that civil disputes
between U.S. citizens in China would be adjudicated by U.S.
authorities and that China would not involve itself in civil disputes
between a U.S. citizen and another foreign national, leaving the
resolution of such disputes to treaties entered into between the
United States and the foreign national's own government.69 7
In so-called "mixed cases"-those civil disputes arising between
U.S. and Chinese citizens 6 9 -- the treaty provided that such cases
would be "examined and decided conformably to justice and equity
by the public officers of the two nations acting in conjunction. 6 99 In
practice, the procedure was somewhat unclear, although it typically
meant that a U.S. citizen with a civil claim against a Chinese citizen
would bring suit in a Chinese "mixed court" presided over by a
Chinese official but with a U.S. official in attendance to "watch the

6' Treaty of Peace, Amity and Commerce, July 3, 1844, U.S.-China, art. XXI, 8 Stat. 592,

597. See generally David J. Bederman, ExtraterritorialDomicileand the Constitution,28 VA.
J. INT'L L. 451, 460-61 (1988) (describing Treaty of Wang Hiya); Mark B. Dunnell, Our
ConsularCourts in China, 34 AM. L. REV. 826, 829 (1900) (explaining historical background
of Treaty); Ohlinger, supranote 15, at 340 (describing how Treaty removed American citizens
from Chinese criminal jurisdiction). A subsequent treaty entered into between the United
States and China in 1858 largely re-affirmed the principles set forth in the 1844 treaty. See
Dunnell, supra at 830 (citing 12 Stat. 1023, June 18, 1858).
6 See In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 463 (1891) C'[B]y reason of the barbarous and cruel
punishments inflicted in those countries, and the frequent use of torture to enforce confession
from parties accused, it was a matter of deep interest to Christian governments to withdraw
the trial of their subjects .... from the arbitrary and despotic action of the local officials.");
LOBINGIER, supra note 15, at 2; Ohlinger, supranote 15, at 339-42.
' Treaty of Peace, supranote 694, art. XXI, 8 Stat. at 596-97.
"7
Id. art. XXV, 8 stat. at 598. As a matter of comity, the U.S. consular courts in China
entertained suits against U.S. nationals brought by other foreign nationals in China.
Dunnell, supra note 694, at 833 ("No such treaties exist[ed between the United States and
other nations,] but by comity all consular courts in China entertain[ed] suits against their
nationals by foreigners.").
Ohlinger, supranote 15, at 343.
9 Treaty of Peace, supra note 694, art. XXIV, 8 Stat. at 597.
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proceedings in the interests of justice.""'0 Likewise, a Chinese
citizen with a civil claim against a U.S. citizen would bring suit in
a proceeding administered by a U.S. official."0 1
To give effect to the Treaty of Wang Hiya, Congress enacted

statutes creating consular courts and vesting the U.S. minister and
consuls in China with full civil and criminal jurisdiction over U.S.
citizens in China.7 02 U.S. consular courts also existed in Siam,
703
Egypt,70 4
Turkey, Persia, Tripoli, Tunis, Morocco, Muscat,

0 See Dunnell, supra note 694, at 833.
[WMhen a foreigner wishes to *prosecute a Chinaman the treaties are
indefinite and conflicting as to the proper procedure and the actual
practice varies in the different ports ....At Shanghai there is a so-called
mixed court presided over by a local Chinese official who has sitting with
him a consular officer as an advisor or assessor. Officers from the British,
American and German consulates take turns in this service. The Chinese
judge pronounces the judgment and in theory the consular officer sits only
to protect foreign interests.
Id.; Ohlinger, supra note 15, at 343-44 ("[A] suit brought by the subject of a treaty power
against a Chinese is tried before the native magistrate, who applies.., the law of the land.
The plaintiffs consul, or other official representative attends the hearing, but only to :watch
the proceedings in the interests of justice.' "); id. at 345 ("The magistrate is supposed to
pronounce judgment, the assessors merely watching the proceedings 'in the interests of
justice.' But in practice the American representatives are the only ones who attempt to
observe this treaty stipulation.").
701 See Dunnell, supra note 694, at 833; Gustavus Ohlinger, supra note 15, at 344.
7o2 Act ofAug. 11, 1848, ch. 150,9 Stat. 276; Act of June 22, 1860, ch. 179,12 Stat. 72. See
generally LOBINGIER, supranote 15, at 2-3 (describing drafting of treaty); DavidJ. Bederman,
supranote 694, at 461-62 (describing U.S. consular courts in China); Dunnell, supranote 694,
at 831-32 (describing power given to consuls in China); Ohlinger, supra note 694, at 344-45
(describing extraterritorial jurisdiction of consuls and ministers). The statutes were made
applicable to U.S. consuls in Japan, Siam, Turkey, Persia, Tripoli, Tunis, Morocco, Muscat,
the Samoan Islands, and to any other country with which a similar treaty was entered into.
Bederman, supranote 694, at 461 n.43.
" Act of June 22, 1860, ch. 179, §§ 1, 21, 28-29, 12 Stat. 72, 72, 76, 78 (creating consular
courts in Siam, Turkey, Persia, Tripoli, Tunis, Morocco, and Muscat).
7- Act ofJuly28, 1866, ch.296, § 11, 14 Stat. 310, 322 (creating consular courtfor Egypt).
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Madagascar,7" 5 the Samoan Islands, 7°6 and Japan,0 7 exercising
jurisdiction comparable to that of the U.S. consular courts in China.
After several unsuccessful attempts, 70 8 Congress enacted a
statute creating a U.S. Court for China in 1906.709 The statute
provided that the U.S. consular courts in China would retain
jurisdiction over civil cases where the amount in controversy was
$500 or less and criminal cases where the potential punishment did
not exceed a $100 fine or 60 days imprisonment 710 but gave the U.S.
Court for China exclusive original jurisdiction over all other
disputes formerly falling within the jurisdiction of the U.S. consular
courts. 7 " Judges of the U.S. Court for China were appointed for tenyear terms, subject to removal by the President."'2 The U.S. Court
for China functioned in large part as a typical federal district court
would in the United States, although it differed in that it assumed
jurisdiction over a broader range of suits, including probate and
family law matters.' 8 In 1943, China and the United States

701

Act of July 1, 1870, ch. 194, § 1, 16 Stat. 183, 183 (creating consular court for

Madagascar).
700 Act of June 14, 1878, ch. 193, 20 Stat. 131, 131 (creating consular court for Samoan
Islands).
7 Act of June 22, 1860, ch. 179, 12 Stat. 72 (creating consular court for Japan); Treaty
with Japan, June 17, 1857, U.S.-Japan, art. IV, 11 Stat. 723, 723; Treaty with Japan, July 29,
1958, U.S.-Japan, art. VI, 12 Stat. 1051, 1056; Treaty with Japan, March 31, 1854, U.S.Japan, art. IX, 11 Stat. 597, 598; G.H. SCIDMORE, OUTLINE LECTURES ON THE HISTORY,
ORGANIZATION, JURISDICTION, AND PRACTICE OF THE MINISTERIAL AND CONSULAR COURTS OF

THEUNITED STATES OFAMERICAINJAPAN 1-4 (1887) (citing treaties between Japan and other

nations in which it gave those nations right to adjudicate civil disputes among their own
citizens and not to interfere in civil disputes between citizen of that nation and citizen of
another treaty power). The right to extraterritoriality in Japan was ended by treaty as of
July 17, 1899. Treaty with Japan, Nov. 22, 1894, U.S.-Japan, arts. XVIII, XIX, 29 Stat. 848,

853.

708 See LOBINGIER, supra note 15, at 4 (describing early attempts to establish U.S. Court
for China); Dunnell, supranote 694, at 836 (describing 1884 bill providing for U.S. Court for
China that passed Senate but failed House).
709
710

Act of June 30, 1906, ch. 3934, 34 Stat. 814.
Id. § 2, at 814.

71 Id. § 1, at 814.

712 Id. § 7, at 816.
713 Seegenerally Bederman, supra note 694, at 462.64 & nn.59-62 (citingIn reAllen's Will,

1 Extraterr. Cas. 92 (U.S. Ct. China 19Q7) (probate) and Ross v. Ross, 1 Extraterr. Cas. 924
(U.S. Ct. China 1919) (divorce)). The inability of Article III courts to exercise jurisdiction over
probate and family law matters is a statutory limitation, not a constitutional one. Peter
Nicolas, Fightingthe ProbateMafia: A Dissectionof the ProbateException to FederalCourt
Jurisdiction,74 S. CAL. L. REV. 1479, 1520-24 (2001).
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entered into a new treaty whereby the United States relinquished
its extraterritorial rights in China, 1 4 and in 1948, Congress
repealed the statute creating the U.S. Court for China. 15
The constitutionality of the U.S. Court for China was approved
7 16
of in dicta by the Supreme Court in Ex Parte Bakelite Corp.
There, the Court reasoned that the court was not a "constitutional"
court subject to the strictures of Article III, but was instead a
"legislative court," established by Congress as a means of effecting
the powers conferred in the Constitution respecting treaties and
foreign commerce. 7 The Court identified two sources of constitutional authority-the Foreign Commerce Clause of Article I' and
the Treaty Clause of Article 11 7 ---that together justified Congress's
creation of federal courts to adjudicate disputes abroad involving
U.S. citizens.
B. USE OF EXISTING ARTICLE I COURTS
1. OriginalJurisdiction,Including Removal. As demonstrated
in the previous section, Congress has the authority to create nonArticle III courts to adjudicate disputes arising in U.S. territories
and other geographic enclaves falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal government. However, creating new, specialized
courts is expensive and time consuming. In some instances, it may
make sense simply to make use of the Article III courts already in
existence. Accordingly, this section examines the ways in which
Congress has harnessed the existing Article III courts to adjudicate
matters for which it might otherwise create specialized, non-Article
III courts and considers the limitations on Congress's ability to do
SO.
The Constitution gives Congress the authority to exercise
exclusive legislative authority,7 20 with the consent of the relevant
"' Treaty for the Relinquishment of Extra Territorial Rights in China, Jan. 11, 1943,
U.S.-China, art. I, 57 Stat. 767, 768.
7'5 Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 39, 62 Stat. 992, 995.
716 279 U.S. 438, 451 (1929).
7'7 Id. at 450-51.
78 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
719 U.S. CONST. art. If, § 2,
cl. 2.
720 The states, while stripped of legislative jurisdiction over such enclaves, nonetheless
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state legislature, over all places located within a U.S. state that are
purchased by the federal government for the erection of forts,
federal buildings, and the like.7 2 ' Congress clearly has the authority
to enact specific, detailed laws to govern criminal and civil matters
arising in such federal enclaves, and Congress has done so as to
certain matters, such as by defining the crime of and punishment
for murder occurring within such enclaves. 2 But Congress has also
enacted two statutes--one for criminal and one for civil matters-that seemingly provide for the application of the law of the
state surrounding the enclaves. As to criminal matters, the
Assimilative Crimes Act provides for the incorporation of state
substantive criminal law as a matter of federal criminal law as to
any matter not already made criminal under federal law but that
would be unlawful under the law of the state within which the
federal enclave is located. 23 Similarly, in the civil context, Section
457 provides that the law of the state within whose exterior borders
an area subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States is
located will govern private tort disputes occurring within that
area.

72 4

With this background, consider the case of Yellowstone National
Park. Congress created Yellowstone in 1872,725 prior to the
admission of Wyoming, Idaho, and Montana as states. The federal
statute admitting Wyoming as a state contained a reservation of
exclusive federal jurisdiction over Yellowstone National Park,
subject to a proviso that the State of Wyoming could serve civil and

possess concurrent adjudicative jurisdiction over disputes arising in such enclaves. See Ohio
River Contract Co. v. Gordon, 244 U.S. 68, 72 (1917) (holding Kentucky courts had
jurisdiction over area under legislative jurisdiction of Congress); Stokes v. Adair, 265 F.2d
662, 665-66 (4th Cir. 1959) (describing federal jurisdiction when exclusive jurisdiction over
territory ceded by statute to federal government).
721 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
722 Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 3, 1 Stat. 112, 113 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §
1111 (1994)).
723 Act of Mar. 3, 1825, ch. 65,3,4 Stat. 115 (codified as amended by Act of June 25, 1948,
ch. 645, 62 Stat. 683, 686 at 18 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1994)).
'24 Act of Feb. 1, 1928, ch. 15, 45 Stat. 54 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 457 (1994)).
72
Act of Mar. 1, 1872, 17 Stat. 32.
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criminal process within the Park.726 Idaho727 and Montana 72' both

ceded legislative jurisdiction over those portions of Yellowstone
National Park falling within their borders.729 In addition, Congress
has provided that the U.S. government exercises exclusive jurisdiction over Yellowstone.7 0 Congress did not, however, create a
specialized, non-Article III court to adjudicate civil and criminal
disputes arising in Yellowstone. Even though parts of the park are
located in the states of Wyoming, Idaho, and Montana, Congress has
provided that the District of Wyoming-which is an Article III
federal district court-consists of the state of Wyoming and those
parts of Yellowstone located in the states ofMontana and Idaho, and
that the Districts of Montana and Idaho consist only of those
portions of those states that do not include the park. 73 ' Since the
enactment of the Judiciary Act of 1789, the District of Wyoming has
been described as the only federal district court whose boundaries
do not conform to state borders,782 although, as shall soon be
demonstrated, other federal district courts, historically and even
today, fail to conform to state borders.
Suppose that an accident occurs in that portion of Yellowstone
falling within the boundaries of Wyoming. The U.S. District Court
for the District of Wyoming would have subject matter jurisdiction
over a tort action brought by one driver against the other, and the

729 Act ofJuly 10, 1890, ch. 664, § 2,26 Stat. 222; WYO STAT.ANN. §§ 36-10-106, 36-10-108

to -109 (Michie 1997).
72' IDAHO CODE § 58-701 (Michie 1994).

72 MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 2-1-207, 2-1-208 (2001).
12 Yellowstone Park Transp. Co. v. Gallatin County, 31 F.2d 644, 646 (9th Cir. 1929)
("[Sluch acceptance is necessarily implied from the Act of May 7, 1894, 28 Stat. 73 .... ").
710 Act of May 7, 1894, ch. 72, § 1, 28 Stat. 73, 73 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 24 (1994)).
731 28 U.S.C. § 131 (1994) ("Wyoming and those portions of Yellowstone National Park
situated in Montana and Idaho constitute one judicial district."); id§ 106 ('Montana, exclusive
ofYellowstone National Park, constitutes one judicial district."); id. §.92 Cldaho, exclusive
of Yellowstone National Park, constitutes one judicial district."). The boundaries of the
District ofWyoming have been so defined since 1894. Act of May 7, 1894, ch. 72, § 2, 28 Stat.
73, 73. Thus, while the Tenth Circuit is defined as including only the states of Colorado,
Kansas, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Utah, and Wyoming, 28 U.S.C. § 41, it technically also
includes parts of Montana and Idaho. Thomas E. Baker, An Assessment of PastExtramural
Reforms of the U.S. Courtsof Appeals, 28 GA. L REV. 863, 898 n.142 (1994).
7
Martha J. Dragich, Once a Century: Time for a StructuralOverhaulof the Federal
Courts,1996 WIS.L.REV. 11, 44 n.184 (1996); Allan R. Stein, Erie and CourtAccess,100YALE
L.J. 1935, 1973 n.186 (1991).
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dispute would be governed by the laws of Wyoming,"' including its
choice of law rules.7 84 Now suppose further that the dispute is
between two non-diverse citizens: does this mean that Congress has
authorized an Article III federal court to adjudicate a non-diversity
case turning on a state-law rule of decision, thus potentially
exceeding the limits imposed by Article III?... If characterized as
the enforcement of state law in federal court in cases in which
diversity is lacking, there would be a potential Article III concern.73 6
In fact, however, such disputes do "arise under" federal law, at
least for Article III purposes. As with many other federal
statutes, 7 7 Congress has, both in the Assimilative Crimes Act and
in Section 457, incorporated by reference state law into federal law
and, in so doing, has enacted federal law.7 3 To be sure, characterizing such law as federal law enacted by Congress requires the courts
to entertain the legal fiction that Congress has considered each of
the incorporated state laws and determined that they comport with

" See Ford v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 72 F.3d 836, 837 n.1 (10th Cir. 1996) ("The accident
occurred in Yellowstone National Park, a federal territory. In such circumstances, the
applicable law is that of the state, Wyoming, in which the national park is located").
7
See id. (applying Wyoming choice of law rules); accordJenkins v. Whitaker Corp., 785
F.2d 720, 721, 724 n.6 (9th Cir. 1986) (applying Hawaii choice of law rules for accident that
occurred on federal government property in Hawaii); Burgio v. McDonnell Douglas, Inc., 747
F. Supp. 865 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) (applying Louisiana choice of law rules for action arising out of
airplane accident at air base in Louisiana). But see Quadrini v. Sikorsky Aircraft Div., 425
F. Supp. 81, 88 (D. Conn. 1977) (applying federal common-law choice of law rule).
" See Note, Over-Protective Jurisdiction?: A State Sovereignty Theory of Federal
Questions, 102 HARV.L. REV. 1948, 1948 n.3 (1989) (discussing Congress's enacting of
"statutes authorizing federal courts to decide non-diversity cases turning on state-law rules
of decision").
7' Cf. Timothy M. Sullivan, InadequateAnalysis Leadingto anAccurateConclusion: The
Ninth Circuit's Cursory Treatmentof the Constitutionalityof the Lacey Act in United States
v. Senchenko, 29 ENVTL. L. 743, 750-51 (1999) (criticizing characterization of Lacey Act,
which prohibits movement in interstate commerce of wildlife taken in violation of federal,
state, foreign, or tribal laws, and provides for enforcement of Act in federal court, as means
of enforcing state law in federal court, on ground that such characterization raises Article III
concerns).
737 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1994) (incorporating state felonies as predicates for
RICO violation); id. § 1153 (providing that certain crimes committed in Indian country "shall
be defined and punished in accordance with the laws of the State in which such offense was
committed as are in force at the time of such offense"); Act of May 25, 1900, ch. 553, 31 Stat.
187-89 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 701, 3371-78 (1994)) (incorporating state law relating to fish
and wildlife); 18 U.S.C. § 42 (1994) (incorporating state and tribal wildlife laws).
"' E.g., Johnson v. Yellow Cab Transit Co., 137 F.2d 274 (10th Cir. 1943), affid, 321 U.S.
383 (1944).
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federal policy." 9 And while such incorporation includes prospective
state laws that Congress has not yet considered, the Court has
nonetheless upheld the validity of such incorporation by reference
on the ground that Congress retains the legislative authority to
exclude a particular state's law from incorporation if it undermines
the federal program.740 Indeed, in interpreting such incorporated
state law, federal courts are not bound by state case law interpreting the state laws, especially where such decisions run counter to
federal policy.74 ' Indeed, state law cannot of its own force apply in
such areas, as they fall within the exclusive legislative jurisdiction
of the federal government, and thus the incorporation of state law
into federal law means that federal law is creating the cause of
action.74 2 To be sure, the Supreme Court has, in interpreting section
739 See Sullivan, supranote 736, at 754-55 (discussing incorporation of state law in Lacey
Act).
' See United States v. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286,287,294 (1958) (upholdingAssimilative
Crimes Act). Indeed, the federal courts themselves, when incorporating state law as a matter
of federal common law, refuse to incorporate state law deemed by the courts to be hostile to
federal policy. See United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 594-97 (1973)
(refusing to incorporate Louisiana law of retroactive imprescriptibility); De Sylva v.
Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 581 (1956) (incorporating state law in copyright case but asserting
state could not use word"in a way entirely strange to those familiar with its ordinary usage");
Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Beaver County, 328 U.S. 204, 210 (1946) (asserting state
definitions of real property are to be incorporated as long as state does not discriminate
against government "or patently run counter to the terms of the Act").
m"See Yellow CabTransitCo., 321 U.S. at 391 (asserting federal courts are not bound by
rulings of state courts in interpretations of federal criminal statute); Kay v. United States,
255 F.2d 476, 479 (4th Cir. 1958) (asserting that state interpretation of statutes adopted
under Assimilative Crimes Act not binding upon federal court); United States v. Hopp, 943
F. Supp. 1313, 1315 (D. Colo. 1996) ("Even when a Colorado criminal statute is utilized under
the [Assimilative Crimes Act], this Court is not bound by decisions of the Colorado Supreme
Court concerning that statute."). See generally Little Lake Misere, 412 U.S. at 594-97
(refusing to incorporate Louisiana law ofretroactive imprescriptibility). But see United States
v. Smith, 965 F. Supp. 756, 791 (E.D. Va. 1997) (holding federal court is bound by state
substantive criminal case law when applying Assimilative Crimes Act); United States v.
Guyette, 382 F. Supp. 1266, 1268 (E.D. Va. 1974) (asserting federal court must, in
interpreting state law under Assimilative Crimes Act, "apply the principles that it believes
would be used by the Supreme Court of Virginia").
" See Carole E. Goldberg-Ambrose, The ProtectiveJurisdictionof the FederalCourts,30
UCLAL. REV. 542, 544-55 (1983).
[A] federal claim that invokes incorporated state law is still a federal
claim because the geographic area to which it applies is within exclusive
federal legislative and judicial jurisdiction. Regardless of the reference to
state law, the rights and obligations relied upon in the claim are entirely
creatures of federal law.
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1331, held that, in some circumstances, a suit brought pursuant to
a federal statute incorporating state law does not "arise under"
federal law for purposes of the general statutory grant of federal
question jurisdiction, 4 8 but that is not an Article III restriction.
Additionally, nearly every court that has considered the matter has
held that suits brought pursuant to Section 457 "arise under"
7 44
federal law for purposes of statutory federal question jurisdiction.
Were it not for the fact that Congress exercises exclusive
legislative jurisdiction over Yellowstone National Park, an interesting Erie question would arise due to the way in which the boundaries of the District of Wyoming are defined.7 45 Under ErieRailroad
v. Tompkins,7 46 a federal district court sitting in diversity is
supposed to apply the law of the state in which it sits,7 47 and under
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co., Inc.,748 that
includes the state's choice of law rules.7 49 Under a literal interpretation of Erie and Klaxon, if an accident took place within the
Montana portion of Yellowstone, Wyoming law would apparently
govern. Such a result would seem contrary to the very purpose of
Erie, as that would lead to forum shopping as between the state
courts in Montana (which would apply Montana law) and the federal
71 See Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter, 177 U.S. 505, 513 (1900) (concluding "mere fact
that a suit is an adverse suit authorized by the statutes of Congress is not in and of itself
sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the Federal courts").
74"See Stokes v. Adair, 265 F.2d 662, 665-66 (4th Cir. 1959) (holding such actions arise
under federal law); Mater v. Holley, 200 F.2d 123, 125 (5th Cir. 1952) (same); Reed v.
Charizio, 183 F. Supp. 52, 53 (E.D. Va. 1960) (same); Olsen v. McPartlin, 105 F. Supp. 561,
563 (D. Minn. 1952) (same). But see Misner v. Cleveland Wrecking Co. of Cincinnati, 25 F.
Supp. 763, 764 (W.D. Missouri 1938) (concluding such actions do not arise under federal law
for purposes of § 1331).
74 Cf. Alfred Hill, The Erie Doctrine and the Constitution, 53 Nw. U.L. REV. 541, 558
(1958).
[l]f, in the first Judiciary Act, Congress had established multistate judicial
districts with process effective anywhere within a particular district, and
with venue privileges scanty or nonexistent... it would be intolerable
under such a system that the policy ofthe state in which the federal court
happens to sit should automatically prevail notwithstanding the possibly
vital interests of other states in the subject of the litigation.
Id.
"4

304 U.S. 64 (1938).

""7Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 533 (1990) (citing Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64 (1938)).
748 313 U.S. 487 (1941).

719Id. at 496.
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district court in Wyoming, which would, perhaps, be required by
Erie to apply Wyoming law.
As discussed in the Introduction, after the Massacre of Wild
Horse Lake, in 1889 Congress attempted to rectify the "no forum"
problem in No Man's Land by placing it within the judicial jurisdiction of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, an
Article III federal district court, even though No Man's Land fell
outside the territorial boundaries of Texas.7 5 After an unsuccessful
attempt by the U.S. attorney for the Northern District of Texas to
claim jurisdiction over the crime,75 1 the defendants were indicted
and convicted in the Eastern District of Texas. 52 The prosecution
was based on a federal criminal statute providing for the death
sentence for murder committed in a place under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the United States,7 5 coupled with the provision in the
1889 Act that placed No Man's Land within the jurisdiction of the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas."54 The
defendants challenged the conviction in the Supreme Court,
asserting that Congress did not and could not constitutionally vest
the Eastern District of Texas with retroactive jurisdiction over
crimes occurring in No Man's Land prior to the enactment of the
755
1889 Act.
The Supreme Court rejected their arguments, interpreting the
1889 Act as granting the Eastern District of Texas retroactive
jurisdiction, and rejecting the claim that the act so construed was
unconstitutional. 7 ' The defendants claimed that the Act was
inconsistent with the Sixth Amendment's requirement that the
accused is entitled to a trial in "the state and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been
' See supra note 8 and accompanying text (discussing congressional solution to
jurisdictional void in No Man's Land).
751 See BURTON, supranote 1, at 160 ('[The] Attorney-General... wrongly instructed the
United States district attorney for the Northern District of Texas that No-Man's-Land lay
within the jurisdiction of [the] court").
752 Cook v. United States, 138 U.S. 157, 184-85 (1891). One of the defendants tried
unsuccessfully to avoid removal from Kansas to the eastern district of Texas. In reJackson,
40 F. 372 (D. Kan. 1889).
Cook, 138 U.S. at 165-66.
"

Id.

Id. at 172, 180.
75 Id. at 180.
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previously ascertained by law." 7 ' According to the Court, this
language was applicable only to those crimes that occurred within
a state."' The court also rejected the claim that so interpreting the
statute violated Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution, which
requires that "the trial of all crimes ...shall be held in the state
where the said crimes shall have been committed; but, when not
committed within any state, the trial shall be at such place or places
as the congress may by law have directed."75' 9 The Court held that
for crimes occurring outside of a state, nothing in this provision
requires that Congress determine the place of trial before the crime
0
76

occurs.

The Court further held that the 1889 Act in no way violated the
Ex Post Facto Clause, as it related only to venue and did not in any
way touch on the substantive offense or change the punishment
therefor-the substantive offense being defined in the federal
criminal statute, enacted prior to the date of the offense, providing
for the sentence of death for murder in areas within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the United States. 7 1' In so holding, the court thus
implicitly decided that No Man's Land fell within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the United States. Because the law being applied to
No Man's Land by the Eastern District of Texas was federal
criminal law enacted by Congress, pursuant to its Article IV power
of exclusive legislation over territories and other property within its
exclusive jurisdiction, criminal prosecutions under those laws
clearly "arose under" federal law for Article III purposes. Therefore,
vesting the existing Article III federal court in Texas with jurisdiction over such prosecutions presented no Article III problem.
In 1868, Congress enacted a statute that extended all federal
laws governing customs, commerce, and navigation to the Territory
of Alaska,762 outlawed the killing of fur-bearing animals in Alaska,7 63
and gave the President the authority to restrict, regulate, and
... U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added).
75 Cook, 138 U.S. at 181.
759 U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2.

"' See Cook, 138 U.S. at 181-83.
761 Id. at 183.
7g Act of July 27, 1868, ch. 273, § 1, 15 Stat. 240, 240.
76 Id. § 6, 15 Stat. at 241. See also Act of July 1, 1870, ch. 189, 16 Stat. 180 (amending
provisions regarding killing of fur-bearing animals in Alaska territory).
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prohibit the importation and use of firearms, ammunition, and
alcoholin Alaska." 4 However, Congress did not create an Article IV
court to adjudicate such claims in 1868. Rather, it granted original
jurisdiction over any such violations to the existing Article III
district courts in the states of California and Oregon and the
existing non-Article III district courts in the territory of Washington.7 65 Just as in the case of the Eastern District of Texas's exercise
of adjudicative jurisdiction over No Man's Land, this clearly fell
within the Article III "arising under" jurisdiction of the federal
district courts in California and Oregon, as they were applying
federal statutory law to disputes arising in the Territory of Alaska
enacted by Congress pursuant to its Article IV powers.
As the United States moved westward in the 1800s, Congress
took steps to provide for federal court jurisdiction over civil as well
as criminal disputes occurring in Indian Country, initially vesting
the existing Article III federal courts with jurisdiction over such
disputes but eventually creating a specialized, non-Article III
federal court to adjudicate such matters. In 1819, Congress created
the Territory of Arkansas 76 and established a territorial judiciary. 767
In 1834, while Arkansas was still a territory, Congress extended
federal laws governing the punishment of crimes committed any
place within the exclusive jurisdiction ofthe United States to Indian
Country (excepting crimes in which the victim and the assailant
were both Indians),7 68 with most of Indian Country annexed to the
Territory of Arkansas for judicial purposes.76 9

Act of July 27, 1868, ch. 273, § 4, 15 Stat. at 241.
Id. § 7, 15 Stat. at 241-42.
7' SeeAct ofMar. 2, 1819, ch. 49, § 1, 3 Stat. 493, 494 (establishing territorial parameters
of Arkansas Territory).
7 Id. § 7, 3 Stat. at 495.
'68 Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 161, § 25, 4 Stat. 729, 733. "Indian Country" is defined in the
act as referring to "all that part of the United States west of the Mississippi, and not within
the states of Missouri and Louisiana, or the territory of Arkansas, and also, that part of the
United States east of the Mississippi river, and not within any state to which the Indian title
has not been extinguished...." Id. § 1, 4 Stat. at 729. Congress subsequently made clear
that the Act of 1834 did not extend to Indian territory those federal laws enacted specifically
for the District of Columbia. Act of Mar. 27, 1854, ch. 26, § 3, 10 Stat. 269, 270.
76 Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 161, § 24, 4 Stat. 729, 733.
76
7
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Arkansas was admitted as a state in 1836,"' and a federal
district court 71 and circuit court 77 2 were established for the District
of Arkansas. After the statutes creating these federal courts were
held not to extend the jurisdiction of said courts beyond the
territorial limits of Arkansas, 773 Congress passed a statute giving
the Article III federal courts sitting in Arkansas territorial jurisdiction over Indian Country. 74 In 1851, Congress divided the state into
the Eastern and Western Districts of Arkansas, and placed Indian
Country in the Western district.7 7 5 In. 1883, Congress took away

part of the jurisdiction that the Western District of Arkansas had
over Indian Territory and vested it in the District of Kansas and the
Northern District of Texas, in part to reduce the burden on the
Western District of Arkansas and in part to provide greater access
to those residing in the western and southern areas of Indian
Territory.77 7 Throughout this period of time, the Article III federal
courts serving Indian Territory exercised almost exclusive criminal
jurisdiction there. 78 Civil disputes among Indians were left to the
tribal courts, but there was no court with jurisdiction over civil
disputes between non-Indians in Indian Country. 79 No Article III
problem presented itself, for these Article III federal district courts
were applying federal criminal statutes, and thus all such prosecutions "arose under" federal law for purposes of Article 111.780

In 1889, Congress created a new federal court-the United States
Court in Indian Territory-with jurisdiction over all of Indian
Country, which was here for the first time defined to include "No

770

Act of June 15, 1836, ch. 100, § 1, 5 Stat. 50, 50.

771

Id. § 4, 5 Stat. at 51.

Act of Mar. 2, 1837, ch. 304, § 3, 5 Stat. 176, 177.
"7 United States v. Starr, 27 F. Cas. 1296 (C.C.D. Ark. 1846) (No. 16,379) (citing United
States v. Alberty (Case No. 14,426) (unpublished opinion)).
"7
Act of June 17, 1844, ch. 103, § 1, 5 Stat. 680, 680.
77,
Act of Mar. 3, 1851, ch. 24, § 1, 9 Stat. 594, 594.
778 Act of Jan. 6, 1883, ch. 13, §§ 2, 3, 22 Stat. 400, 400; BURTON, supra note 1, at 121
(showing map of division of Indian territory among three district courts as result of Act of
January 6, 1883)
77 THE FEDERAL COURTS OF THE TENTH CIRCUIT, supra note 2, at 180.
778 See BURTON, supra note 1, at 72-82, 109 (discussing laws and jurisdiction over Indian
Territory throughout period).
772

779 Id.
7

See supra notes 737-44 and accompanying text.
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Man's Land.""' l The new court was given exclusive jurisdiction over
minor crimes,"'2 as well as civil jurisdiction in suits involving more

than $100 (excluding suits between Indians). 8' Major crimes,
however, continued to fall within the jurisdiction of the federal
district courts in Arkansas, Texas, and Kansas,78 4 except that the
jurisdiction of the Northern District of Texas was eliminated and
transferred to the Eastern District of Texas, as was a portion of the
territorial jurisdiction previously exercised by the Western District
of Arkansas.8 5 The new court's creation was necessary to provide
a forum of general jurisdiction for civil disputes arising in Indian
Territory, as such disputes, where diversity was lacking, would not
appear to fall within the Article III jurisdiction of the federal district
courts in the surrounding states that were exercising criminal
jurisdiction over Indian Country.8 6
In 1890, Congress enacted a statute in which it created the
Territory of Oklahoma out of a large portion of what was formerly
Indian Country. 8 7 The act provided for the creation of a territorial

judiciary8 8 and stripped the federal courts in Texas, Arkansas, and
Kansas of any jurisdiction over those areas. 8 ' It defined Indian
Country as now including the portion of Indian Country that was
not used to create the Territory of Oklahoma, and limited the
jurisdiction of the U.S. Court in. Indian Territory to that area.79 °
The civil jurisdiction of the federal court in Indian Territory was
expanded to include all civil disputes save for those falling within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the tribal courts, 91 which was defined
as all cases in which all parties to the dispute were members of the

Act of Mar. 1, 1889, ch. 333, § 1, 25 Stat. 783, 783. The judge of the court was to be
appointed by the President for a term of four years. Id. See also supra note 8 and
accompanying text.
7m Act of Mar. 1, 1889, ch. 333, § 5, 25 Stat. at 783.
7"3 Id. § 6, 25 Stat. at 783-84.
' See BURTON, supra note 1, at 151-54 (discussing jurisdiction over major and minor
crimes committed on Indian lands).
7" Act of Mar. 1, 1889, ch. 333, §§ 17-18, 25 Stat. at 786.
7m See BURTON, supranote 1, at 72-82, 109.
7' Act of May 2, 1890, ch. 182, § 1, 26 Stat. 81, 81.
7s Id. § 9, 26 Stat. at 85.
'8 Id. § 9, 26 Stat. at 86.
"0 Id. § 29, 26 Stat. at 93.
78

791

Id.
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same Indian nation,792 and all contract disputes on contracts
between a member of a tribe and a U.S. citizen.7 93 The statute also
expanded the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the U.S. Court in
Indian Territory to include any case in which the parties, while all
Indians, were members of different tribes."9 Because the court was
a legislative court and not an Article III court, it was not bound by
the restrictions of Article III and could thus be vested with this
special form of "diversity" jurisdiction.79
In 1895, Congress enacted a statute dividing Indian Territory
into three judicial districts796 and provided for the appointment of
two additional judges.797 The act also provided for the appointment
of commissioners with exclusive jurisdiction in civil cases where the
amount in controversy was less than $100.7"' In addition to the

jurisdiction previously conferred on the United States court in
Indian Territory, the judges of the three judicial districts were given
appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the commissioners where the
amount in controversy exceeded $20 and, after eighteen months,
original jurisdiction in all criminal cases arising in Indian Territory
that had previously been exercised by the Western District of
Arkansas, the District of Kansas, and the Eastern District of
Texas.7 9 Thus, while six different federal courts exercised jurisdiction over the area then known as Indian Territory for a transition
period of eighteen months, thereafter all federal court jurisdiction
over Indian Country was vested in the three non-Article III district
courts for Indian Country.s"0 In addition, the judges of the three
judicial districts of Indian Territory were constituted as a court of

§ 30, 26 Stat. at 94.
Id. § 29, 26 Stat. at 93-94.

79 Id.

79 Id. at § 36, 26 Stat. at 97. In 1897, Congress expanded the jurisdiction of the U.S.
Court in Indian Territory to include all civil and criminal cases in Indian Territory, making
no exception for suits involving members of the same tribe. Act of June 7, 1897, ch. 3, 30
Stat. 62, 83.
78 See Wallace v. Adams, 204 U.S. 415, 422 (1907) ('The United States Court in Indian

territory is a legislative court...").

79 Act of Mar. 1, 1895, ch. 145, § 1, 28 Stat. 693, 693.

7

Id. § 2, 28 Stat. at 694.
Id. § 4, 28 Stat. at 695-96.
7" Id. § 9, 28 Stat. at 697.
8 See BURTON, supranote 1, at 217-19 (discussing transformation from six federal courts
to three courts).
79
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appeals for Indian Territory with appeals therefrom to the Eighth
02
Circuit8"' but with no further appeal to the Supreme Court.
In 1906, Congress passed an enabling act providing for the
merger of the Oklahoma and Indian Territories and their admission
collectively as the State of Oklahoma. °3 The enabling act provided
for the creation of two federal judicial districts in the new state,
with the former Indian Territory constituting the eastern district
and the former Oklahoma Territory constituting the western
district. 4 and provided for the transfer of Article III cases from the
territorial courts of Oklahoma and Indian Country to the newly
created federal courts.80 5 The following year, the enabling act was
accepted by the Constitutional Convention for Oklahoma, 80 6 and the
President proclaimed Oklahoma admitted as a state.8 0 7
2. Defining Islands as Vessels on the High Seas: The Pacific
Possessions and Guano Islands. In 1856, Congress enacted a
statute providing that, when a U.S. citizen discovered a deposit of
guano8°8 on any unoccupied island, rock or key not within the

wl See Act of Mar. 1, 1895 § 11, 28 Stat. 693, 698. In 1905, Congress provided that
appeals from the U.S. Court of Appeals in Indian Territory to the Eighth Circuit would be
governed by the same rules governing appeals from the U.S. circuit courts to the Eighth
Circuit. Act of Mar. 3, 1905, ch. 1479, § 12, 33 Stat. 1048, 1081. Because there were only
three judges in IndianTerritory who also sat as the U.S. Court ofAppealsin Indian Territory,
there were never enough judges to sit as a court of appeals without involving on that panel
one of the judges whose decision was being appealed. See BURTON, supra note 1, at 233
(discussing appointment of additional judge to appellate court to allow for review without
including judge who presided over case under review). Therefore, in 1897 Congress provided
for the appointment of a fourth judge for Indian territory who would sit on the court of
appeals and would also serve as a district judge where needed. Act of June 7, 1897, ch. 3, 30
Stat. 62, 84. In 1902, Congress carved out of the northern district of Indian Territory a
western district, and assigned a floating judge to that district. Act of May 27, 1902, ch. 888,

§ 8, 32 Stat. 245, 275. In 1904, Congress provided for the appointment of a second judge in
each of the four districts, although none of them were to sit on the Court of Appeals. Act of
Apr. 28, 1904, ch. 1824, § 1, 33 Stat. 573, 573.
' Laurel Oil & Gas Co. v. Morrison, 212 U.S. 291, 296 (1909).
803 Act of June 16, 1906, ch. 3335, § 1, 34 Stat. 267, 267.
' Id. § 13, 34 Stat. at 275.
Id. § 16, 34 Stat. at 276.
See Ordinance Accepting Enabling Act, Apr. 22, 1907, reprinted in OKLA. STAT. ANN.,
Coast. vol. 1, p. 493 (1981).
' See Proclamation of Statehood, Nov. 16, 1907, reprinted in OKLA. STAT. ANN. Const.
vol. 1, pp. 497-99.
' Guano is made up of the bird droppings of the white-breast cormorant, the gray
pelican, and the white-head gannet or piqueros, amassed over hundreds of years and
considered a prized commodity in the 19th century world-wide for use as a fertilizer. See
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jurisdiction of any government, it would, in the discretion of the
President, be considered a part of the United States.8 0 9 The act
further provided for U.S. criminal jurisdiction by extending
admiralty law over such islands, rocks, and keys, stating that acts
committed on them or in the surrounding waters would be deemed
to have been committed on board a U.S. merchant ship on the high
8 10

seas.

On September 14, 1889, on Navassa Island, an island in the
Caribbean Sea that had been appertained to the United States in
accordance with the act, one Henry Jones murdered one Thomas N.
Foster with an axe. 81 ' Under the Constitution, a crime committed
within any state must be tried in that state and in a district
previously ascertained by law, but a crime not committed within any
state may be tried at any such place as Congress directs.8 12
Congress by statute had directed that all offenses committed outside
of any state would be tried in the district where the offender is
found or in the district where he is first brought.8 1 Under federal
law, murder committed on the high seas or on any land within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the United States was a capital offense.8 14
The defendant was indicted in the district of Maryland, the first
district into which he was brought from Navassa Island, and was
convicted of murder and sentenced to death.8 1 5
In Jones v. United States, the Supreme Court upheld Jones's
conviction against a challenge that the 1856 Act was an unconstitutional expansion of federal admiralty jurisdiction8 1 6 to offenses

generally R.E. Coker, Peru'sWealth-ProducingBirds,NAT'LGEOGRAPHIc, June 1920, at 53766 (discussing wealth from guano on Peru's islands); Guy Gugliotta, Dropping Anchor to
Claim Fortune in Government Guano, WASH. POST, Nov. 12, 1996, at A15 (discussing 1865
Guano Island Act).
mo Act of Aug. 18, 1856, ch. 164, § 1, 11 Stat. 119, 119 (codified at 48 U.S.C. §§ 1411, 1412
(1994)).
8'oId. § 6, 11 Stat. at 120 (codified at 48 U.S.C. § 1417 (1994)).
8" Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202, 203-04 (1890).
812 Id. at 211 (citing U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 & amend. VI). See also supra notes 757-60
and accompanying text.
813 Jones, 137 U.S. at 211.
814 Id. at 211-12.
8'5 Id. at 204, 209.
S6 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (-The judicial Power shall extend... to all Cases of
admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction ....).
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taking place on land.817 The Court held that the act was, in effect,

incorporating pre-existing statutes governing offenses occurring on
the high seas into one statute that provided for the punishment of
crimes on territory within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal
government, 818 thus falling under the federal courts' "arising under"
jurisdiction. Congress was not unconstitutionally expanding the
scope of the federal courts' grant of admiralty jurisdiction but was
in effect legislating for a U.S. territory within its exclusive jurisdiction pursuant to its Article IV powers. Thus, just as in the case of
federal enclaves-where Congress has enacted federal law that
incorporates by reference the law of the state in which the federal
enclave is located-here Congress, instead of creating a specialized
set of criminal laws for Guano Islands, chose instead to incorporate
by reference federal admiralty law.
A similar statutory scheme exists for the United States' Pacific
Possessions. Congress has defined the District of Hawaii as
including not just Hawaii, but also a group of islands in the Pacific
8 20
Ocean,81 9 some ofwhich are thousands of miles away from Hawaii,
that are U.S. possessions administered by the U.S. Department of
the Interior. 2 ' In addition, Congress has vested the U.S. District
22
Court for the District of Hawaii with nonexclusive jurisdiction
over all civil and criminal actions taking place on these islands and
has provided that such actions shall be governed by federal
817 Jones, 137 U.S. at

209, 224.

818 See id. at 211 ("This section... unequivocally extends the provision of the statutes of
the United States for the punishment of offenses committed upon the high seas to like
offenses committed upon guano islands [appertenant to the United States.").

a'9See 28 U.S.C. § 91 (1994) ("Hawaii constitutes one judicial district which includes the
Midway Islands, Wake Island, Johnston Island, Sand Island, Kingman Reef, Palmyra Island,
").
Baker Island, Howland Island, Jarvis Island, Canton Island, and Enderbury Island ....
' See, e.g., Hall v. Envtl. Chem. Corp., 64 F. Supp. 2d 638, 639 (S.D. Tex. 1999)
(CPalmyraIsland, a possession of the United States that lies thousands of miles south of the

State of Hawaii.").
821 See Exec. Order No. 13,022,3 C.F.R. 224 (1997), reprintedin 48 U.S.C. § ch. 3 app. at
220-21 (1994) (covering administration of Midway Island); Exec. Order No. 11,048, 3 C.F.R.
241 (2002 Supp.), reprintedin 48 U.S.C. § 731 (1994) (covering administration of Wake &
Midway Islands); Exec. Order No. 10,967,3 C.F.R. (1961) (covering administration ofPalmyra

Island); Exec. Order No. 7,828, 3 C.F.R. 366 (1936-1938) (covering Canton and Enderbury
Islands); Exec. Order No. 7,368, 3 C.F.R. 162 (1936-1938) (covering Jarvis, Baker, and

Howland Islands).
82 Hall, 64 F. Supp. 2d at 640-41; Jackman v. Asiatic Petroleum Corp., 228 N.Y.S.2d 720,
720 (N.Y. 1962).
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admiralty law. 23 To achieve this result, the statute, like the act
governing the Guano Islands, "requires a court to entertain the
fiction that [each island] is, essentially, a vessel on the high seas."8'24
Also similar to the statute for the Guano Islands, this statute has
been construed not to expand the definition of the admiralty
jurisdiction of the federal courts on the ground that Congress could
not constitutionally do so.825 This scheme can be justified on the
same basis as the statute for the Guano Islands. These Pacific
possessions, as U.S. territories, fall within Congress's exclusive
legislative jurisdiction under Article IV, and rather than legislating
directly, Congress has incorporated federal admiralty law by
reference. Under this statute, the District of Hawaii has thus
upheld its authority to entertain a breach of contract dispute on one
such island possession that did not satisfy the requirements of the
diversity statute. 26
3. Protection of Particular Groups from State Court Bias.
Congress has, through a variety of statutes, provided existing
Article III courts with jurisdiction over certain categories of cases
that would otherwise be adjudicated in state courts where Congress
believed that state courts may lack impartiality. At first glance,
many of these cases do not appear to fall within any of the Article
III categories of jurisdiction-typically, the parties are not diverse
and the claims raised in the suit are grounded in state law. Yet, in
each case, the Supreme Court has upheld Congress's authority to
provide for jurisdiction in an Article III court. Because each of these
holdings provides guidance as to the limits of Congress's authority
to make use of the federal courts to protect parties from local court
bias, they are examined here.

48 U.S.C. § 644(a) (1994).
Jacobson v. Kalama Serv., 128 F. Supp. 2d 644, 647 (D. Haw. 2000).
See Yandell v. Transocean Air Lines, 253 F.2d 622,624 (9th Cir. 1957) ("Congress has
no power to extend the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the courts of the United States
beyond the concepts solidified at the time of the adoption of the Federal Constitution....').
However, the court declined to reach the issue of whether Congress had the power to enact
such legislation. See id. at 624 n.4.
8 Cornelius v. Facilities Mgmt. Corp., 375 F. Supp. 916 (D. Haw. 1974). One district
court opinion has questioned the statute's applicability to disputes not typically falling within
the area of traditional admiralty claims. Jacobson, 128 F. Supp. 2d at 647 n.1.
n3

'2

2002]

NO MAN'S LAND

1017

The language of section 1331, the general federal question
jurisdiction statute, parallels that of the "arising under" clause of
Article III. However, the Supreme Court has held that the latter is
substantially broader than the former. Thus, jurisdictional rules
restricting the reach of section 1331, such as the well-pleaded
complaint rule, are considered interpretations of the statute and are
not required by Article 111.127 The "controlling decision" 2 on the
scope of Article III "arising under" jurisdiction is Chief Justice
Marshall's opinion in Osborn v. Bank of the United States8 29 and its
companion case, Bank of the United States v. Planters' Bank of
Georgia."'0 Both suits were initially filed in a federal circuit court
by the Bank of the United States pursuant to a special federal
jurisdictional statute that granted to the federal courts jurisdiction
over any suit to which the Bank was a party. 31 The suit in
Osborn-the main case in which the court's holding was announced-involved a suit by the Bank for an alleged violation of the
U.S. Constitution and thus contained a clear question of federal law
on its face. 8 2 Planters',by contrast, involved a mere breach of
contract claim brought by the bank to collect on negotiable notes
3
issued by a state bank.1 1

' Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 494-95 (1983). It is not clear,
however, that these jurisdictional rules reflect the intent of Congress so much as they reflect
the desire of federal judges to lighten their caseloads. See generally William M. Wiecek,
Murdock v. Memphis. Section 25 of the 1789 JudiciaryAct and JudicialFederalism, in
ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY: ESSAYS ON THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789, 223 (Maeva
Marcus ed., 1992).
m Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 492.
"29 22 U.S. 738 (1824).
8' 22 U.S. 904 (1824).
831 See Osborn,22 U.S. at817.18 (highlightingtext of statute thatprovided"that the Bank
shall be 'made able and capable in law,' 'to sue and be sued, plead and be impleaded, answer
and be answered, defend and be defended, in all State Courts having competent jurisdiction,
and in any Circuit Court of the United States.' "). See also Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 492 ('In
Osborn, the Court upheld the constitutionality of a statute that granted the Bank of the
United States the right to sue in federal court on causes of action based upon state law.").
m Osborn, 22 U.S. at 739-44,859-71.
i3 Planters', 22 U.S. at 904. See also Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S.
448, 471 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (noting that in Osborn "Chief Justice Marshall
sustained federal jurisdiction in a situation-hypothetical in the case before him but
presented by the companion case of... Planters' Bank... involving suit by a federally
incorporated bank upon a contract.'.
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The Osborn Court sustained the constitutionality of the statute
granting jurisdiction to the federal courts over all actions brought
by or against the Bank of the United States. 84 The Court noted that
all of the Bank's capacities-such as its capacity to sue and its
capacity to enter into a contract-were derived from federal law, to
wit, its charter of incorporation enacted by Congress, and were thus
federal questions." 5 These remote, hypothetical federal questions,
even if they remained in the background of the case and were not in
fact raised during the case, were nonetheless "original [federal]
ingredient[s]" in the case sufficient to justify Article III "arising
under" jurisdiction." 6 Under the broad conception of "arising under"
jurisdiction as interpreted by Chief Justice Marshall in Osborn,
"Congress may confer on the federal courts jurisdiction over any
case or controversy that might call for the application of federal
law. , 37
While the breadth of Osborn has subsequently been questioned,
its original ingredient test was reaffirmed by the Court recently in
American NationalRed Cross v. S.G."'8 There, the Court construed
an analogous "sue and be sued" provision in the Red Cross' federal
charter8

39

as a statutory grant of jurisdiction to the federal courts

over all suits to which the Red Cross was a party 4 and held-by
analogy to Osborn-that the statutory grant of jurisdiction fell
within the permissible bounds of Article III.841
8" Osborn, 22 U.S. at 828.
8 Id. at 823-24.
See id.
831 Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 492 (1983). See also Textile
Workers, 353 U.S. at 481-82 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
The basic premise was that every case in which a federal question might
arise must be capable of being commenced in the federal courts, and when
so commenced it might, because jurisdiction must be judged at the outset,
be concluded there despite the fact that the federal question was never
raised.. . [it] permits assertion of original federal jurisdiction on the
remote possibility of presentation of a federal question.
Id.
505 U.S. 247 (1992).
See 36 U.S.C. § 2 (1994) (noting that Red Cross's federal charter authorized organization "to sue and be sued in courts of law and equity, State or Federal, within the jurisdiction
of the United States").
*' Am. Nat'l Red Cross, 505 U.S. at 248-63.
"' See id. at 264-65 ("As long ago as Osborn, this Court held that Article I'fs 'arising
under' jurisdiction is broad enough to authorize Congress to confer federal-court jurisdiction
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An even broader conception of Article III "arising under"
jurisdiction is the theory of protective jurisdiction, first proposed by
Herbert Wechsler.8 42 Under Wechsler's interpretation of Osbornand
Article III, Congress, at a minimum, has the power under Article III
to confer jurisdiction over any case that might involve a federal
question. 4
In his view, however, Congress's power extended
further. Reasoning that providing jurisdiction over a dispute is one
way by which Congress can exercise its regulatory powers under
Article I, Wechsler reasoned that in any case in which Congress
could take the (arguably) greater step of enacting substantive
federal law to govern the dispute or incorporating state law as the
federal rule of decision, it could instead take the (arguably) lesser 44

over actions involving federally chartered corporations . . . . We have consistently
reaffirmed.., that holding... and this case gives us no reason to contemplate overruling
it.").
' Herbert Wechsler, FederalJurisdictionand the Revision of the JudicialCode, 13 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 216, 224-25 (1948).
Id. at 224.
'
The notion that protective jurisdiction is a lesser intrusion by Congress than simply
creating the substantive law to govern the area is a disputed one. See Goldberg-Ambrose,
supra note 742, at 591.
[G]overnmental responsibility and accountability to the public become
dangerously tangled when the federal government forcibly employs the
law of a state. Thus, when Congress seizes upon state substantive law
claims to promote national policy in federal courts, it is necessary to
explore whether the federal system has been improperly manipulated.
Id.; see also, id. at 604.
Accountability is disturbed by the confusion of authority and control
Protective jurisdiction ... results in loss of control by state citizens over
the development of state law .... When federal courts undertake the
interpretation and application of state statutes, the development of state
common law, and the review ofdecisions by state administrative agencies,
federal judges deny state citizens the opportunity to influence such
decisions through the direct or indirect selection of state court judges. ...
What distinguishes protective jurisdiction from diversity, pendant or
ancillary, and other.state jurisdiction ... is its systematic displacement
of state courts.... It is unlikely that jurisdiction asserted on any of these.
three bases will encompass a substantial portion of the litigation in any
given field of state law ....
By contrast, protective jurisdiction often
invites and sometimes compels all litigants with state law claims in
particular areas to choose a federal forum ....
While an occasional
departure from state policy by a federal diversity court can be corrected
in a future state court action... the repeated displacement of state courts
under protective jurisdiction can fundamentally alter the texture of state
policy.
Id.; see also John T. Cross, CongressionalPower to Extend FederalJurisdictionto Disputes
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step of enacting a jurisdictional statute providing for the adjudication of the dispute in a federal forum in which state substantive law
would be applied.845 According to Wechsler, such cases satisfy
Article III by "arising under" the federal jurisdictional statute. 46

OutsideArticle IM. A CriticalAnalysis from the Perspectiveof Bankruptcy, 87 Nw. U. L. REV.
1188, 1218-1219 (1993).
Under most of its variants, protective jurisdiction results in a federal
court construing claims arising under state law. This state law, however,
is probably defined in large part by the same state judiciaries that caused
Congress such concern. Because the federal court is required by Erie to
follow state law, it is unclear exactly how that federal court is to "protect'
some unidentified federal interest from the intrusion of state judiciaries.
Id.; Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Over-Protective Jurisdiction?: A State Sovereignty Theory of
FederalQuestions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1948, 1964 (1989).
The power to interpret a state's laws, however, is not subordinate to the
power to create those laws; it is not a lesser power, but a separate power.
A state has "an ongoing interest in how the law it creates is applied"
because it is through adjudication that state courts articulate and shape
into law the understandings and ideals that make the state a distinctive
political community. Indeed, divesting states of the power to construe
their own laws impairs their democratic integrity more than does
preempting their legislative powers.
Id.; Scott A. Rosenberg, Note, The Theory of Protective Jurisdiction,57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 933,
960-61 (1982).
State law grows and evolves in the state courts, a process frozen when
state rules are enforced by federal courts. Whether the imposition of a
federal rule, a rule amenable to growth and interpretation in the federal
courts, is a greater intrusion upon principles of federalism and legal
evolution than the freezing of state rules seems a debatable question,
certainly a question incapable of resolution in the abstract .... [Tihe
power to create jurisdiction derives from the necessity to advance article
I interests, whether those interests be forum-based or substance-based.
When Congress enacts a federal rule of decision, there are substancebased reasons for federal jurisdiction over that rule; some federal court
ought to have the power to ensure the enforcement of the rule and impose
upon it a uniform construction. When Congress does not enact a federal
rule of decision, there are no substance-based reasons for federal
jurisdiction; in the absence of forum-based grounds for jurisdiction, there
are no reasons for jurisdiction at all. The mere existence of unexercised
power to enact substantive rules is irrelevant to the issue of jurisdiction
and is, therefore, an insufficient reason to support the power to grant
jurisdiction.
Id.
Wechsler, supra note 842, at 224-25.
Id. at 225. However, under Wechsler's theory, not every jurisdictional statute would
"arise under" federal law, but only those that represent subject areas for which Congress
could legislate. See Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 742, at 586.
Critics of this approach have dismissed it as circular, claiming that
enactment of the jurisdictional statute cannot by itself make the
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Professor Mishkin has proposed a narrower conception of
protective jurisdiction.8 4 In Mishkin's view, a suit could not "arise
under" the jurisdictional statute itself, as the Diversity Clause
provides the only basis for asserting federal jurisdiction to protect
a party from prejudice. 48 However, under Mishkin's theory, where
Congress has "an articulated and active federal policy regulating a

field," the "arising under" clause of Article III allows Congress to
confer jurisdiction on the federal courts in all cases in that field,
even those substantively governed by state law.849 According to
Mishkin, the case would "arise under" the federal program itself.
The purpose would not be so much to protect the individual litigant
as to protect the federal program, which might be better served if all
litigation relating to it were handled by the same courts, well versed
in and not hostile to the national policies established by the
legislation."' The Supreme Court has on several occasions been
given the opportunity to consider the theory of protective jurisdiction, but on each occasion, it has carefully avoided reaching the
issue.8 5 1
jurisdiction constitutional under article MI.There is in fact an independent limitation on Congress' power to enact such jurisdictional statutes:
they must fall within the article I powers. Thus, not every jurisdictional
statute would automatically create a valid protective jurisdiction because
not every jurisdictional statute would necessarily constitute a federal law
under which a case could properly "arise."
Id. Wechsler's view that a suit can "arise under" the jurisdictional statute itself has been
rejected by the Supreme Court. Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 136 (1989); Verlinden B.V.
v. Cn. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 495-96 (1983); Mossman v. Higginson, 4 U.S. 12 (1800).
However, the Court has not rejected the theory of protection jurisdiction.
" Although Professor Mishkin is generally credited for this narrower version of
protective jurisdiction, the roots ofthis alternative theory were first suggested by Professor
Forrester. Forrester, The Jurisdictionof Federal Courts in Labor Disputes, 13 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 114, 128-31 (1948).
' Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 475-76 (1957) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
949Id. at 476 (citing Mishkin, The Federal'Question'in the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L.
REv. 157, 192 (1953)).
' See Paul J. Mishkin, The Federal 'Question'in the DistrictCourts, 53 COLUM. L. REV.
157, 195-96 (1953).
8" See Mesa, 489 U.S. at 137-38; Verlinden B.V, 461 U.S. at 491 n.17 (finding it
unnecessary to "consider petitioner's alternative argument that the Act is constitutional as
an aspect of so.called 'protective jurisdiction.' "). Verlinden has been criticized for
repudiating reliance on the theory of protective jurisdiction when the result could only be
justified as such. See Linda S. Mullenix, Complex Litigationand ArticleII Jurisdiction,59
FORDHAM L. REV. 169,201-02,205 (1990) (describing Verlinden as "fancy footwork regarding
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In Textile Workers Union of America,852 the Court considered a
challenge to the constitutionality of the Taft-Hartley Act, which
conferred on the federal courts jurisdiction over all suits alleging
violations of contracts between labor and management, without
regard to diversity or the amount in controversy, so long as the labor
organization represented employees in an industry affecting
commerce. 53 Justice Douglas, writing for a six-justice majority,
side-stepped the issue of protective jurisdiction by construing the
statute as directing the federal courts to create a body of federal
common law to govern such contracts. 54 Justice Burton, concurring
for himself and one other justice, disagreed with the majority's
conclusion that federal common law governed such contracts but
concluded that it was nonetheless permissible for Congress to grant
the federal courts jurisdiction over such disputes under the theory
of protective jurisdiction. 5 Justice Burton reasoned that some
federal rights may be involved in cases brought under the Act, thus
endorsing Mishkin's theory of protective jurisdiction.856
Justice Frankfurter penned a lengthy dissent, in which he first
challenged the majority's construction of the Taft-Hartley Act as
inconsistent with both the text of the Act and its legislative history
and then characterized it as a disingenuous attempt to avoid
8 r7
addressing the difficult Article III problem posed by the Act.

Having construed the Act as vesting the federal courts with
article III arising under jurisdiction and the theory of productive jurisdiction."); Comment,
The Supreme Court, 1982 Term: FederalJurisdictionand Procedure: Article HI Federal

Question Jurisdiction,97 HARV. L. REV. 208, 213 (1983) (criticizing Court's characterization
of sovereign immunity as substantive issue, suggesting Court's reference to legal standard
applicable to federal and state courts alike as "a more satisfactory, functional way of
approaching the distinction"). For a discussion of the Court's holding in Verlinden, see infra
notes 869-77 and accompanying text.
353 U.S. 448 (1957).
61 Stat. 156, § 301(a) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1994)).
s See Textile Workers, 353 U.S. at 456.
Id. at 459, 460 (Burton, J., concurring).
SId.

Id. at 460-69 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) CThe Court has avoided the difficult
problems raised by § 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act ... by attributing to the section an occult
content. This plainly procedural section is transmuted into a mandate to the federal courts
to fashion a whole body of substantive federal law appropriate for... collective bargaining.").
Justice Frankfurter's dissent was somewhat critical of the notion of federal common law,
viewing law-making as a legislative function and suggesting, by a citation to Hayburn's Case,
2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792), that it might fall outside of the judicial power. Id. at 464 65.
MI
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jurisdiction to adjudicate cases based entirely on state law and in
the absence of diversity, Justice Frankfurter then addressed the
Article III question,85 characterizing the broad reading of Article III
set forth in Osborn and later applied in the Pacific Railroad
Removal Cases,85 9 as standing for the proposition that "the 'arising'
clause of the Constitution, though limited to cases involving
potential federal questions, has such flexibility that Congress may
confer it whenever there exists in the background some federal
proposition that might be challenged, despite the remoteness of the
likelihood of actual presentation of such a federal question."860 He
then noted that the Court has upheld Congress's vesting authority
in the federal courts to hear private causes of action arising under
and wholly governed by state law between bankruptcy trustees and
adverse claimants, and indicated that this was likely due to the
presence of a remote federal question in the background. 6'
In his dissent, Justice Frankfurter considered the various
theories of protective jurisdiction. He first considered and rejected
Wechsler's theory of the greater including the lesser,86 noting that
in both Osborn and the bankruptcy cases, some question of substantive federal law was present in the background.863 He concluded
that those cases could not be read to support the theory of protective
jurisdiction, as it is not clear that Congress has the constitutional
authority to create the substantive rules of decision governing every
transaction of a person who subsequently becomes bankrupt or all
disputes involving the Bank of the United States.864 Justice

Textile Workers, 353 U.S. at 469-70.
9 Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Myers, 115 U.S. 1 (1885).
o Textile Workers, 353 U.S. at 471 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 471-72. See also George D. Brown, Beyond Pennhurst-Protective Jurisdiction,
the Eleventh Amendment, and the Power of Congress to Enlarge Federal Jurisdictionin
Response to the Burger Court, 71 VA. L. REV. 343, 371 (1985) ("[O]ne might analogize to
Osborn and argue that jurisdiction should be based on potential federal law challenges to the
trustee's authority."); Ralph Brubaker, On the Nature of FederalBankruptcy Jurisdiction:
A GeneralStatutory and ConstitutionalTheory, 41 WM. & MARYL. REv. 743, 813-31 (2000)
(applying Osborntotheorize an original federalingredientin bankruptcy proceedings); Cross,
supra note 844, at 1229-33 (describing "original ingredient" theory and trustees as federal
parties in bankruptcy proceedings).
Textile Workers, 353 U.S. at 473.
See id. (noting Court cannot argue what Congress has not legislated).
Id. at 474 (citing Mishkin, supra note 850, at 189).
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Frankfurter then considered the alternative theory of protective
jurisdiction proposed by Professor Mishkin and expressed doubt that
Mishkin's theory comported any more with Article III than did
Wechsler's, absent the existence of federal rights in the background
of suits brought under section 301.65

Finally, Justice Frankfurter considered the "original federal
ingredient" test of Osborn.86 He conceded that suits brought under
section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act could be construed as containing
a remote federal ingredient, to wit, that federal law vested labor
unions with the right to enter into collective-bargaining agreements
867
on behalf of their members and the right to sue on those contracts.
However, he questioned the extension of those precedents to the
instant case, although in so doing, he based his opinion on cases
interpreting the scope of section 1331 "arising under"
jurisdiction
868
instead of Article III "arising under" jurisdiction.
In Verlinden B. V. v. CentralBank of Nigeria,19 the Court again
side-stepped the theory of protective jurisdiction in considering
whether the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA") comported
with the strictures of Article III. The FSIA provides foreign states
with a statutory grant of sovereign immunity to suit in any U.S.0
87
court, state or federal, subject to various statutory exceptions.

'ss

See id. at 475-77.

The second "protective jurisdiction" theory has the dubious advantage of
limiting incursions on state judicial power to situations in which the
State's feelings may have been tempered by early substantive federal
invasions. Professor Mishkin's theory of"protective jurisdiction" may find
more constitutional justification ifthere is not merely an "articulated and
active" congressional policy regulating the labor field but also federal
rights existing in the interstices of actions under § 301.
Id.; see also Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 742, at 593.
It is difficult to understand why a federal interest expressed in
tangentially-related federal legislation should be any more effective to
cause a case to arise under federal law than the federal interest expressed
by the creation of federal jurisdiction. Congress may articulate that
interest quite distinctly in enacting a jurisdictional statute, and the
interest expressed may be a strong and active one.
Id.
8' Textile Workers, 353 U.S. at 480.
W71 Id.
"s
Id. at 481-84 (citing Gully v. First Nal Bank, 299 U.S. 109 (1936)).
689

461 U.S. 480 (1983).

870

28 U.S.C. §§ 1604, 1605, 1607 (1994).
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Under the FSIA, any suit against a foreign state permitted under
one of the statute's exceptions to sovereign immunity may be
brought in federal court in the first instance8 7 17 or,
if filed initially in
2
state court, may be removed to federal court.
In Verlinden, the Court interpreted the FSIA as authorizing a
foreign plaintiff to sue a foreign state in federal court on a nonfederal cause of action and then considered whether the statute so
construed violated Article III.7' The Court noted that the Diversity
Clause of Article III was insufficient to sustain the FSIA, as it did
not extend to suits between a foreign plaintiff and a foreign state. 7 4
However, the Court found that the FSIA could be sustained under
the "arising under" clause, noting that every case brought under the
Act contains a question of substantive federal law at the outset, to
wit, whether the foreign state is entitled to the federal statutory
defense of sovereign immunity or whether some exception to the
statutory grant of sovereign immunity applies.8 75 The Court
affirmed its prior decisions, holding that a jurisdictional statute
itself couldhot serve as the federal law under which the suit arises
for purposes of Article IIIs "arising under" clause.
However, the
Court distinguished the FSIA on the ground that the Act did not
merely, concern access to the federal courts-it also governed the
types of actions for which foreign states could be held liable in any
U.S., Court, state or federal, which it deemed to be a separate,
substantive question of federal law. 77
Although the Supreme Court has avoided reaching the question
of whether Congress has the authority to vest the federal courts
with protective jurisdiction, an argument can be made that the
Supreme Court has, through its endorsement of the development of
federal common law, endorsed a form of protective jurisdiction.
Indeed, in Textile Workers itself, the constitutionality of the statute
was saved by construing it as a directive to the federal courts to
8' Id. § 1330(a).
172 Id. § 1441(d).
87 Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 482, 489-91.
"4 Id. at 491-92.

87 Id. at 492.94.
87 See id. at 495-96 (citing The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 US. (12 How.)
443, 451-53 (1852); Mossman v. Higginson, 4 U.S. (4 Dall) 12 (1800)).
"77 Id. at 496.97.
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develop substantive federal common law to govern such disputes.
When the Supreme Court decides that federal common law will
govern a particular dispute, the Court typically incorporates state
law as the federal common law rule of decision.8 78 This is properly
characterized as protective jurisdiction in disguise.8 7
Thus,
Congress can effectively provide for protective jurisdiction by
directing the federal courts to create substantive federal common
law to govern disputes for which Congress could itself legislate
under Article I; 8o alternatively, Congress can itself provide by
statute that federal law will apply to such disputes and can, by
statute, incorporate state law as the federal rule of decision. 8 '
Yet another expansive theory of the jurisdiction of Article III
courts is found in a decision by the Supreme Court sustaining a
8

See, e.g., Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 442 U.S. 653, 658-60, 670-79 (1979)

(concluding that state law should be incorporated as the federal rule of decision).
" See Rosenberg, supra note 844, at 1001-02 ([TChe Court applied federal common law
in Wilson not because of any interest in the substantive law applied.., but because of a
forum-based interest in federal jurisdiction ...in doing so the courts apply a forum-based
theory of protective jurisdiction.").
880See Cross, supra note 844, at 1220-22.
Congress can delegate to the federal courts the power to craft federal
common law rules. Therefore, Congress can "protect" all of its Article I
powers by delegating lawmaking authority to the federal courts, even if
it has not otherwise exercised one or more of those powers by creating
substantive law ....in contrast to protective jurisdiction, federal courts
do not always need specific congressional authorization to create federal
common law .... A number of Supreme Court decisions indicate that
Congress can require federal common law to mirror state law, unless a
particular state-law rule interferes with a federal interest. Although the
governing law in such a case is "federal," the outcome of the vast majority
of cases is no different than it would have been under state law ....
Indeed, the federal common law approach provides a much more
efficient-and honest-way for Congress to provide a federal flavor to a
particular area than does the doctrine of protective jurisdiction ....
Id.; Kenneth C. Randall, FederalQuestions and the Human Rights Paradigm,73 MINN. L.
REV. 349, 381 (1988).
Justice Frankfurter's similar criticisms of both the federal common-law
and protective jurisdiction theories indicates that it is not always easy to
separate the two theories. Indeed, judicial reference to, or reliance on,
nonfederal law in the creation of federal common-law causes of action
differs little from the adoption of nonfederal causes of action under
protective jurisdiction. Perhaps, then, the legitimacy of jurisdiction over
federal common-law cases also supports judicial authority under the
protective jurisdiction theory.
Id.
831See supra notes 720-49 and accompanying text.
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statutory grant of "diversity" jurisdiction to the federal courts in
suits involving citizens of the District of Columbia. In the Judiciary
Act of 1789, Congress vested the lower federal courts with diversity
jurisdiction over suits "between a citizen of the State where the suit
is brought and a citizen of another State."8 2 In 1805, the Supreme
Court in Hepburn v. Ellzey"8 3 held that the word "State" in the Act
did not include the District of Columbia.8 4 The Court did not
further decide whether the word "State" in the Diversity Clause
included the District of Columbia, but the Court indirectly decided
that it did not. 85 In construing the meaning of the word "State" as
used in the Judiciary Act of 1789, the Court turned to the text of the
Constitution-reasoning that the term as used in the Act was used
in the same sense as the term is used in the Constitution8 ---and
concluded that the meaning of the word "State" as used in the
Constitution included only those entities that were members of the
Union. 8 7 The Court conceded that this produced an unusual result,
but held 8 that resolution of the matter was for the legislative
88
branch.
As a result of the Court's decision in Hepburn,Article III courts
remained closed to citizens of the District of Columbia in diversity
cases for 136 years.88 9 Congress then amended the diversity statute
explicitly to provide that the District of Columbia and the U.S.
territories were "States" for purposes of the diversity statute.8 90 In
NationalMutual Ins. Co. v. TidewaterTransfer Co.,' 91 the Supreme
Court considered the constitutionality of the amended statute in the
context of a suit brought by a District of Columbia corporation

Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78.

6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 445 (1805).
See id. at 452-53.
8

Id.

See id. at 452 ("[A]s the act ofcongress obviously uses the word 'state' in reference to
that term as used in the constitution, it becomes necessary to inquire whether Columbia is
a state in the sense of that instrument.").
8 id. at 452-53.
See id. at 453 (".Tlhis is a subject for legislative, not for judicial consideration.").
See Nat1 Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582,584 (1949) (opinion of
Jackson, J.).
m Act of Apr. 20, 1940, ch. 117, 54 Stat. 143 (amended by Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
62 Stat. 869) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1994 and Supp. V 1999)).
893 337 U.S. at 582.
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against a Virginia corporation in a federal district court and
grounded solely on diversity.8 92 Justice Jackson, writing for himself
and for Justices Black and Burton, upheld the constitutionality of
the statute.89 The trio first held that the District of Columbia was
not a "State" within the meaning of the Diversity Clause of Article
III, reasoning that Hepburnwas effectively an interpretation of the
Diversity Clause itself.8 94 Four other justices agreed with Justice
Jackson on this point.8 9
Justice Jackson's opinion, however, went on to hold that the
amended diversity statute was valid,898 grounding the decision on
Congress' broad power to legislate for the District of Columbia
98
under both the District89 7 and the Necessary and Proper Clauses"
of Article .899 He then noted that these provisions have long been
held to give Congress the authority to vest federal courts within the
District of Columbia with such jurisdiction as a state may confer on
its own local courts-that Congress could thus unquestionably vest
federal courts located within the District with jurisdiction over suits
between a citizen of the District and a citizen of another state.0 0 He
Id. at 583 (opinion of Jackson, J.).
Id. at 604.
'

See id. at 586-88.
In referring to the "States' in the fateful instrument which amalgamated
them into the ""United States," the Founders obviously were not speaking
of states in the abstract. They referred to those concrete organized
societies which were thereby contributing to the federation by delegating
some part of their sovereign powers and to those that should later be
organized and admitted to the partnership in the method prescribed.
They obviously did not contemplate unorganized and dependent spaces as
states. The District of Columbia being nonexistent in any form, much less
as a state, at the time of the compact, certainly was not taken into the
Union of states by it, nor has it since been admitted as a new state is
required to be admitted. We therefore decline to overrule the opinion of
Chief Justice Marshall, and we hold that... cases between citizens of the
District and those of the states were not included in the catalogue of
controversies over which the Congress could give jurisdiction to the
federal courts by virtue of Art. III.

Id.
'9
See id. at 653-54 (Frankfurter, J., joined by Reed, J., dissenting); id. at 626 (Vinson,
C.J., joined by Douglas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 604 (opinion of Jackson, J.).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
8 Id. cl. 18.
' Tidewater Transfer, 337 U.S. at 589 (opinion of Jackson, J.).
9 Id. at 590.
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further posited that Congress likely had the power under these
provisions to set up special legislative courts throughout the United
States to adjudicate disputes involving citizens of the District of
Columbia." 1 Justice Jackson conceded that Congress could not vest
the Article III federal courts with non-judicial functions,90 2 but held
that the enumerated categories of cases and controversies contained
in Article III did not exhaust the types of cases which Congress can
vest in the Article III federal courts.0 ° In Justice Jackson's view,
where Congress in the exercise of its powers under
Art. I finds it necessary to provide those on whom its
power is exerted with access to some kind of court or
tribunal for determination of controversies that are
within the traditional concept of the justiciable, it
may open the regular federal courts to them regardless of lack of diversity of citizenship.90 4
Thus, in Justice Jackson's view, Congress had the authority under
the Necessary and Proper Clause to vest the existing Article III
courts with jurisdiction over all disputes involving citizens of the
District.90 5 Justice Jackson went on to establish what appears to be
a greater-includes-the-lesser rationale somewhat akin to that
employed in the theory ofprotective jurisdiction: since Congress has
the admitted (arguably) greater power to create a non-Article III
court to adjudicate such disputes, it has the (arguably) lesser power
of vesting the existing Article III courts with jurisdiction over such
9 0°
disputes.
id.
Id. at 591.
Id. at 591-99.
Id. at 600.
Id.
See Tidewater Transfer,337 U.S. at 602-03.
As we have pointed out, the power to make this defendant suable by a
District citizen is not claimed to be outside of federal competence. If
Congress has power to bring the defendant from his home all the way to
a forum within the District, there seems little basis for denying it power
to require him to meet the plaintiff part way in another forum. The
practical issue here is whether, if defendant is to be suable at all by
District citizens, he mustbe compelled to come to the courts ofthe District

90 See
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In separate opinions, six Justices rejected Justice Jackson's view
that Congress can vest the Article III courts with jurisdiction over
cases beyond those enumerated in Article III."'1 However, two of
those Justices also held that the District of Columbia was a "State"
within the meaning of the Diversity Clause, reasoning that the
Sixth Amendment-which also uses the word "State"-has been
construed as applying to prosecutions in the District of Columbia
and that the word "State" could not mean different things in
different parts of the Constitution." 8 Accordingly, the Justices who
dissented to both rationales for upholding the constitutionality of
the statute collectively provided the five votes necessary to uphold
9 09
it.
Lower court decisions have, with little discussion, extended the
rationale of Tidewater to uphold the constitutionality of Congress
extending the statutory grant of diversity jurisdiction to include
citizens of the then-territory of Hawaii9 1 and Puerto Rico.?" No

of Columbia or perhaps to a special statutory court sitting outside of it, or
whether Congress may authorize the regular federal courts to entertain
suit. We see no justification for holding that Congress in accomplishing
an end admittedly within its power is restricted to those means which are
most cumbersome and burdensome to a defendant. Since it may provide
the District citizen with a federal forum in which to sue the citizens of one
of the states, it is hard to imagine a fairer or less prejudiced one than the
regular federal courts sitting in the defendant's own state. To vest the
jurisdiction in them rather than in courts sitting in the District of
Columbia would seem less harsh to defendants and more consistent with
the principles of venue that prevail in our system under which defendants
are generally suable in their home forums.
Id.
Id. at 607 (Rutledge, J., joined by Murphy, J., concurring) CThe Article I courts in
the several states cannot be vested, by virtue of other provisions of the Constitution, with
powers specifically denied them by the terms of Article III ....
");id. at 646-52 (Frankfurter
J., joined by Reed, J., dissenting); id. at 626-46 (Vinson, C.J., joined by Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
Id. at 617-24 (Rutledge, J., joined by Murphy, J., concurring).
See id. at 655 (Frankfurter, J., joined by Reed, J., dissenting).
A substantial majority of the Court agrees that each of the two grounds
urged in support of the attempt by Congress to extend diversity jurisdiction to cases involving citizens of the District of Columbia must be
rejected-but not the same majority. And so, conflicting minorities in
combination bring to pass a result-paradoxical as it may appear-which
differing majorities of the Court find insupportable.
Id.
o See Siegmund v. Gen. Commodities Corp., 175 F.2d 952, 953-54 (9th Cir. 1949).
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decisions have considered the constitutionality of extending the
diversity statute to citizens of the other territories, although the
rationale would likely be the same. These decisions are viewed as
even harder to justify than Tidewater itself, for the territories are
12
said to look even less like states than the District of Columbia.1
The Tidewater theory has also been considered in one case
considering the scope of federal court jurisdiction over disputes
involving aliens.91 3 In 1988, Congress amended the diversity statute
to include a proviso that "an alien admitted to the United States for
permanent residence shall be deemed a citizen of the State in which
such alien is domiciled.""14 Interpreted literally, the plain text of
this provision would appear to have two different effects. The first
would be to contract diversity jurisdiction. Consider a suit brought
The NationalMutualcase upheld the constitutionality of the Act involved
here as applied to an action between a citizen of the District of Columbia
and a citizen of a state. We think that decision is controlling where the
action is between the citizens of a state and a citizen of the Territory of
HawaiL...
Id.
9' See Americana of Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Kaplus, 368 F.2d 431, 436 (3d Cir. 1966).
Coming now to the issue ... as to whether Article IV, Section 3, provides
the requisite constitutional authority for the 1956 amendment [providing
that Puerto Rico is a State within the meaning of the diversity statute],
we conclude that our answer must be "yes." We find the conclusion of
Siegmund . .. and Lummus ... to be correct. The Siegmund opinion
pointed out that the power of Congress to "make all needful Rules and
Regulations respecting the territory ... belonging to the United States"
was expressly given byArticle IV, Section 3 of the Constitution. Although
the Siegmund case dealt with Hawaii, Lummus concerned the applicability of these principles to Puerto Ricans.
Id.; Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil Refining Co., 195 F. Supp. 47,49-51 (S.D.N.Y. 1961)
("The Court is persuaded that the Siegmund conclusion that the Tidewaterholding is equally
applicable in the instance of territories is sound .... Congress, in enacting section 1332(d)
to include the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, acted within its constitutional power. .. );
Detres v. Lions Bldg. Corp., 234 F.2d 596,603 (7th Cir. 1956) ("We think the Siegmund case
was correctly decided and that the principles there announced apply also to the citizens of
Puerto Rico."); see also Act ofJuly 26, 1956, Pub. L. No. 808, ch. 740, 70 Stat. 658 CThe word
'States', as used in this section, includes the Territories, the District of Columbia, and the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.").
912 See Rosenberg, supra note 844, at 984 & n.258 ("The lower federal courts have
extended ihe Tidewaterrationale to the territories as well as the District of Columbia-an
uncomfortable result, for however little the District might look like a state, the territories
certainly look less so.").
91
Singh v. Daimiler Benz, AG, 9 F.3d 303 (3d Cir. 1993).
9 Judicial Improvement and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4642
(1988) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1994 and Supp. V 1999)).
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by a citizen of New York against a citizen of France residing in New
York and admitted to the United States as a permanent resident
alien. Under section 1332(a)(2), this would be a suit between a
citizen of a state and a citizen of a foreign state, and there would be
diversity jurisdiction. However, since the proviso would now deem
the permanent resident alien to be a citizen of New York, the suit
would now be between two citizens of New York, and diversity
would be lacking. In this sense, the proviso seems to be akin to the
dual citizenship proviso for corporations, which treats them as
citizens of both the state in which they are incorporated and that in
which they have their principal place of business.9 15
At the same time, the plain text of the amendment would also
appear to expand diversity jurisdiction. Consider a suit brought by
a citizen of Germany residing in Pennsylvania who is admitted to
the United States as a permanent resident alien against a citizen of
Japan residing in Virginia who is admitted to the United States as
a permanent resident alien. Normally, diversity jurisdiction would
be lacking, since it is a suit brought by a citizen of a foreign state
against another citizen of a foreign state. Under the proviso,
however, it would now appear to be a suit brought by a citizen of
Pennsylvania against a citizen of Virginia, and diversity jurisdiction
would exist. Alternatively, if the citizen of Japan were not a
permanent resident, it would be a suit between a citizen of a state
and a citizen of a foreign state. The problem, however, is that the
Supreme Court has previously held that Article III does not allow
for diversity suits brought by a citizen of a foreign state against
another citizen of a foreign state.9 16 The question, then, is can
Congress, by simply providing by statute that they are not citizens
of foreign states but are instead to be deemed citizens of the states
in which they reside, overcome this Article III limitation?
One court in dicta has drawn an analogy to the Tidewater
situation, noting that the Tidewater Court upheld Congress's
definition of "States" as including the Territories, the District of

915 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1).
916 See Hodgson v. Bowerbank, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303 (1809) (holding that alien cannot
bring suit against another alien in federal court); Mossman v. Higginson, 4 U.S. (Dall.) 12
(1800) (same).
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Columbia, and Puerto Rico, which likewise had the effect of
expanding diversity jurisdiction.9 17 The court suggested that even
if the Diversity Clause does not support jurisdiction in this circumstance, Congress might be able to justify it based on its Article I
powers or under the "arising under" clause of Article III.98 The
court noted further that the requirement that a citizen of a state
must also be a citizen of the United States is only an interpretation
of the diversity statute, not Article III.' Most courts, however,
have avoided the Article III issue by finding a legislative intent to
contract, not expand, diversity jurisdiction, and have thus concluded
that the statute does not extend jurisdiction to suits between two
permanent resident aliens or between a permanent resident alien
and a citizen of a foreign state. 20
4. Appellate Jurisdiction.Although the well-pleaded complaint
rule prevents the removal of a case from state to federal court when
a federal question comes in only by way of a defense, 2 ' the Supreme
Court's review by writ of certiorari of federal questions decided by
the states' highest courts-as well as the in terrorem effect of the
possibility of such review-is an alternative means of safeguarding
parties from local court bias or hostility. Thus, an alternative to
creating or providing a federal forum of original jurisdiction to
protect parties against local court bias is to allow the local courts to
adjudicate the matters in the first instance but to provide for
appellate review of their decisions in a federal forum, such as the
917 Singh, 9 F.3d at 310-12.
9. Id. Singh involved a suit brought by a citizen of India who was a permanent resident

alien domiciled in Virginia against a German corporation as well as a Delaware corporation
with its principal place of business in New Jersey. Id. at 304. Since there was at least
minimal diversity and because complete diversity is not an Article I requirement, the court
was able to sidestep the question whether the suit would be valid if all parties were
permanent resident aliens. Id. at 311-12.
9's See id. at 311 n.4 (citing Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826,828-29
(1989); Brown v. Keene, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 112 (1834)).
See, e.g., Saadeh v. Farouki, 107 F.3d 52, 60-61 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (finding legislative
intent to reduce diversity jurisdiction); Matsuda v. Wada, 128 F. Supp. 2d 659, 664-67 (D.
Haw. 2000) (finding Congress designed statute to curb diversity jurisdiction); Marcus v. Five
J Jewelers Precious Metals Indus. Ltd., 111 F. Supp. 2d 445, 448 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding
legislative history indicates Congress' purpose was to narrow scope of diversity jurisdiction);
Lee v. Trans Am. Trucking Serv., Inc., 111 F. Supp. 2d 135, 139-41 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (finding
legislative intent to limit diversity jurisdiction).
"' Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Graham, 489 U.S. 838 (1989).

1034

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:895

United States Supreme Court. Of course, appellate review is not a
perfect substitute for providing an original federal forum. Appellate
courts typically defer to the factual findings of trial courts, so any
bias in fact finding is unlikely to be cured by appellate review.
Moreover, the Supreme Court grants certiorari in so few cases that
its in terroremeffect may not be substantial.2 2 In addition, because
the Supreme Court's jurisdiction is limited to reviewing questions
of federal law,92 it is not an effective substitute for diversity
jurisdiction 24 or other cases involving purely questions of local law.
However, Congress has provided for-and the Supreme Court has
seemingly approved-federal court appellate review of the decisions
of both the local territorial courts as well as the non-Article III
federal territorial courts, even in nondiversity cases involving local
territorial law. In so doing, Congress has managed to surmount the
limits on the Supreme Court's capacity to review more than a
handful of cases each year. An examination of these different
methods of providing for appellate review in federal courts-as well
as the constitutional basis for exercising such appellate review-is
constructive in considering methods of providing for appellate
review of the decisions of tribal courts, and accordingly is examined
here.
Throughout the nineteenth century, Congress vested the
Supreme Court with jurisdiction to review, by way of either appeal
or writ of certiorari, the decisions of the federal, non-Article III
territorial courts established by Congress. 2 ' In addition, just as the

' Indeed, it is the unlikelihood of Supreme Court review that in part serves as a
justification for federal habeas review by the lower federal courts. See supra note 494 and
accompanying text.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1994) (giving Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over highest
state court decisions involving federal law); Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.)
590, 635-36 (1874) (holding Supreme Courts appellate jurisdiction over state court decisions
is limited to decisions involving federal law).
' Although the Supreme Court by statute has always lacked jurisdiction over diversity
suits that are adjudicated in state courts, Article I gives Congress the authority to vest the
Supreme Court with appellate review over such cases. See David P. Currie, 7e Constitution
in the Supreme Court The Powerof the Federal Courts, 1801-1835, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 646,
685 n.253 (1982).
"' See, e.g., Act of June 23, 1874, ch. 469, § 3, 18 Stat. 253, 254 (Utah territory); Act of
Sept. 9, 1850, ch. 51, § 9, 9 Stat. 453, 455-56 (same); Act of Sept. 9, 1850, ch. 49, § 10, 9 Stat.
446, 449-50 (New Mexico territory); Act of Aug. 14, 1848, ch. 177, § 9, 9 Stat. 323, 326-27
(Oregon territory); Act of July 14, 1832, ch. 239, § 2, 4 Stat. 600, 600 (Florida territory); Act
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Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the decisions of the highest
state courts, 92 in the territories of Hawaii and Puerto Rico-in
which Congress allowed for parallel local and federal territorial
courts-Congress provided for Supreme Court review of the
decisions of the supreme courts of both territories.927 Finally,
Congress has provided that the Supreme Court will eventually have
jurisdiction to review the decisions of the highest local appellate
courts established in Guam,9 28 the Northern Mariana Islands, 929 and

the Virgin Islands98 in the same manner in which it currently
reviews the decisions of the highest state courts.
Congress has also provided for federal appellate review of local
territorial courts in federal courts other than the Supreme Court.
Congress created an appellate division of the District Court of
Guam, 93 ' the District Court of the Virgin Islands,91 2 and the District

of Apr. 17, 1828, ch. 29, § 7, 4 Stat. 261, 262 (Arkansas territory); Act of Feb. 5, 1825, ch. 6,
§ 5, 4 Stat. 80, 81 (Michigan territory); Act of Apr. 20, 1818 ch. 127, § 1, 3 Stat. 468, 468
(Alabama territory).
28 U.S.C. § 1257.
s See Act of Mar. 3, 1905, ch. 1465, § 3, 33 Stat. 1035, 1035 (Territory of Hawaii); Act of
Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 246, 36 Stat. 1087, 1158 (same); Act of Jan. 28, 1915, ch. 22, § 2, 38
Stat. 803, 804 (Puerto Rico); Act ofMar. 3,1911, ch. 231, § 244,36 Stat. 1087, 1157-58 (same);
Act of Apr. 12, 1900, ch. 191, § 35, 31 Stat. 77, 85 (same). In 1916, the Supreme Coures
appellate and certiorari jurisdiction over the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico was amended to
harmonize it with that applicable to decisions from the state supreme courts. Act ofSept. 6,
1916, ch. 448, § 2, 39 Stat. 726, 726-27; Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 302 (1922). Today,
writs of certiorari may be brought from the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico to the United
States Supreme Court under the same circumstances as exist for bringing certiorari from a
state court. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1258, with 28 U.S.C. § 1257.
928 48 U.S.C. § 1424-2 (1994).
Id. § 1824(a).
'30 Id. § 1613.
93'Id. § 1424-3(a). The appellate division of the District Court of Guam consisted of a
panel of three judges, id. § 1424-3(b), typically made up of the single District Court Judge of
Guam, the District Judge of the District for the Northern Mariana Islands, and either a
Circuit or District Court Judge from the Ninth Circuit. REP. OF THE PAC. ISLANDS COMM. OF
THE JUD.COUNCIL OFTHE NnTH CiR.To THE SEN. COMM. ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RES. AND
THE H. COMM. ON NATURAL RS. ON THE SUP. Or.OF GUAM 2 (2001) [hereinafter REP. OF THE
PAC. ISLANDS COMM.]. Congress also authorized the Guam legislature to create an appellate
court, 48 U.S.C. § 1424-1(a), and provided that the appellate jurisdiction of the District Court
of Guam over the local territorial courts would cease at such time as the Guam legislature
created an appellate court. Id. § 1424-3(d). The Supreme Court had construed the Organic
Act as not allowing the Guam legislature to divest the District Court of Guam of appellate
jurisdiction by the creation of a territorial appellate court, as Congress had not provided for
review of such a territorial appellate court by an Article III court, thus potentially raising
constitutional questions regarding jurisdiction-stripping. Territory of Guam v. Olsen, 431
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Court for the Northern Mariana Islands933 with appellate jurisdiction over the decisions of the local courts of these territories until
such time as the respective territorial legislatures create their own
local appellate courts. In addition, Congress provided that the
judges of the District of Indian Territory were to constitute a U.S.
Court of Appeals for Indian Territory and vested it with appellate
jurisdiction over the U.S. Court in Indian Country. 34 To be sure,
Congress's authority to create such non-Article III federal courts to
exercise appellate jurisdiction over the decisions of either the federal
non-Article III trial courts or the trial courts created by the local
territorial legislatures seems beyond question. To the extent that
Article IV gives Congress authority to create non-Article III courts
of original jurisdiction to adjudicate criminal and civil matters
arising in the territories, there is no principled reason why it should
not likewise be able to create non-Article III courts of appellate
jurisdiction to review the decisions of either local or federal
territorial courts.
But both of these options-vesting the U.S. Supreme Court with
appellate jurisdiction over the territorial courts or creating specialized federal appellate courts-have their drawbacks. The former

U.S. 195, 204 (1977). Congress subsequently revised the Act to provide for review of the local

appellate coures decisions by an Article III court. See infra note 951. The Guam legislature
has created the Superior Court of Guam as a court of general, original jurisdiction, 7 GUAM

CODE ANN. §§ 3105, 4101(a) (1992), as well as a Supreme Court with appellate jurisdiction
over the decisions of the Superior Court of Guam, id. § 3103(a), designated as the highest

court of Guam. Id. § 3102. Accordingly, the District Court of Guam no longer exercises
appellate jurisdiction over the local courts of Guam.

m See 48 U.S.C. § 1613a(a) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). The appellate division of the District
Court of the Virgin Islands consists of a panel of three judges. Id. § 1613a(b). Since the
legislature of the Virgin Islands has not yet established an appellate court, the District Court
of the Virgin Islands continues to exercise appellate jurisdiction over the local courts of the
Virgin Islands.
-'
See 48 U.S.C. § 1823(a) (1994). The appellate division of the District Court for the
Northern Mariana Islands consists of a panel of three judges. Id. § 1823(b). In 1989, the
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands established the Supreme Court of the
Northern Mariana Islands, with appellate jurisdiction over the decisions of the local trial

courts ofthe Northern Mariana Islands. Commonwealth Judicial Reorganization Act of 1989,
Pub. L. No. 6-25, 1 C.M.C. Div. 3, §§ 3101-08. In so doing, the appellate jurisdiction of the
District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands over the decisions of local trial courts in the
Northern Mariana Islands terminated. See Northern Mariana Islands v. Kawano, 917 F.2d
379, 381 (9th Cir. 1990).
' See Act of Mar. 1, 1895, ch. 145, § 11, 28 Stat. 593, 698.
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option overburdens an already heavy Supreme Court docket and
makes it unlikely that there will be any realistic appellate review in
most cases. The latter option can be costly and time consuming, as
it requires the creation of new courts. Thus, a third option employed by Congress is to vest the lower, Article III federal courts
with appellate jurisdiction over not only the decisions of the federal
non-Article III territorial courts but also with appellate jurisdiction
over the local territorial courts established by the territorial
legislatures.
As to lower court appellate review of federal, non-Article III
territorial courts, the First Circuit has historically and continues to
exercise appellate jurisdiction over the decisions of the U.S. District
Court for the District of Puerto Rico;93 5 the Third Circuit currently
has jurisdiction over the decisions of both the trial936 and
appellate3 . divisions of the District Court of the Virgin Islands; the
Fifth Circuit historically exercised jurisdiction over the decisions of

the U.S. District Court for the District of the Canal Zone;93 8 the

28 U.S.C. § 41; Act of Jan. 28, 1915, ch. 22, §§ 1-3, 38 Stat. 803-804.
28 U.S.C. § 1294(3).
48 U.S.C. § 1613a(c).
See Act ofAug. 24, 1912, ch. 390, § 9,37 Stat. 560,565. In 1903, the United States and
Panama entered into a treaty whereby the United States was granted a permanent lease of
the Panama Canal and a zone of land extending five miles on either side of the Canal over
which the United States was given the power to exercise its sovereignty. Isthonian Canal
Convention, Nov. 18, 1903, U.S.-Panama, arts. H, HII,33 Stat. 2234-2235. Congress gave the
President authority to administer the Canal Zone, Act ofApr. 28, 1904, ch. 1758, 33 Stat. 429,
429, and later gave the President the authority to appoint a governor to administer the Canal
Zone, Act of Aug. 24, 1912, ch. 390, § 4, 37 Stat. 560, 561. Congress provided for the
establishment of magistrate courts with exclusive original jurisdiction over certain minor civil
and criminal actions, id. § 7, 37 Stat. at 564, as well as the establishment of a United States
District Court for the District of the Canal Zone with original jurisdiction over all actions in
equity, all felony cases, allviolations of laws regarding the use and obstruction of the Panama
Canal, and all actions at law or admiralty where the amount in controversy exceeded $300.
Id. §§ 8, 10, 37 Stat. at 565-66. The District Court was also given appellate jurisdiction over
the decisions of the magistrate courts. Id. § 8, 37 Stat. at 565. The judge ofthe District Court
was to be appointed by the President with the concurrence ofthe Senate for a four-year term,
id., and the magistrates were to be appointed by the governor for four-year terms. Id. § 7, 37
Stat. at 564. Like most territorial courts, the District Court for the District of the Canal Zone
exercised jurisdiction over various matters not typically fIling within the jurisdiction of
typical Article III district courts, such as cases involving divorce, property distribution,
alimony, and child support. See, e.g., Egle v. Egle, 715 F.2d 999, 1001 (5th Cir. 1983)
(affirming district court's modification of custody order). In 1977, Congress entered into a
new treaty with Panama which abrogated the 1903 treaty and provided for Panama to resume
sovereign authority over the Canal Zone as of October 1, 1979. The District Court ceased
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Eighth Circuit historically exercised appellate jurisdiction over the
decisions of the U.S. Court of Appeals for Indian Territory;9. 9 and
the Ninth Circuit was historically vested with jurisdiction to review
the decisions of the U.S. District Courts for the Territories of
Alaska9 4 and of Hawaii,9 41 the U.S. Court for China,9 42 the appellate
division of the District Court of Guam,9 4' and the District Court for
the Northern Mariana Islands,9 4 4 and today continues to review the
decisions of the District Court of Guam 45 and the District Court for
the Northern Mariana Islands.94 6 In addition, the U.S. Circuit Court
for the District of California was historically vested with appellate
jurisdiction over the decisions of the consular courts in China9 47 and
Japan.

948

In addition, several of the U.S. Courts of Appeals have historically exercised and continue to exercise appellate jurisdiction over
the decisions of the local territorial courts. Thus, the First Circuit
historically exercised appellate jurisdiction over the decisions of the
Supreme Court of Puerto Rico,94 9 and the Ninth Circuit historically

operations on March 31, 1982. See Marian Nash Leich, The PanamaCanal Treaty and
Jurisdictionof U.S. Courts, 77 AM. J. INTVL L. 167 (1983) (discussing executive branch's
position that court in Engle v. Engle had jurisdiction).
93 Act of Mar. 1, 1895, ch. 145, § 11, 28 Stat. 693, 698. In 1905, Congress provided that
appeals from the U.S. Court of Appeals in Indian Territory to the Eighth Circuit would be
governed by the same rules governing appeals from the U.S. district courts to the Eighth
Circuit. Act of Mar. 3, 1905, ch. 1479, § 12, 33 Stat. 1048, 1081. No further appeal was
available therefrom to the U.S. Supreme Court. Laurel Oil & Gas Co. v. Morrison, 212 U.S.
291, 296 (1909).
9m Act of Mar. 3, 1899, ch. 21, § 202, 30 Stat. 1307; Act of June 6, 1900, ch. 51, § 504, 31
Stat. 414.
9" Act of Apr. 30, 1900, ch. 339, § 86, 31 Stat. 141, 158.
942 Act of June 30, 1906, ch. 3934, § 3, 34 Stat. 814, 815; Act of Feb. 13, 1925, ch. 229, 43
Stat. 936.
9" See 48 U.S.C. § 1424-3(c) (1994).
9" Id. § 1823(c).
9" 28 U.S.C. § 1294(4) (1994).
9" See id.; 48 U.S.C. § 1821(a) ("The Northern Mariana Islands shall constitute a part of
the same judicial circuit of the United States as Guam.'); 28 U.S.C. § 41 (including Guam in
the Ninth Circuit).
947 Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 517, § 4, 26 Stat. 826, 827; Ohlinger, supra note 14, at 345
(noting appeal provided for civil cases involving more than $2,500).
9u Act of July 1, 1870, ch. 194, §§ 3-8, 16 Stat. 183, 184.
949 Act of Feb. 13, 1925, ch. 229, § 128, 43 Stat. 936; Act of Jan. 28, 1915, ch. 22, § 2, 38
Stat. 803, 804; Prensa Insular de Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 189 F.2d 1019, 1021 (1st
Cir. 1951). This jurisdiction was repealed in 1961. Act of Aug. 30, 1961, Pub. L. 87-189, 75
Stat. 417.
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exercised appellate jurisdiction over the decisions of the Supreme
Court of Hawaii.95 ° Moreover, the Ninth Circuit currently has
jurisdiction to review by writ of certiorari the decisions of the Guam
Supreme Court 951 and to review by appeal the decisions of the
952
Supreme Court of the Commonwealth of Northern Mariana.
Additionally, the Third Circuit will, at such time as the legislature
have
of the Virgin Islands establishes a territorial appellate court,
53
certiorari.
of
writ
by
decisions
those
review
to
jurisdiction
It may seem odd to see lower federal courts exercising appellate
jurisdiction over the decisions of non-federal courts. This impression is likely due to the Rooker-Feldmandoctrine, which holds that
the federal district courts lack jurisdiction over collateral attacks on
judgments rendered in state court proceedings.954 The rationale for
the doctrine is that the statutory grant of subject matter jurisdiction
to the federal district courts is strictly original. For them to
entertain actions to reverse or modify the judgments of state courts
due to errors, even those of a constitutional nature, would be an
exercise of appellate jurisdiction, and only the United States
Supreme Court has been granted appellate jurisdiction over
judgments rendered by the states' highest courts. 955
However, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is merely a matter of
statutory interpretation and not an Article III limitation. Indeed,
in the Federalist Papers, Hamilton indicated that Congress did have
the authority under the Constitution to vest the lower federal courts
with appellate jurisdiction over the state courts. 56 The few courts
Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 1293, 62 Stat. 929; Act of Feb. 13, 1925, 43 Stat. 936;
Act of Jan. 15, 1915, § 2, 38 Stat. 803, 804.
9" 48 U.S.C. § 1424-2 (1994). See also 9TH CIR. R. 6-2 (providing for review by writ of

certiorari to the Supreme Court of Guam). In its first report to Congress, the Judicial Council
of the Ninth Circuit has recommended that Congress proceed immediately to provide for

direct U.S. Supreme Court review ofthe decisions of the Guam Supreme Court. See REPORT
OF THE PAC. ISLANDS COMM., at 26-27.

'

48 U.S.C. § 1824(a); 9TH CR. R. 6-1 (providing for appellate review ofthe decisions of

the Supreme Court of the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands).
48 U.S.C. § 1613.
D.C. Ct. of App. v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983); Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263
U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923).
Rooker, 263 U.S. 413, 416.

See THE FEDERALIST No. 82 (Alexander Hamilton) (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 1888).
But could an appeal be made to lie from the State courts to the subordinate federal judicatories? ... And this being the case, I perceive at

1040

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:895

and commentators to consider the issue seem to agree that Congress
has the authority to vest lower federal courts with such
jurisdiction. 5 7 One court has suggested, moreover, that the RookerFeldman doctrine has no application in circumstances in which the
Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction to review the state court's
decisions.95 8 Furthermore, in all of the cases cited above, Congress
clearly has vested the U.S. Courts of Appeals with appellate
jurisdiction over the decisions of the local territorial courts, so there
is no question as to congressional intent.
Although Congress has provided for some form of federal court
appellate review of the highest court of most of the territories, it has
not done so for all of them. American Samoa is a cluster of islands
in the South Pacific, which became a U.S. territory when the islands
were ceded to the United States by treaties with indigenous
chiefs. 5 By Executive Order, President McKinley granted the
Department of the Navy full authority to govern American Samoa. 9 0
The Navy promptly created the High Court of American Samoa and
appointed a Navy Commander to serve as chief justice. 961 Congress
present no impediment to the establishment of an appeal from the State
courts to the subordinate national tribunals; and many advantages
attending the power of doing it may be imagined. It would diminish the
motives to the multiplication of federal courts, and would admit of
arrangements calculated to contract the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court. The State tribunals may then be left with a more entire
charge of federal causes; and appeals, in most cases in which they may be
deemed proper, instead of being carried to the Supreme Court, may be
made to lie from the State courts to district courts of the Union.
Id.
s See, e.g., In re Meyerland Co., 910 F.2d 1257, 1261 n.5 (5th Cir. 1990) C'Although
Congress generally forbids the lower federal courts from entertaining appeals from state
courts ... there is no constitutional prohibition against it doing so.") (citing Feldman, 460
U.S. 462, Rooker, 263 U.S. 413, and THE FEDERALIST NO. 82); Vicki C. Jackson, Congressional
Control of Jurisdictionand the Futureof the Federal Courts-Opposition,Agreement, and
Hierarchy,86 GEo. L.J. 2445, 2470-71 (1998) (citing Federalist No. 82 for proposition that
"there are substantial reasons to doubt that Rooker-Feldman is constitutionally required").
' See Cruz v. Melecio, 204 F.3d 14, 21 n.5 (1st Cir. 2000) ('[D]enying jurisdiction based
on a state court judgment that is not eligible for review by the United States Supreme Court
simply would not follow from the jurisdictional statute that invigorated the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine in the first place.") (citing ASARCO, Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 622 (1989)).
9" 48 U.S.C. § 1661(a) (1994); Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints v. Hodel, 830 F.2d 374, 376 (D.C. Cir. 1987). American Samoa is deemed
to be an unincorporated territory. See King v. Morton, 520 F.2d 1140, 1142 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
96 AM. SAMOA CODE ANN. § 6 (1988).
9SI See Laughlin, supra note 626, at 385 (citing I AM. SAMOA, Forward, p. v. (1977)).
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subsequently ratified the treaties,96 2 and provided that, untilit acted
to establish a government for American Samoa, "all civil, judicial,
and military powers shall be vested in such person or persons and
shall be exercised in such manner as the President of the United
States shall direct.""'
In 195 1, President Truman issued an Executive Order transferring all authority over American Samoa to the Secretary of the
Interior.96 4 This Executive Order has been construed as granting
the Secretary of the Interior "plenary authority over the judicial
system of American Samoa."96 5 Under the supervision of the
Secretary of the Interior, American Samoa adopted a constitution,
which the Secretary approved after making certain amendments.9 6 6
Under that constitution, the Secretary of the Interior appoints the
chief justice and the associate justices of the High Court 6 " and has
statutory authority to remove them. 968
As in the case of tribal courts, no federal court has appellate
jurisdiction over the decisions of the High Court even where a
federal constitutional question is raised.9 69 However, the Secretary
of the Interior, in the exercise of his supervisory authority over the
territory, retains authority to "review and reverse" the High Court's
decisions. 9 '0 Because the Secretary of the Interior has such
authority and has a duty to administer the government of American
Samoa in a manner consistent with the U.S. Constitution, a litigant
who has exhausted his remedies in the High Court may collaterally
attack the Court's judgment by bringing suit directly against the

m Act of Feb. 20, 1929, ch. 281, 45 Stat. 1253 (amended by Act ofMay 22, 1929, ch. 6, 46
Stat. 4) (codified at 48 U.S.C. § 1661(a)).
m Act of Feb. 20, 1929, ch. 281, 45 Stat. 1253 (amended by Act of May 22, 1929, ch. 6, 46
Stat. 4) (codified at 48 U.S.C. § 1661(c)).
' Exec. Order No. 10,264, 16 Fed. Reg. 6417 (June 29, 1951), reprintedin 48 U.S.C. §
1662 (1994).
' Corp. ofPresiding Bishop of Church ofJesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Hodel, 830
F.2d 374, 376 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
' Laughlin, supra note 626, at 385. Congress has since given itself sole authority to
amend the constitution of American Samoa. See Pub. L. 98-213, § 12; Act of Dec. 8,1983, 97
Stat. 1459, 1462 (codified at 48 U.S.C. § 1662a (1994)).
REV. CONST. OF AM. SAMOA, art. III, § 3.
AM. SAMOA CODE ANN. § 3.1001 (1981).
96 See Hodel, 830 F.2d at 385.
970 Id. at 383.
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Secretary of the Interior in the U.S. District Court for the District

of Columbia, where the Secretary is located.9 '
The notion that territorial courts created by Congress are not
subject to the limitations of Article III, that they can be staffed with
judges lacking life tenure and salary protection, and that they can
adjudicate matters falling outside of the enumerated categories in
Article III is certainly firmly grounded. 72 The Supreme Court has
held that Congress clearly has the authority to create non-Article III
courts to adjudicate cases in geographic areas outside of the
boundaries of any U.S. state.973 It would thus seem perfectly
acceptable for the non-Article III courts that Congress has created
and vested with appellate jurisdiction over the decisions of local
territorial courts, such as the appellate divisions of the District
Courts in Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands and the Virgin
Islands, to review all decisions, regardless of whether or not there
is a federal question, diversity, or some other type of case falling

97, See id. at 385 & n.68 CAs in this case, [litigants from American Samoa] are remitted
to collateral attack in an independent, indeed an Article III, court); King v. Morton, 520 F.2d
1140, 1144 (D.C. Cir. 1975) ("ITihe United States District Court for the District of
Columbia.... is competent to judge the Secretary's administration of the government of
American Samoa by constitutional standards and, if necessary, to order the Secretary to take
appropriate measures to correct any constitutional deficiencies.").
972 Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 546 (1828) (holding judges in legislative
courts not entitled to Article III salary and tenure protections); see also Glidden Co. v.
Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 544-45 (1962) (plurality opinion) C'[I]n the territories cases and
controversies falling within the enumeration of Article III may be heard and decided in courts
constituted without regard to the limitations of that article ...").
9" See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50,63-64,75-76 (1982)
(plurality opinion) (recognizing that "the grant of power to the Legislative and Executive
Branches was historically and constitutionally so exceptional that the congressional assertion
of a power to create legislative courts was consistent with, rather than threatening to, the
constitutional mandate of separation of powers"). Not every justice agreed that the case law
necessarily supports "a general proposition and three tidy exceptions," id. at 91 (Rehnquist,
J., concurring), with the dissent instead viewing the issue as requiring a balancing of the
values Congress hopes to serve through the use of Article I courts against the value ofjudicial
independence expressed in Article I. See id. at 113-18 (White, J., dissenting) (favoring
balancing test to determine whether Congress properly created Article I court instead of
Article III court). Subsequent cases appear to endorse the balancing test, although none of
these subsequent cases question Congress's authority to create non-Article III courts for
geographic areas outside of the fifty states. See generally Commodity Futures Trading
Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986) (using balancing test to affirm non-Article M
delegation of adjudicative functions to CFTC); Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prod. Co., 473
U.S. 568 (1985) (using balancing test to validate binding arbitration provision of Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act).
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within the "judicial power" of Article III, since such courts are not
bounded by the restrictions set forth in Article III.
Yet historically, most of the federal appellate jurisdiction
exercised over the territorial courts has been exercised by the U.S.
Supreme Court or the lower Article III courts. Can these Article III
courts hear appeals from the territorial courts on matters falling
outside of the enumerated categories set forth in Article III?
Although the statutory grants of appellate jurisdiction to the
Supreme Court and the lower federal courts over the decisions of the
federal non-Article III territorial courts and the local territorial
courts have typically contained an amount in controversy requirement, they have not contained any subject matter limitation, such
as a requirement that there be a federal question, diversity, or the
like.974 The grants would thus seem to authorize review of cases
coming from the territorial courts based entirely on local territorial
law and for which there is no diversity of citizenship, thus falling

9" 48 U.S.C. § 1424-2 (1994) '[Mhe United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
shall have jurisdiction to review by unit of certiorari all final decision of the highest court of
Guam from which a decision could be had."); Act of Feb. 13, 1925, ch. 229, § 128(a), 43 Stat.
936, 936.
The circuit courts of appeal shall have appellate jurisdiction to review by
appeal or writ of error final decisions ....In the Supreme Courts ofthe
Territory of Hawaii and of Porto Rico, in all civil cases, civil or criminal,
wherein the Constitution or a statute or treaty of the United States or any
authority exercised thereunder is involved; in all other civil cases wherein
the value in controversy, exclusive of interest and costs, exceeds $5,000,
and in all habeas corpus proceedings.
Id.; Act of Mar. 3, 1905, ch. 1465, § 3, 33 Stat. 1035, 1035 ("[Wjrits of error and appeals may
also be taken from the supreme court of the Territory of Hawaii to the Supreme Court of the
United States in all cases where the amount involved, exclusive of costs, exceeds the sum or
value of five thousand dollars."); REVISED STATUTES OF THE UNITED STATES § 702 (2d ed.
1878).
The final judgments and decrees of the supreme court of any Territory,
except the Territory of Washington, in cases where the value of the matter
in dispute . .. exceeds one thousand dollars, may be reviewed and
reversed or affirmed in the Supreme Court, upon writ of error or appeal,
in the same manner and under the same regulations as the final
judgments and decrees of a circuit court. In the Territory of Washington
the value of the matter in dispute must exceed two thousand dollars ....
And any final judgment or decree of the supreme court of said Territory
inany cause [when] the Constitution or a statute or treaty of the United
States is brought in question may be reviewed in like manner.
Id. But see 28 U.S.C. § 1258 (1994) (limiting Supreme Court review over decisions of Supreme
Court of Puerto Rico to issues of federal law).
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outside the "judicial power" as defined in Article III. Although this
presents no problem when a non-Article III court adjudicates the
dispute, can it be permissible where an Article III court reviews the
decisions of a local or federal territorial court?
Throughout its history, the Supreme Court has heard appeals
flom territorial courts involving local territorial matters.9 75 In
addition, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that when it or a
lower federal court reviews the decision of a territorial court, the
Court has the authority to reverse the decision solely on the basis of
the territorial court's interpretation of territorial law, although such
review is limited to cases of "manifest" or "clear" error by the
territorial court, i.e., a decision plainly inconsistent with established
principles of local law.9" 6 To be sure, if a case otherwise fell within
the judicial power, Article III would not necessarily block review by
the Supreme Court or the lower federal courts on a question of local
law.977 However, none of these cases identify any way in which the
case falls within any of the categories of judicial power enumerated
in Article III.
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has construed its jurisdiction to
review by writ of certiorari the decisions of the Supreme Court of

' See Paul M. Bator, The Constitutionas Architecture: Legislative and Administrative
Courts UnderArticle 11I, 65 IND. L.J. 233, 242 (1990) (noting that Supreme Court has always
been court of final appellate review for territorial court decisions).
76 See De Castro v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 322 U.S. 451, 455-56 (1944).
If the rule thus announced by the insular court is one which is not plainly
inconsistent with established principles of the local law .... [iJt will be
rejected only on a clear showing that the rule applied by the local court
does violence to recognized principles of local law or established practices
of the local community.
Id.; Benot v. Texas Co., 308 U.S. 463, 470-71 (1940) C'[T]o justify reversal in [purely
territorial] such cases, the error must be clear or manifest; the interpretation must be
inescapably wrong; the decision must be patently erroneous."); Waialua Agric. Co. v.
Christian, 305 U.S. 91, 109 (1938) 'Unless there is clear departure from ordinary legal
principles, the preference of a federal court as to the correct rule of general or local law should
not be imposed upon Hawaii."); William W. Bierce, Ltd. v. Waterhouse, 219 U.S. 320, 338
(1911) (reversing decision of Supreme Court of Hawaii for clear error).
"' Cf. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 728 (1966) (ve are not prepared to
say that in the present case the District Court exceeded its discretion in proceeding to
judgment on the state claim."); Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738,
823 (1824) ("[When a question to which the judicial power of the Union is extended by the
constitution, forms an ingredient of the original cause, it is in the power of Congress to give
the Circuit Courts jurisdiction of that cause .... ).
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Guam as substantially broader than that of the United States
Supreme Court exercising jurisdiction over the decisions of state
courts by extending jurisdiction to pure questions of local Guamian
law,97 although it has thus far only granted certiorari in cases
raising federal questions."7 In addition, the Ninth Circuit has held
that it has jurisdiction to review the decisions of the non-Article III
appellate division of the District Court for the Northern Mariana
Islands reviewing the local courts of the Northern Mariana Islands,
even on questions of purely local law.98 Additionally, when Alaska
was still a territory and the Ninth Circuit had appellate jurisdiction
over the federal territorial court in Alaska, it claimed to have
jurisdiction to review de novo the decisions of the territorial court on
questions of territorial law.9 8 '
' See EIE Guam Corp. v. Supreme Court, 191 F.3d 1123,1125-27 (9th Cir. 1999) ("Unlike
the Supreme Court in its review of state court decisions, however, this circuit has authority
to review not only federal issues, but also all issues of local law."); see also Guam v. Fejeran,
687 F.2d 302, 306-07 (9th Cir. 1982) (deciding Guam case based on issues of Guam law);
Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Gems-By-Gordon, Inc., 649 F.2d 710, 712 (9th Cir. 1981)
(same); Gumataotao v. Guam, 322 F.2d 580, 582 (9th Cir. 1963) (same).
979 REP. OF THE PAC. ISLANDS COMM., supra note 930, at 6-7. Unlike its authority with
respect to the Supreme Court of Guam, however, the Ninth Circuit has construed its
jurisdiction to review the decisions of the Supreme Court of the Northern Mariana Islands
as limited to cases raising federal questions. See N. Mariana Islands v. Bowie, 243 F.3d 1109,
1111 (9th Cir. 2001) ("Ourjurisdiction over the appeals from judgments ofthe CNMI Supreme
Court is similar to United States Supreme Court's jurisdiction over the final judgments and
decrees of the highest state courts in cases involving the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the
United States."); Manglona v. Tenorio, No. 96-15259, 1997 WL 268384, at **1 (9th Cir. May
15, 1997) C"'hile the jurisdictional statute refers to 'all cases' .... we have construed the
statute to limit our jurisdiction on an issue-by-issue basis."). Cases that involve only the
Constitution or laws of the Northern Mariana Islands are not cases involving the laws of the
United States. Sablan v. Manglona, 938 F.2d 970, 971 (9th Cir. 1991). However, like the
Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit will review interpretations of local law where they are a
mere subterfuge designed to avoid federal review ofa federal constitutional violation. Sonoda
v. Cabrera, 189 F.3d 1047, 1050 (9th Cir. 1999).
'
See Camacho v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 666 F.2d 1257, 1259-62 (9th Cir. 1982) (citing
Corn v. Guam Coral.Co., 318 F.2d 622, 628 (9th Cir. 1963)).
'
See Carscadden v. Territory of Alaska, 105 F.2d 377, 382-83 (9th Cir. 1939).
The Supreme Court of the United States has never declared the "manifest
error' rule applicable to Alaska.... [WTe should continue to exercise our
independent judgment with respect to appeals from the District Court of
the Territory ofAlaska, on all questions, whether federal, general or local,
until required to 'abdicate' from that practice by a statute or a decision of
the Supreme Court of the United States to the contrary.
Id.; see also id. at 383 ("The settled practice in this court has been to exercise an independent
judgment with respect to both general and local questions, probably because of the chance of
conflicting decisions by the Alaska judges, without other remedy in the courts to avoid the
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In holding as it has, the Supreme Court appears to have taken
the argument that Article III does not limit the jurisdiction of nonArticle III territorial courts and extended it to appellate jurisdiction
over these non-Article III courts," 2 without stopping to consider the
fact that the lower Article III courts reviewing such territorial court
decisions and, indeed, the Supreme Court are themselves Article III
courts and thus presumably subject to the constraints of Article
MII.9"3 The Supreme Court has not carefully analyzed its authority
to exercise appellate jurisdiction over the decisions of territorial
courts, merely stating that its authority to do so is unquestioned. 98'

conflict.").

' See De la Rama v. De Ia Rama, 201 U.S. 303, 308 (1906) C'[The general rule ... has
no application to the jurisdiction of the territorial courts, or of the appellate jurisdiction of
this court over those courts .. "); Simms v. Simms, 175 U.S. 162, 167-68 (1899).
[Tihose considerations have no application to the jurisdiction of the courts
of a Territory, or to the appellate jurisdiction of this court over those
courts. In the Territories of the United States, Congress has the entire
dominion and sovereignty, national and local, Federal and state, and has
full legislative power over all subjects upon which the legislature of a
State might legislate within the State; and may, at its discretion, intrust
that power to the legislative assembly of a Territory.
Id.
See Sharon Elizabeth Rush, Domestic RelationsLaw: FederalJurisdictionand State
Sovereignty in Perspective,60 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 1, 4 n.16 (1984) ("Oddly, the Simms Court
did not address the fact that the Supreme Court was itself an article III court, even when
reviewing a territorial court's alimony award.").
See United States v. Coe, 155 U.S. 76, 84, 86 (1894).
[W]herever the United States exercise the power of government, whether
under specific grant or through the dominion and sovereignty of plenary
authority as over the Territories, that power includes the ultimate
executive, legislative, and judicial power, it follows that the judicial action
of all inferior courts established by Congress may, in accordance with the
Constitution, be subjected to the appellate jurisdiction of the supreme
judicial tribunal of the government. There has never been any question
in regard to this as applied to territorial courts.
Id. However, at issue in Coe was an appeal from the Court of Private Land Claims, a nonArticle III court established to adjudicate private land claims against the United States
government as to lands derived by the United States from Mexico within the western states
and territories. Id. at 84. Accordingly, this authority would have fallen within the Article IlI
power in any event as a suit against the United States government. U.S. CONST. art. I, §
2.
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On the other hand, the Supreme Court has elsewhere stated 9 5 or
indirectly suggested9 8 6 that the Court cannot review cases falling
outside of the judicial power as defined in Article III. Indeed, in two
cases involving review of the decisions of the District of Columbia
courts exercising administrative power, the Supreme Court held
that it was without jurisdiction to review those parts of the decisions
involving non-judicialpower.9 7 These cases can be distinguished on
See Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 696-97 (1992).
Ifihe Court has heard appeals from territorial courts involving divorce...
by hearing appeals from legislative, or Article I, courts, this Court
implicitly has made clear its understanding that the source of the
constraint on jurisdiction from Barberwas not Article I; otherwise the
Court itself would, have lacked jurisdiction over appeals from these
legislative courts.
Id.; Nal Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 387 U.S. 582, 642-43 (1949) (Vinson, C.J.,
dissenting).
The appellate jurisdiction of this Court is, in fact, dependent upon the fact
that the case reviewed is of a kind within the Art. III enumeration. That
article, after setting out the cases of which inferior courts may take
cognizance and the original jurisdiction of this Court, extends the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court only as far as "all the other
Cases before mentioned." ... We can no more review a legislative court's
decision of a case which is not among those enumerated in Art. I than
we can hear a case from a state court involving purely state law questions.
But a question under the Constitution and laws of the United States,
whether arising in a constitutional court, a state court, or a legislative
court may, under the Constitution, be a subject of this Court's appellate
jurisdiction.
Id.; Keller v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 261 U.S. 428, 444 (1923) (holding that Article I
restrictions relating to assignment of non-judicial functions to Article III courts apply with
equal force to Article III court sitting on appeal as they do to one sitting as court of nisi prius);
Cross, supra note 844, at 1195-96.
[A] Tidewaterproblem may exist even when a district court reviews a case
tried by the bankruptcy court. Although a non-Article III court sits as the
court of first instance, the underlying dispute still involves neither a
federal question nor diverse parties. Because there is little doubt that the
nine categories of Article III apply with equal force to both original and
appellate jurisdiction, the fact that the district court may be sitting as an
appellate court merely delays the point at which the state-law question is
presented to the Article I court and therefore cannot save the bankruptcy jurisdiction statutes from a Tidewater challenge.
Id.
s' See Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530,545 n.13 (1962) (plurality opinion) ("Far from
being 'incapable of receiving' federal-question jurisdiction, the territorial courts have long
exercised a jurisdiction commensurate in this regard with that of the regular federal courts
and have been subjected to the appellate jurisdiction of this Court precisely because they do
so.").
' See supra note 606 and accompanying text.

1048

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:895

the ground that they involved an exercise of non-judicial power, as
opposed to an exercise of judicial power falling outside of the
boundaries enumerated in Article III, but that seems to be a
distinction without a difference.
An attempt could be made to justify the exercise of appellate
jurisdiction by the Article III courts over the territorial courts based
on the theory of protective jurisdiction. The argument would be that
Congress's arguably greater plenary power to enact all substantive
law to govern disputes arising in the territories includes the lesser
power to allow the territorial governments to enact the substantive
law to govern such matters, while vesting the Article III federal
courts with jurisdiction over the disputes. Alternatively, the
Tidewater theory could be employed, to wit, that the arguably
greater power to create a distinct, non-Article III court with
appellate jurisdiction over the decisions of the territorial courts
includes the lesser power to instead vest the existing Article III
courts with such jurisdiction. 988
But there is a simpler way to justify review of the territorial
courts by Article III courts. First, a distinction must be drawn
between those territories and geographic areas in which local
territorial governments are enacting local law and those areas in
which no local legislature exists. In the case of appeals from the
consular courts in China9 89 and Japan,9 9 ° the U.S. Court for China9"'
*"8 Tidewater, 337 U.S. at 600.
989 See Act of June 22, 1860, ch. 179, § 4, 12 Stat. 72, 73.
[Jiurisdiction in criminal and civil matters shall, in all cases, be exercised
and enforced in conformity with the laws of the United States, which are
hereby, so far as is necessary to execute such treaties, respectively,
extended over all citizens of the United States in the said countries (and
over all others to the extent that the terms of the said treaties, respectively, justify or require, but in all cases where such laws are not adapted
to the object, or are deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish
suitable remedies, the common law, including equity and admiralty, shall
be extended in like manner over such citizens and others in the said
countries; and.... ifneither the common law, including equity and
admiralty, nor the statutes of the United States, furnish appropriate and
suitable remedies, the ministers in the said countries respectively, shall,
by decrees and regulations which shall have the force of law, supply such
defects and deficiencies.
Id.; Act of Aug. 11, 1848, ch. 150, § 4,9 Stat. 276,276 (containing substantially similar quote).
The "laws of the United States" included federal statutes of general application, although
these by themselves were incomplete, because state law is typically the source of law
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and the District of the Canal Zone,99 2 there is no Article III problem
because Congress either legislated directly for those areas, delegated to a government official the authority to enact regulations for
those areas, or provided by statute that such courts were to apply
federal common law to all disputes. Thus, in such cases, the dispute
could truly be said to "arise under" federal law because federal law
provided the rule of decision.99 It is true that Congress has
specified that any federal statutes made applicable solely to the
District of Columbia do not "arise under" federal law for purposes of
section 133 1. 94 However, that is simply a matter of statutory

"arising under" jurisdiction, and the laws enacted by Congress
specifically for the District of Columbia, as well as those enacted by
Congress specifically for the territories, clearly "arise under" federal
law for Article III purposes. 95 Likewise, the Supreme Court has

governing crimes, contracts, domestic relations, torts, and the like. SeeFARE.AM.BARASS'N,
UNITED STATES COURT FOR CHINA DECENNIAL ANNIVERSARY BROCHURE 22-23 (1916)
(describing inadequacy of federal law in certain cases); LOBINGIER, supranote 15, at 1 (same);
Dunnell, supra note 694, at 836-37. However, the phrase has been construed to include
special acts of Congress creating civil and criminal codes to govern the District of Columbia
and the individual territories. Biddle v. United States, 156 F. 759,762 (9th Cir. 1907). This
principle was later extended to include civil codes created for the District of Columbia and the
territories. See LOBINGIER, supra, at 13 (quoting United States Court for China discussion
of federally created Civil Codes in Alaska and District of Columbia). Where more than one
such act of Congress covers the same subject, the later enacted statute governs. See id. at 1314. The "common law" refers to the common law of the American colonies as it stood in 1789.
Biddle, 156 F. at 762. In addition to the difficulty of determining what the common law was
in 1789, applying those common law rules-with their often harsh outcomes-to events
taking place in modem China would lead to odd results, and American consuls frequently
refused to apply such common law rules on the ground that they were il-adapted to modem
conditions. FAR E. AM. BAR ASS'N, supra, at 23; Dunnell, supra, at 837. This resulted in
recourse to the final alternative, decrees of the United States minister. See generally
Dunnell, supra note 694, at 838-39.
9 See Act ofJune 22, 1860, ch. 179, § 4,12 Stat. 72, 73 (describing jurisdiction of consular
courts in China and Japan).
99 See Act of June 30, 1906, ch. 3934, § 4, 34 Stat. 814 (desdribing original and appellate
jurisdiction of U.S. Court for China); Biddle, 156 F. at 760-61.
See United States v. Husband R. (Roach), 453 F.2d 1054, 1057-58 (5th Cir. 1971)
(discussing law and government of Canal Zone).
-'
See, e.g., HusbandR. (Roach), 453 F.2d at 1058-59 (deriving rulemaking authority of
government of Canal Zone from federal law); Biddle, 156 F. at 760-61 (deriving rule of
decision in United States Court for China from federal law).
' See 28U.S.C. § 1366 (1994) ('For the purposes of this chapter, references to laws of the
United States or Acts of Congress do not include laws applicable exclusively to the District
of Columbia.").
9 See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 424 (1821).
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held that, as a matter of policy, it will defer in its exercise of
appellate jurisdiction over the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
on matters of local concern,996 including its interpretation of federal
statutes made applicable by Congress solely to the District of
Columbia, except for exceptional situations where an egregious error
has been committed.997 However, the Court has made clear that this
is a matter of policy only, and that review of such issues clearly falls
within the scope of its Article III "arising under" jurisdiction. 99
In other instances, Congress has provided that the laws of a
particular state will apply throughout a territory. Thus, for
example, Congress provided by statute that the laws of Virginia and
Maryland, as they existed at the time of the cession of land from
those states to the federal government to form the District of
Columbia, would apply to the District of Columbia;99 that the laws

In the enumeration of the powers of Congress ... we find that of
exercising exclusive legislation over such District as shall become the seat
of government ....
In legislating for the District, they necessarily
preserve the character of the legislature of the Union; for, it is in that
character alone that the constitution confers on them this power of
exclusive legislation.
Id.; Cross, supra note 844, at 1200 n.43.
The United States Congress serves as the primary legislative body for the
District. The statutory law for the District is accordingly federal law. A
lawsuit brought under District of Columbia statutory law is therefore a
federal question for purposes of Article III. Of course, such actions may
not be brought in federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the general federal
question statute. ...
Section 1366, however, is merely a statutory
limitation. It does not-and could not-define the breadth of an Article
III federal question. Because itis a constitutional federal question, a case
brought under District of Columbia statutory law presents no... problem,
even though it does not qualify under the general federal question
jurisdiction statute. A similar result would apply in the territorial courts.
No... concerns are presented by a federal court adjudicating a lawsuit
brought under a law passed by Congress for the territories. Both Article
III and non-Article III courts may hear these matters as constitutional
federal questions.
Id.
Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 366 (1974).
IId. at 367.
See Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 687-88 (1980) ('[T]he approach described
in the Pernellopinion is a matter ofjudicial policy, not a matter of judicial power.").
9" Act of Feb. 27, 1801, ch. 15, § 1, 2 Stat. 103, 103-105. This, in part, remains the rule
today. Act of Mar. 3, 1901, ch. 854, § 1, 31 Stat. 1189, 1189 (codified at D.C. CODEANN. § 45401 (2001)).
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of Oregon would apply in the Territory of Alaska;"0 0 that the laws
of Nebraska would apply in the Territory of Oklahoma;' 0 0 ' and that
the laws of Arkansas would apply in Indian Territory. 1 2 More
generally, Congress has provided that the laws of the state in which
003
federal property is located will apply on that federal property.
Although at first glance suits brought pursuant to such state laws
would seem to arise under state law, this is an instance of federal
incorporation. Under Article IV, Section 3, Congress has plenary
authority to legislate with respect to all matters in the territories.
Yet instead of legislating in detail, Congress often takes shortcuts
by borrowing provisions from existing state codes and applying them
to the territories. Such incorporated state law is federal law, at
10 0 4
least for Article III purposes.
However, those laws enacted by the local legislatures themselves
would seem to stand on somewhat of a different footing,'00 5 and the
question arises whether purely local territorial law, enacted by the
local territorial legislature, is federal law for purposes of Article III.
Although some courts have held that cases involving purely
territorial law do not "arise under" federal law within the meaning
of section 1331,006 those cases are merely interpreting section 1331,
not Article 11I.1"7 Using the federal ingredient theory of Osborn,

00 Act of May 17, 1884, ch. 53, § 7, 23 Stat. 24, 25-26.
'0' Act of May 2, 1890, ch. 182, § 11, 26 Stat. 81, 87.
10w Id. § 31, 26 Stat. at 94-95.

Act of Mar. 3, 1825, ch. 65, § 3, 4 Stat. 115, 115.
720-49 and accompanying text (noting that state law applied in cases
originating in Yellowstone National Park actually arises under federal law for Article III
purposes).
100 See Cross,supra note 844, at 1200 n.43.
Several of the territories have their own legislative bodies, which have the
power to enact substantive law. Although most of these legislative bodies
were created by Congress, suits based upon local territorial law do not
qualify as Article I federal questions .... In addition, the District of
Columbia and territorial courts may adjudicate purely common-law
claims, which similarly present no federal question ....
Id.
100 See, e.g., Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., 288 U.S. 476, 483-84 (1933) (holding case
involving purely territorial law did not present federal question); Manglona v. Tenorio, No.
96-1529a, 1997 WL 268384, at **1 & n.1 (9th Cir. May 15, 1997) (same); Dennis v. Figueroa,
642 F. Supp. 959, 961-62 (D.P.R. 1986) (same).
" See Nal Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 614-15 (1949)
(Rutledge, J., concurring) (noting that decision in Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co. involved
00

1004 See supranote
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one could certainly argue that local territorial law "arises under"
federal law for Article III purposes. Just like the Bank of the
United States, 00 8 the territorial governments are created by and
given all of their powers by Congress. Thus, in every case involving
territorial law, the question arises as to whether the territorial
government has the authority to enact such a law. This is an
original federal ingredient sufficient to say that such a case "arises
under" federal law for purposes of Article III.1009
5. Erie and the Territories. The Rules of Decision Act, also
known as section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, provides that "[t]he
laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or treaties
of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or
provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the
courts of the United States, in cases where they apply."1 10 This
statute was originally construed by the Supreme Court as requiring
federal courts sitting in diversity (or exercising supplemental
jurisdiction over state law claims) to apply only state statutory law,
state court decisions interpreting state statutes, and state court
decisions on questions of so-called "local" law, such as rights and
title to real estate and other matters immovable and intraterritorial
in character or nature. Federal courts were not otherwise required
to follow state court decisions--even those of the state's highest
court---on matters of general law not codified by state statute, such
as tort and contract matters.1 1
In ErieRailroadCo. v. Tompkins,0 1 2 the Supreme Court reversed
course, holding that federal courts sitting in diversity or exercising

interpretation of statutory grant of federal question jurisdiction to federal courts, and not
meaning of "arising under" as contained in Article III).
I&"8 See supra notes 829-41 and accompanying text.
''
See Gary Lawson, TerritorialGovernments and the Limits of Formalism, 78 CAL. L.
REv. 853, 896 (1990).
Like the Bank of the United States, territorial governments are "entirely
the creation of Congress." All their powers flow from the relevant organic
statutes; they cannot so much as enter into contracts without congressional authorization. It would seem that all their laws-indeed all their acts
and decisions-arise under the laws of the United States.

Id.
"

28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1994).
Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).

1012

304 U.S. 64 (1938).

1010
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supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims must follow state
court decisions on all matters of state substantive law.' 0 13 The Erie
Court expressed concern that under existing practice, the rule of
decision-and consequently the outcome of the case-could turn on
whether the suit could be brought in or removed to federal court
based on diversity or supplemental jurisdiction. Thus, the outcome
could be different for the same set of facts depending on the
citizenship of the parties and the amount in controversy.1 14
By its terms, the Rules of Decision Act does not apply to a federal
court applying territorial law, for it refers only to the laws of the
"States."'0 15 However, the Supreme Court has held that the policy
arguments marshaled in the Erie decision weigh in favor of
deferring to the territorial courts on matters of territorial law.' 16
Accordingly, the Court has held that a federal court sitting in
diversity applying territorial law should follow the decisions of the
territorial courts except for those instances in which it believes that
17
the territorial courts have made a "manifest" or "clea" error. 1
1013 Id.

at 78.
See id. at 74-75 (noting "rights enjoyed under the unwritten 'general law' vary
according to whether enforcement was sought in the state or in the federal court?).
101528 U.S.C. § 1652.
1016 De Castro v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 322 U.S. 451, 452-59 (1944); Waialua Agric. Co. v.
Christian, 305 U.S. 91, 108-10 (1938).
1017See De Castro, 322 U.S. at 452-59.
Nor does it follow that the deference due, on appeals from the local
tribunals, to their understanding of matters of local concern will lead to
the establishment of a local law differing from that developed in decisions
in appeals from the federal district courts sitting in our insular possessions. It is not any the less the duty of the federal courts in cases pending
in the federal district court or on appeal from it to defer to that understanding, when it has found expression in the judicial pronouncements of
the insular courts.... Once understood what deference is to be paid, the
problem is comparable to that presented when, upon appeals from federal
district courts sitting in the states, the federal appellate courts are
required to follow state law under the rule of [Erie].
Id. While the lower federal courts have routinely followed this rule, e.g., Abuan v. Gen. Elec.
Co., 1992 WL 535958, at *1 (D. Guam Feb. 25, 1992) (As a federal court sitting in diversity,
the Court must apply Guam substantive law."), there appears to be an exception in the
District Court of the Virgin Islands. That District Court has reasoned that it is not bound to
predict local law when sitting in diversity, because it has been vested by the Virgin Islands
code with authority to decide novel questions of Virgin Islands law as a local trial court. See
Spink v. Gen. Acc. Ins. Co. of Puerto Rico, Ltd., 36 F. Supp. 2d 689, 691 & n.6 (D.V.I. 1999)
("The judicial power of the Territory is vested in... the Tistrict Court ofthe Virgin Islands,'
and in a court of local jurisdiction to be designated the 'Territorial Court of the Virgin
1014
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IV. PROPOSALS FOR RESOLVING THE PROBLEM

Part II of this Article catalogued the "no forum" and "biased
forum" problems that exist in Indian Law cases, 0 18 and Part III of
this Article examined ways in which Congress has resolved similar
"no forum" and "biased forum" problems in analogous circumstances. 1 9 Accordingly, this Part applies the lessons derived from
Part III to the problem identified in Part II.
A. CREATE SPECIALIZED, NON-ARTICLE I COURTS FOR INDIAN
RESERVATIONS

One option for resolving the "no forum" and "biased forum"
problems in Indian Law is for Congress to create specialized, nonArticle III federal courts to adjudicate disputes arising in Indian
Country. Since such specialized courts would not be created
pursuant to Article III, Congress would be able to vest such courts
with jurisdiction over any matter. Thus, for example, creating a
specialized federal court could provide for jurisdiction over disputes
between two members of an Indian tribe arising in Indian Country
where the tribe has not yet created its own tribal court. Moreover,
such a court could exercise jurisdiction over civil disputes between
an Indian and a non-Indian arising in Indian Country and could
provide for removal of such suits from tribal and state courts to such
a specialized federal court to avoid concerns of local court bias.
1. Source of Authority. Congress's plenary authority to regulate
Indians and Indian affairs is derived from three sources: the Indian
Commerce Clause," 20 the Treaty Clause, 0 2 ' and the Territory
Islands.").
1O18 See supra notes 71-603 and accompanying text.
1019See supranotes 604-1017 and accompanying text.
102 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ('[The Congress shall have Power] [t]o regulate
Commerce ... with the Indian Tribes.'); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551-52 (1974)
("Article I, § 8, cl. 3, provides Congress with the power to 'regulate commerce ... with the
Indian Tribes,' and thus, to this extent, singles Indians out as a proper subject for separate
legislation."); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217,219 n.4 (1959) C(The Federal Governmenes power
over Indians is derived from Art. I, § 8, cl. 3 of the United States Constitution.").
102' See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, d. 2 ("[The President] shall have Power, by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators
present concur .... "); Morton, 417 U.S. at 551-52 (stating power to regulate Indian tribes
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Clause. 12 2 Parallels to courts in foreign countries can be drawn.
Just as the combination of the Foreign Commerce Clause and the
Treaty Clause justify the creation of specialized federal courts
abroad, such as the U.S. Court for China,0 28 so the combination of
the Indian Commerce Clause and the Treaty Clause justify the
creation of such specialized federal courts for Indian Country.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has recognized that Indian reservations set aside for the Indians by the federal government are
territory within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal
government.10 24 Thus, just as Congress has the authority to create
Article IV territorial courts in the formal territories, so it should
have like authority to create such courts for Indian reservations.
Indeed, the U.S. Court in Indian Territory, which exercised
jurisdiction over civil disputes arising in Indian Country, was
identified and implicitly approved of as a non-Article III court by the
Supreme Court.0 25
Creating specialized, non-Article III courts to adjudicate disputes
in Indian Country would comport with the Supreme Court's holding
in NorthernPipelineConstructionCo. v. MarathonPipeLine Co." 26
that Congress has the authority to create non-Article III courts for
geographic enclaves over which Congress exercises plenary control,
such as the District of Columbia and the Territories. 27 Indeed, the
Northern Pipeline Court cited with approval its prior decision
recognizing the U.S. Court in Indian Territory as a non-Article III
court.1028

derived in part from "the war and treaty powers"); McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n ofAriz.,
411 U.S. 164, 172 n.7 (1973) (discussing federal power to regulate Indian tribes).
" See U.S. CONST. art. IV,§ 3, cl. 2 ("The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and
make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging
to the United States."); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375,379-80 (1886) (stating Indians

are under federal regulation because they "are within the geographical limits of the United
States"); United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567, 571-72 (1846) (holding Cherokees

controlled and occupied territory "with the assent of the United States, and under their
authority").
10" See supra notes 716-19 and accompanying text.
'o" See supra note 1022 and accompanying text.
"o' See supra note 795 and accompanying text.
102 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
io Id. at 64-65, 75-76.
low Id. at 65 n.16.
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Could Congress go a step further and vest such specialized courts
with jurisdiction over any dispute involving an Indian or an Indian
tribe, regardless of whether such disputes arose within or outside of
Indian Country? Here, Congress's authority is not nearly as clear.
The Northern Pipelineplurality recognized that Congress's authority to create non-Article III courts for geographic enclaves was an
exception to the "constitutional command that the judicial power of
the United States must be vested in Art. III courts."'" 29 The
plurality identified two other situations in which Congress is able
to create non-Article III courts: military courts and courts to
adjudicate public rights disputes.0 3 ° To the extent such specialized
courts are adjudicating matters arising in Indian Country itself,
they would seem to fall within the first exception identified in
Northern Pipeline,but to the extent they extend to private disputes
arising elsewhere throughout the United States, they would not.
The Northern Pipeline court rejected the argument that Congress
could, pursuant to its Article I powers, create non-Article III courts
whenever it found that to be necessary.'0 3'
However, the Northern Pipelineplurality spoke generally of the
three identified exceptions as "each recognizing a circumstance in
which the grant of power to the Legislative and Executive Branches
was historically and constitutionally so exceptional that the
congressional assertion of a power to create legislative courts was
consistent with, rather than threatening to, the constitutional
mandate of separation of powers. " '... To be sure, the authority of
Congress and the Executive over Indians and Indian affairs has
historically been viewed as "extraordinarily broad."'0 3 3 Thus the
ability of Congress to create non-Article III courts might seem to fall
within this broadly defined exception to the general rule requiring
that private law disputes be adjudicated in Article III courts.
Moreover, in subsequent cases, the Supreme Court has moved away
from the Northern Pipeline plurality's general rule that private
rights disputes should be adjudicated in Article III courts, endorsing
1029

Id. at 63-64.

Id. at 66-67.
1'3'Id. at 73.
'm

1032
103

Id. at 64.
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 72 (1978).
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instead a balancing test that weighs the reasons Congress had for
creating such a non-Article III court against the values underlying
Article IIrs Tenure and Compensation Clauses.1034
In addition, it is not clear that Congress's Article I authority over
the District of Columbia, or its Article IV authority over the
territories, limits its authority to provide a non-Article III forum to
cases arising within the District of Columbia or the territories. In
Tidewater,'0 35 the Court recognized-and the parties seemed to
agree-that Congress had the authority to create a non-Article III
federal forum to adjudicate disputes involving citizens of the District
of Columbia regardless of whether they arose in the District itself
or elsewhere in the United States.'0 36 Thus, it would seem that
Congress could, using similar logic, create a federal forum to
adjudicate disputes involving Indian tribes, tribal entities, or tribal
members regardless of where they arose in the United States. In
any event, as will be demonstrated below, even if Congress lacks the
authority to create non-Article III courts to adjudicate Indian law
disputes arising outside of Indian Country, there are numerous
other ways of ensuring that such disputes are adjudicated in a
federal forum.
2. Structure of Courts. As demonstrated above, when Congress
has found it necessary to create federal courts to adjudicate disputes
arising in the territories, it has employed a variety of different
models.' 3
Some territories-particularly the western territories-required courts of general jurisdiction to adjudicate all
disputes, as they had no existing local court systems in place. Other
territories, such as Hawaii, already had well-developed judicial
systems in place and required nothing more than a federal court
with the ability to adjudicate federal question, diversity and similar
cases.

"s See generally CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 847.48 (1986) (stating constitutionality of
non-Article I court is determined by reference to purposes underlying requirements of
Article IH); Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568,587 (1985) ("[Plractical
attention to substance rather than doctrinaire reliance on formal categories should inform
application of Article IM).
337 U.S. 582 (1949).
o Id. at 590, 600-03.
o See supranotes 605-56 and accompanying text.
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What is true for the territories is likewise true for the various
Indian reservations across the United States. Tribal judicial
systems can range from very sophisticated to very unsophisticated,
and indeed, as was demonstrated above in the "no-forum" cases,0 38
may not exist at all. On the sophisticated end, the Navajo Nation's
court system consists of seven district courts, a children's court, a
peacemaker court, and an appellate court, and adjudicates tens of
thousands of cases per year; the Nation also has a published tribal
code and its own caselaw reporter. °" 9 Thus in attempting to solve
the "no forum" and "biased forum" problems, care must be taken to
encourage and respect tribal sovereignty, to preserve the existing
tribal court systems, and to encourage the future development of
tribal court systems.
Accordingly, it makes the most sense in creating specialized, nonArticle III courts for Indian Country to model them after the
"transitional" federal courts created for the Virgin Islands, the
Northern Mariana Islands, and Guam. 140 Such courts can be vested
with permanent original as well as removal jurisdiction over the
typical cases adjudicated in Article III federal district courts, such
as federal question and diversity cases. In addition, such courts can
be vested with such general jurisdiction as is not then vested in the
local tribal courts. This sort of a scheme would ensure that there
are no gaps in jurisdiction while a tribe is in the process of developing its own judicial system, eliminating the "no forum" problem
while at the same time preserving tribal sovereignty and giving
tribes an incentive to create their own judicial systems.
Even in the case of tribes with fully developed judicial systems,
such as the Navajo Nation, such non-Article III courts will still
exercise jurisdiction, including removal jurisdiction, over federal
question and diversity cases, with the latter being defined to include
disputes between an Indian and a non-Indian (which is permissible,
as a non-Article III court is not subject to the formal limitations on
subject matter jurisdiction imposed by Article III). Even if defen-

10"s See supra notes 182-86 and accompanying text.
1039 REPORT OF THE U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS AcT 32-33
(1991).
lW See supra notes 641-56 and accompanying text.
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dants opt not to remove such cases to the specialized federal court,
the mere ability to remove such cases would alleviate some of the
10 41
concerns expressed by the Supreme Court in Nevada v. Hicks,
and would thus blunt efforts by the Court to continue narrowly
construing the adjudicative jurisdiction of the tribal courts.
Another question that arises is whether it really makes sense to
create a different specialized federal court for each reservation given
the number of reservations in the United States and the cost of
creating new courts. The Navajo Nation-extending as it does over
four states and having a substantial population and
caseload-might justify the creation of a separate federal court.
However, there are many smaller tribes scattered throughout the
United States with populations of only a few hundred people that
likely generate a very small number of cases each year. 0 4' For such
reservations, the United States Tax Court provides a useful model.
Congress created the United States Tax Court as an Article I
legislative court'0 48 to adjudicate disputes between taxpayers and
the U.S. government. The judges of the Tax Court, appointed by the
President with the advice and consent of the Senate, 10 44 serve for a
term of 15 years. 0 45 While the Tax Court is based in the District0 of
46
Columbia, it may sit anywhere throughout the United States,
and, by statute, it is supposed to schedule its sessions so as to
enable taxpayers to appear before it with as little expense as
possible." 47 Accordingly, the Tax Court rides circuit throughout the
United States, hearing cases in different federal courthouses
throughout the country. 41 In like fashion, Congress could create a
non-Article III United States Court for Indian Country, which could
ride circuit throughout the country, sitting in various federal courts
throughout the nation according to a schedule and adjudicating
cases arising in Indian Country.
1i01 See supra notes 498-603 and accompanying text.
102 See generally GaTcHEs ETAL., supra note 17, at 8-9.
104 I.R.C. § 7441 (1994).
104 Id. § 7443(b).
100 Id. § 7443(e).
1'0 Id. § 7445.

1047 Id. § 7446.
"s See T.C.R. 140, reprinted in I.R.C. app. (1994) (outlining places of trial for cases tried
in Tax Court).
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B. USE OF EXISTING, ARTICLE III COURTS

While it is certainly possible to create specialized, non-Article III
courts to adjudicate Indian law cases, such a scheme presents
several difficulties. First, it is expensive, even if Congress were to
choose to follow the Tax Court model. Moreover, as indicated above,
although it seems certain that Congress has the constitutional
authority to create such courts to adjudicate disputes arising in
Indian Country, it is less certain whether it has like authority to
create such courts to adjudicate such disputes arising outside of
Indian Country. Accordingly, this section proposes a number of
changes that Congress could enact that make use of the existing
Article III federal courts already in place throughout the country.
1. Modify the Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule. As shown above,
under current law, when an Indian tribe is sued in state court and
it raises the federal defense of tribal sovereign immunity, the wellpleaded complaint rule bars removal of the case from state to federal
court, forcing the Indian tribe to litigate the issue of sovereign
immunity all the way through the state court system, with the
possibility of federal court review only by way of a petition for a writ
of certiorari to the Supreme Court. 10 49 This is so even when a tribe
is sued by the state itself or by an arm of the state, thus raising
concerns that the forum adjudicating the dispute is not a neutral
one. 1 50 Accordingly, if sued in a state court, an Indian tribe should
be able to remove the suit to federal court by raising the federal
defense of tribal sovereign immunity.
As demonstrated above, the well-pleaded complaint rule is not
constitutionally required, but is merely a gloss on the "arising
under" jurisdiction of section 1331.'051 Thus, Congress can modify
it as it pertains to Indian tribes. The simplest way to achieve this
result is to modify section 1362 so that it applies to suits in which
an Indian tribe is a plaintiff or a defendant and where the federal
issue arises by way of either a well-pleaded complaint or as a

'049

See supra notes 492-95 and accompanying text.

"o See, e.g., Okla. Tax Corm'n v. Graham, 489 U.S. 838, 841 (1989).
. Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 494-95 (1983); Osborn v. Bank of
the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 819 (1824).
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defense. Accordingly, when suit is brought against an Indian tribe
in state court, the tribe can remove the case to federal court and
01 5 2
have the suit adjudicated in a federal forum in the first instance.
In the special case of a suit being brought against the tribe by a
state, a question arises whether providing for removal of such cases
from state to federal court is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
Yet it seems fairly clear that when a state brings a suit against
someone in state court that raises a federal question in a wellpleaded complaint, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar the
defendant's removing the case to federal court.0 53 A like result
should apply where the federal issue comes in as a defense, since
the well-pleaded complaint rule is not constitutionally required.
Although a few courts have suggested that the Eleventh Amendment bars removal of suits brought by the state against someone in
state court, this language is arguably dicta as none of those cases
involved a federal question, and all were decided on the alternative
ground that a state is not a citizen of a state for purposes of
diversity jurisdiction. 5 4
2. Define Indian Tribes as Citizens of the State in Whose Borders
They Are Located. As indicated above, the federal courts have for
the most part declined to exercise diversity jurisdiction over suits
involving Indian tribes on the ground that Indian tribes are not
citizens of any state for purposes of the diversity statute. Yet the
Court has previously deemed other sovereign entities located within
states-such as counties and school boards-to be citizens of the
states in which they are located for purposes of diversity jurisdic-

2 Indeed, such a modification of the well-pleaded complaint rule need not be limited to

suits involving Indian tribes: it could apply to any dispute between a tribal member or tribal
entity on the one hand and a non-Indian on the other.
"3 See Illinois v. City ofMilwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 101 (1972) (citing Ames v. Kansas, 111
U.S. 449 (1884)) ([W]here a state is suing parties who are not other states.., those suits
may be brought in or removed to [federal court]."); Regents of Univ. of Minn. v. Glaxo
Wellcome, Inc., 58F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1039 (D. Minn. 1999) (holding Eleventh Amendment did
not bar removal of action to federal court).
10" See Moore ex rel. Mississippi v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 900 F. Supp. 26, 30-31 (S.D. Miss.
1995); California v. Steelcase, Inc., 792 F. Supp. 84,87 (C.D. Cal. 1992). While it is clear that
a state is not a citizen of a state for purposes of the diversity statute, the cases so holding are
grounded on the diversity statute and not Article III itself, so it is not entirely clear that
Congress lacks authority to define a state as a citizen of a state if it so chooses. Postal Tel.
Cable Co. v. Alabama, 155 U.S. 482, 487 (1894).
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tion. 55 Additionally, Congress has defined corporations as citizens
of both the states in which they are located and the state in which
they have their principal place of business," 5 6 and the Court has
upheld Congress's ability to so define corporate citizenship."" 7
Moreover, at least one lower court has recognized Congress's
authority to define a tribe as a citizen of the state within whose
borders the tribe is located. 1 58
Such a scheme, however, would only partially solve the "biased
forum" problem. Undoubtedly, most disputes between a tribe on the
one hand and non-Indians on the other will involve either nonIndians who are residents of the same state in which the reservation
is located or a governmental entity located in that state. There will
thus not be diversity jurisdiction except in those instances in which
suit is brought by or against a citizen of a different state.
3. Define Indian Tribes as "States"for Diversity Purposes. As
demonstrated above, where a dispute is between a citizen of a state
on the one hand and a member of an Indian tribe located within the
same state, there is no diversity jurisdiction under the diversity
statute as it is currently defined. 5 9 Thus, even if Congress (or the
Supreme Court) makes clear that federal district courts can exercise
diversity jurisdiction notwithstanding the tribal abstention rule
announced in LaPlantewhere no forum otherwise exists, that would
only partially solve the problem; in non-diversity cases, the parties
0 60
would still be left without a forum.

Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 720 (1973).
28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (1994).
'
United Steelworkers v. R.H. Bouligny, Inc., 382 U.S. 145, 152-53 (1965).
,os See Akins v. Penobscot Nation, 130 F.3d 482, 485 (1st Cir. 1997) ("Although Indian
"'

'6

tribes are not usually subject to the diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts, ...
the
Settlement Act subjects the Maine tribes to diversity jurisdiction.' "). See also Ninigret Dev.
Corp. v. Narragansett Indian Wetuomuck Hous. Auth., 32 F. Supp. 2d 497, 502 (D.R.I. 1999)
('Perhaps the Narragansett Tribe could be considered a citizen of Rhode Island for diversity
jurisdiction under the Rhode Island Indian Claims Settlement Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1708."). Of
course, Congress might have to be more specific in the case of certain tribes. The Navajo
reservation, for example, is located within four states-Utah, Colorado, Arizona, and New
Mexico.
1059 See, e.g., Poitra v. Demarrias, 502 F.2d 23, 29 (8th Cir. 1974).
"oso See Frank Pommersheim & Terry Pechota, Tribal Immunity, Tribal Courtsand the
FederalSystem: EmergingContours and Frontiers,31 S.D. L. REV. 553, 572 (1986).
In each case, if the plaintiff was a resident of the state in which the
reservation was located, diversity would be defeated but there would also
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One way to solve this problem, at least in the case of disputes
between tribal members and non-members, as well as to rectify the
biased forum problem, would be to define each of the Indian tribes
throughout the United States as "States" for purposes of diversity
jurisdiction. As indicated above, Congress has defined the term
"States" in the diversity statute as including the territories, the

District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico. 1 61 The Supreme Court and
the lower federal courts have upheld Congress's authority to do so
on the grounds that they are in fact "States" within the meaning of
the Diversity Clause and that the greater power to create nonArticle III courts includes the lesser power to vest the existing
016 2
Article III courts with jurisdiction.

be no access to state court [in non-Public Law 280 states]. Therefore, in
these circumstances, non-resident plaintiffs have access to federal court
but resident plaintiffs are denied access to federal and state court. A more
discriminatory result is hard to-imagine.
Id.; Jean Pendleton, supra note 52, at 544.
While these courts have found that exercising diversity jurisdiction when
possible is essential in a "no forum" situation to avoid discrimination
against plaintiffs with bona-fide substantive claims, a diversity forum only
solves half the problem. A plaintiff residing in the state in which the
reservation-based claim arose, lacking diversity of citizenship, would still
remain without a forum ....The solution to this "no forum" situation
would appear to be legislative. Congress, in that event, would have to
create a federal forum for plaintiffs residing outside of the reservation but
in the same state. This is the least satisfactory solution given the speed
at which Congress acts, when and if it acts at all.
Id.; Pommersheim, supra note 56, at 350.
Any application of the diversity doctrine in the tribal court jurisdiction
situation has potentially discriminatory effects. Diversity jurisdiction is
premised on the notion that instate plaintiffs have ready, ifnot favorable,
access to state forums, and diversity jurisdiction allows a non-resident
plaintiff access to a more neutral federal forum. But this scheme breaks
down in the context of diversity in the tribal court situation because no
plaintiff has access to a state forum. The result is that one class of
plaintiffs (non-residents of the state in which the reservation is located)
will have access to federal court while another class ofplaintiffs (residents
of the state in which the reservation is located) will have access to neither
federal nor state court. It is highly unlikely that federal courts can ratify
the use of diversity jurisdiction given that it leads to such unfair and
discriminatory results.
Id.
'0o' 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d).
1062 See supra notes 842-68 and accompanying text.
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Yet whatever ambivalence the Constitution may have to treating
the District of Columbia and the Territories as "States" for purposes
of the Diversity Clause, the Constitution seems outright hostile to
the prospect of treating Indian Tribes, located within the boundaries
of existing states, as "States" for any purpose. The Admissions
Clause of the Constitution provides that "no new State shall be
formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any
State be formed by the Junction of two or more States, or Parts of
States, without the Consent of the Legislatures of the States
concerned as well as of the Congress." 01 63 The purpose of this clause
was both to appease larger states with significant western land
holdings, such as Georgia, North Carolina, and Virginia, that feared
they would be divided into multiple states without their consent and
to appease smaller states against the risk of a junction of smaller
states (and thus a diminution of their power) without their
consent.0 6 4 Indeed, when the Cherokee Nation adopted a constitution modeled after the U.S. Constitution on July 4, 1827, proponents
of removing the Indians westward decried this as an effort by the
Cherokee Nation to erect a state within a state, in contravention of
10 6 5
the Admissions Clause.
'3

U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1.

1064

2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 461-69 (Max Farrand ed., 1937)

(providingJames Madison's record of Federal Convention from Aug. 30, 1787); Luther Martin,
The Genuine InformationDelivered to the Legislatureof the State of MarylandRelative to the
Proceedingsof the GeneralConventionLately Held atPhiladelphia,in 2 THE COMPLETEANTIFEDERALIST 72-75 (Herbert L. Storing ed., 1981); THE FEDERALIST No. 43 (Madison) (Henry
Cabot Lodge ed., 1888) ("The particular precaution against the erection of new States, by the
partition of a State without its consent, quiets the jealousy of the larger States; as that of the
smaller is quieted by a like precaution, against the junction of States without their consent.");
JOSEPH STORY, 3 COMMENTARIES ONTHE CONSTITUTION OFTHE UNITED STATES § 1313(1833).
10'5

See J.P. KINNEY, A CONTINENT LOST-A CIVLIZATION WON: INDIAN LAND TENURE IN

AMERICA 54-55 (1975) ("It was represented that [the preparation and adoption of a
constitution] by the Cherokee was an effort to set up an independent nation within the
sovereign State of Georgia. These critics of the Cherokee quoted in support of their position
Section 3 of Article IV of the Federal Constitution."). See also FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA,

AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY INTHE FORMATIVE YEARS: THE INDIAN TRADE AND INTERCOURSE
ACTS 1790-1834 237-238 (1962).
The Constitution forbade the erection of a new state within the territory
of an existing state without that state's permission .... On these grounds,
[President Jackson] told Congress, he had informed the Indians that their
attempt to establish an independent government [within the boundaries
of Georgia and Alabama] would not be counteranced by the Executive of
the United States.
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It would seem as though the meaning of "States" as used in
Article IV is the same as the meaning of the word "States" as used
in describing the "judicial power" in Article IM."66 It would thus
seem that Congress could not simply create diversity jurisdiction
over disputes between a citizen of a state and a member of an Indian
tribe located within the boundaries of that state merely by defining
the reservation as a "State" for purposes of the diversity statute, as
it has done for the territories and the District of Columbia. 10 6 7 The
distinction between Indian tribes on the one hand and the territories and the District of Columbia on the other is pronounced: while
the former are located within the boundaries of existing states, the
latter are not, and thus the former could not be deemed to be
"States" in the sense in which that term is used in the Constitution
without the consent of the states within which those Indian tribes
are located.
Thus, one would seem to be able to rely only on the alternative
rationale employed by the Tidewater court: that, in essence, the
greater the power to create a specialized non-Article III court to
adjudicate such disputes justifies the lesser power of vesting the
existing Article III courts with jurisdiction to adjudicate such
disputes." 6 8 As demonstrated above, Congress would seem to have
the authority to create specialized non-Article III courts to adjudicate disputes between Indians and non-Indians, at least when those
disputes arise in Indian Country."6 9 Accordingly, it would seem as
though this would fit within the Tidewater rationale, to the extent
that rationale is a valid one. However, as shown above, that
rationale garnered only three votes,' 70 and the decision was only
sustained because two justices believed the District of Columbia to
Id.

06 C. Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 620 & n.14 (1949)
(Rutledge, J., concurring).
067 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (1994) (The word'States', as used in this section, includes the
Territories, the District of Columbia, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico."). Note,
however, that the definition of "State" is more limited for purposes of the removal statute.
28 U.S.C. § 1451 (1994) ("For purposes of this chapter-(1) The term'State courte includes the
Superior Court of the District of Columbia. (2) The term "State" includes the District of
Columbia.").
"'i
Tidewater, 337 U.S. at 600 (opinion of Jackson, J.).
106 See supra notes 882-920 and accompanying text.
1070Tidewater,337 U.S. at 583 (opinion of Jackson, J.).

1066

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:895

be a "State" within the meaning of the Constitution. 7 ' Given the
difficulties of using the latter rationale for Indian tribes, it would be
hard to justify federal court jurisdiction under the Tdewatertheory.
4. Provide for Federal Court Removal and Federal Appellate
Review. A number of commentators have suggested that Congress
should eliminate the ability under National Farmerscollaterally to
attack the jurisdiction of tribal courts in federal district courts and
should instead give the Supreme Court the authority to review the
decisions of tribal courts by writ of certiorari. 72 Of course, one
argument in support of such a proposal is that Congress and the
Supreme Court are unlikely to allow tribal court jurisdiction to
expand absent some federal check on their exercise of authority. 7 3
Indeed, as demonstrated above, much of the Supreme Court's recent
jurisprudence shrinking the jurisdiction of the tribal courts seems
to be motivated by the lack of a means of removing cases from tribal
to federal courts and
the lack of federal court review of the decisions
10 74
of tribal courts.

Congress can easily amend the removal statute to allow for the
removal from tribal to federal courts of cases falling within the
original jurisdiction of the federal courts in a manner akin to the
current provision allowing for removal from state to federal court. 1075
Under such a scheme, federal question cases such as Nevada v.
Hicks1 71 could be removed to federal court. As demonstrated above,
'01' Id. at 625-26 (Rutledge, J., concurring).
"2 See Enforcement of the Indian Civil Rights Act: HearingBefore the U.S. Comm'n on
Civil Rights, 100th Cong., 2d Seas. 81-82 (1988) (remarks of Professor Robert N. Clinton);
Reynolds, supra note 27, at 601 ("A proposal for reviewing tribal court decisions by writ of
certiorari is more respectful of the sovereignty and independence of the tribal court system,
yet still cognizant of the need for some ultimate check on the exercise of tribal sovereign
powers."); Laurie Reynolds, Exhaustion of Tribal Remedies: Extolling Tribal Sovereignty
While ExpandingFederalJurisdiction,73 N.C.L.REV. 1089,1154 (1995) (endorsing Supreme
Court review of tribal court decisions because it would end "insulation" of some tribal courts
while maintaining careful balance "between respectfor tribal sovereignty and the overarching
principle of judicial review than the current exhaustion doctrine").
1023 See Reynolds, supranote 1072, at 1154 ("Moreover, complete insulation of tribal court
decisions from all federal judicial review will preclude meaningful expansion and enhancement of tribal court powers. Congress and the federal courts... are unlikely to allow tribal
courts to exercise significant coercive power over nonmembers without the check of ultimate
federal review.").
1074 See supra notes 498.603 and accompanying text.
'07" See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1994) (setting forth general requirements for removal).
'0'8 121 S. Ct. 2304 (2001).
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Congress has historically and currently provides for removal from
local territorial to federal territorial courts in cases falling within
the original jurisdiction of Article III district courts, and there is no
reason why Congress cannot do the same in the case of tribal
0 77

courts.

1

As to providing for appellate review of tribal court decisions, one
commentator doubts that Congress would enact such a proposal,
reasoning that Congress is unlikely to take measures that would
add to the Supreme Court's already heavy workload. 1 171 However,
as has been demonstrated above, Congress could create a nonArticle III federal court to hear such appeals, or alternatively, it
could vest the existing federal courts of appeals with such jurisdiction. Since Indian tribes are scattered throughout the nation,
Congress could vest each of the federal courts of appeals with
jurisdiction to review the decisions of tribal courts located within the
circuit, thus preventing an overload on any one court of appeals and
providing an appellate forum that is geographically proximate to the
respective reservations. Moreover, to prevent overloading, the
courts of appeals could be given the ability to review such decisions
by discretionary writ of certiorari, as in the case of the Ninth
1 79
Circuit's review of Guam, instead of through mandatory appeal. 0
Alternatively, they could be vested with mandatory appellate
080
jurisdiction over only certain matters.
There is no question that a non-Article III appellate court created
by Congress could hear appeals of all cases from tribal courts and
that the Supreme Court and the federal courts of appeals could hear
appeals on matters falling within the Article III categories of
jurisdiction. However, it is less clear whether the Supreme Court
and the federal courts of appeal could hear appeals involving
disputes between non-diverse citizens (including an Indian versus
a non-Indian) arising under tribal law. While territorial law can be

'7

See supra notes 921-1009 and accompanying text.

os See Robert Laurence, Martinez, OliphantandFederalCourtReview of Tribal Activity
Under the Indian Civil Rights Act, 10 CAMPBELL L. REV. 411, 431 n.88 (1988) ("I judge the
chance that Congress would ever add to the Supreme Coures workload by allowing certiorari
to be sought from several hundred tribal courts to be approximately zero.").
1019 48 U.S.C. § 1424-2 (1994).

'm Cf 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1994) (providing for mandatory Supreme Court review of
decisions of three-judge district courts).
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deemed to "arise under" federal law for Article III purposes, in
interpreting the Double Jeopardy Clause,""8 l the Court has drawn
a distinction between the territories and Indian tribes that might
suggest that laws enacted by territorial governments "arise under"
federal law, while those enacted by Indian tribes do not.
In United States v. Wheeler,0 8 2 the Court held that the Double
Jeopardy Clause did not bar prosecution of an Indian in federal
court under a federal criminal statute when he had been previously
convicted in a tribal court of a lesser included offense arising out of
the same incident."8 3 Previously, the Court had held that a
prosecution in a territorial court barred a subsequent prosecution in
a federal court and vice-versa. 01 84 The Wheeler Court distinguished
the relationship between the territorial and federal governments
from that between the tribal and federal governments, reasoning
that although territorial governments are creations of Congress that
act as mere arms of the federal government, 8 5 tribes exercise their
power to punish tribal offenders as part of their retained sovereignty.0 8 6 However, this distinction would seem only to require the
identification of a different original federal ingredient, and not to
say that no original ingredient exists. In every case involving

U.S. CONST. amend. V.
'°32 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
10 Id. at 313-14.
1
See Puerto Rico v. Shell Co., 302 U.S. 253,264 (1937) C'Both the territorial and federal
laws and the courts, whether exercising federal or local jurisdiction, are creations emanating
from the same sovereignty .... Prosecution under one of the laws in the appropriate court,
necessarily, will bar a prosecution under the other law in another court.") (citing Grafton v.
United States, 206 U.S. 333, 352 (1907)).
See Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 318.21.
The "dual sovereignty" concept does not apply, however, in every instance
where successive cases are brought by nominally different prosecuting
entities... successive prosecutions by federal and territorial courts are
impermissible because such courts are "creations emanating from the
same sovereignty." ... [A] territorial government is entirely the creation
of Congress, "and its judicial tribunals exert all their powers by authority
of the United States." ...
When a territorial government enacts and
enforces criminal laws to govern its inhabitants, it is not acting as an
independent political community like a State, but as "an agency of the
federal government." ... Thus, in a federal territory and the Nation, as
in a city and a State, "[t]here is but one system of government, or of laws
operating within [its] limits."
Id.
'08 Id. at 328.
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territorial law, the original federal ingredient that exists in every
case is "Did Congress vest the territorial government with authority
to enact such a law?" "° 7 In the case of Indian tribes, the question is
the reverse: since tribes retain their inherent sovereignty unless
diminished or extinguished by Congress, an original ingredient in
every case involving tribal law would be "Has Congress diminished
or extinguished the tribe's authority to enact such a law?," or "Does
the tribe have, as a matter of federal law, legislative jurisdiction to
enact such a law?" Thus, because an original ingredient could be
found in every case, it would appear as though the existing Article
III courts could exercise appellate jurisdiction over all cases
adjudicated in the tribal courts, thus providing a measure of
protection against local court bias.
Indeed, such an original federal ingredient would seem to justify
originalArticle III jurisdiction over all disputes arising in Indian
Country. In every such case, the question would arise whether
tribal law or state law would govern the dispute. Since the question
of whether a state or a tribe has legislative jurisdiction over a
particular cause of action arising in Indian Country is itself a
federal question, all such disputes would fall within the Article III
"arising under" jurisdiction of the federal district courts located in
the states.
5. ProtectiveJurisdiction,FederalIncorporationof Tribal Law,
and Federal Common Law. As discussed above, the theory of
protective jurisdiction provides that Congress's (arguably) greater
power under Article I to enact substantive law to govern a particular
dispute includes the (arguably) lesser power to allow local law to
govern but instead to provide a federal forum in which to adjudicate
such a dispute. 8 8 Although there are questions about Congress's
ability to legislate the rules of decision for every dispute involving
a resident of the District of Columbia or the territories, 10 89 it is

10" See supranotes 989-1009 and accompanying text.
,o8 See supranotes 842-68 and accompanying text.
"~ Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 27, at 580 n.217.
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relatively clear that Congress's plenary power under the Indian
Commerce Clause. 90 is far broader than its powers under the
Territory and District Clauses." 9' Congress's power under these
clauses is not limited by geography, giving Congress the authority
to enact substantive law governing, for example, every contract
entered into by an Indian and any tort involving an Indian,
regardless of where geographically such disputes arose.'0 92 Accordingly, Congress has the authority to enact the governing law to
adjudicate such disputes.0 9 " Thus under Wechsler's theory of
protective jurisdiction, it could take the lesser step of vesting the
existing Article III courts with jurisdiction over all such disputes.
Even under the Mishkin version of the theory of protective jurisdiction, Congress's extensive involvement in the field of Indian affairs
would seem to make this the sort of federal program that it could
protect.0 94 The theory of protective jurisdiction has never been
approved by the Supreme Court; however, to the extent it is a viable
theory, the case of suits involving Indians appears to be a perfect fit.
As demonstrated above, there are more doctrinally sound ways
in which Congress can effectively achieve the same result. Rather
than specifically legislating the rules of decision for all tort,
contract, and other like disputes arising in Indian Country and for

There has been considerable speculation over whether Congress possesses
the power to legislate rules of decision for suits involving citizens of the
District of Columbia ....
Congress' power to legislate for the District
readily sustains any federal substantive rules designed to govern
transactions between District citizens and state citizens within the
District. Only when transactions outside the District between District
citizens and state citizens are at issue does the existence of federal lawmaking competence become problematic. These problems become
especially thorny when the federal rule is applied to a case involving a
District citizen who moved to the District after the transaction which is
the subject of the litigation took place.
Id.
U.S. CONST. art. I,
'09' Id. c. 17.
'Wo

§ 8, cl. 3.

"' See Dick v. United States, 208 U.S. 340, 357 (1908) CCongress has the power to say
with whom, and on what terms [Indians] shall deal and what articles shall be contraband.');
United States v. 43 Gallons of Whiskey, 93 U.S. 188, 197-98 (1876) (holding Congress may not
only ban unlicensed sale and production of liquor in "Indian Country," but also extend ban
to neighboring jurisdictions).
1o9 See supra notes 842-46 and accompanying text.
1094 See supra notes 847-51 and accompanying text.
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all disputes involving Indian tribes, tribal entities, and tribal
members arising elsewhere, Congress could simply incorporate state
and tribal law as a matter of federal law. For example, Congress
could provide that when a dispute arises on a reservation, tribal law
will be incorporated as the federal rule of decision, and when it
arises off a reservation, state law will be incorporated as the federal
rule of decision. The result would be the same as if Congress simply
vested the federal courts with jurisdiction over such disputes except
that, as a result of the fiction that Congress has carefully considered
the various state and tribal laws prior to adopting them, there is no
Article III problem and no need to invoke the untried theory of
protective jurisdiction.
Alternatively, Congress could authorize the federal courts to
create federal common law to govern disputes arising in Indian
Country or involving tribal entities or tribal members. The federal
courts could either adopt local tort and contract law as a matter of
federal common law or create their own body of rules to apply
uniformly across the country. In any event, this alternative likewise
reaches the same result without raising any Article III concerns.
6. Create an Indian Sovereign ImmunitiesAct. This Article has
identified two problems with respect to tribal sovereign immunity.
First, when a tribe is sued in state court, it is forced to litigate its
federal defense of sovereigrimmunity in that forum because of the
well-pleaded complaint rule." 5 This creates a potential "biased
forum" problem, especially when a state citizen or a state entity is
bringing suit against the tribe. Second, tribal sovereign immunity
can create a "no forum" scenario because the only exceptions to
tribal sovereign immunity are waiver by the tribe or abrogation by
the federal government. Since the defense applies in state, federal,
and tribal courts, those injured by tribes may have no form of
judicial relief.
Since tribal sovereign immunity is analogous to foreign sovereign
immunity, 0 9 Congress could enact something akin to the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA'), and allow for removal to federal
court whenever suit is brought against an Indian tribe. Like the

19

See supra notes 213-22 and accompanying text.

Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 759 (1998).
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FSIA, such an act could specify those instances in which an
exception to sovereign immunity would arise. 1197 If the goal is
merely to provide a neutral forum in which the tribe can adjudicate
its defense of sovereign immunity, an exception to sovereign
immunity need only be made in the act where there is waiver by the
tribe or express abrogation by Congress. This would allow suits to
be brought in federal court whenever a tribe is sued, thus effectively
addressing the biased forum problem. 98 If the goal is to go
further-to ensure that tribes are subject to suit in connection with
their non-sovereign activities--exceptions could likewise be made
for cases involving commercial activity by the sovereign entity'0 99
and noncommercial torts committed by the sovereign entity, as in
the FSIA. 100 Moreover, when the tribe itself brings the suit, it could
be subjected to counterclaims arising out of the same transaction or
occurrence or to other counterclaims to the extent that they do not
seek relief in excess of the amount claimed by the tribe in its suit.1 01
Just as under the FSIA, such suits would be deemed to "arise under"
federal law for Article III purposes since, at the outset of every case,
the federal court would be required to determine whether the
federal right of tribal sovereign immunity bars suit being brought
against the Indian tribe."02
V. CONCLUSION

This Article has identified two significant problems in Indian
Law involving judicial jurisdiction. First is the "no forum" problem
-7'

See 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (1994) (setting forth general exceptions to immunity of foreign

states).
'

Cf. id. § 1605(a)(1) (setting forth exception to foreign sovereign immunity in case of

waiver).
1- Cf. id.

§ 1605(a)(2).

Cf. id. § 1605(a)(5) (setting forth exemption to foreign sovereign immunity in case of
noncommercial tortious acts or omissions of foreign sovereign).
"00

"0' Id. § 1607(b)-(c).

Alternatively, Congress could abrogate tribal sovereign immunity under specific
circumstances, but only in tribalas opposed to state or federal court. Although the Supreme
1102

Court has held that Congress lacks the ability to abrogate a state's sovereign immunity in the
state's own courts (except in narrowly defined circumstances), Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706,
754 (1999), that holding is based on the 1 1th Amendment, and is thus not applicable to tribal
sovereign immunity. Of course, such a proposal would solve the "no forum" problem but
would expand the "biased forum" problem.
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in which no court has jurisdiction over disputes involving Indian
tribes, tribal entities, or tribal members. Second is the "biased
forum" problem in which a state or a tribal court has jurisdiction
over a dispute, but the possibility of local bias poses a substantial
risk that litigants will not be treated fairly. By examining the ways
in which Congress has addressed the "no forum" and "biased forum"
problem in other circumstances, this Article has proposed ways in
which Congress can, consistent with the strictures of Article III,
address the "no forum" and "biased forum" problems in Indian Law.
To be sure, while this Article has tried to suggest ways in which
the problems can be solved in a manner that safeguards tribal
sovereignty, all of the proposed solutions will, to some extent,
involve a diminishment in tribal sovereignty. On the other hand, a
failure to find a solution to these problems will only mean a
continued attack on tribal courts by the Supreme Court and the
lower federal and state courts that will permanently and seriously
erode tribal sovereignty. If tribes are unwilling to allow Congress
to make measured reductions in tribal sovereignty, they risk a
steady erosion of their sovereignty at the hands of the federal and
state courts.

